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Survival of Rights Under The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty: Withdrawal
and the Continuing Right of
International Atomic Energy
Agency Safeguards
A roNio F. PEREZ*
On February 25, 1993, the Board of Governors of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency1 (IAEA or Agency) adopted a reso-
lution calling upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK or North Korea) to cooperate with the IAEA and accept
its request to inspect two sites at Yongbyon. 2 The Agency's Secre-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America. A.B. 1982, Harvard College; J.D. 1985, Columbia University. I would like to
thank the Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America, for the generous
financial support it provided for research for this Article, and Chris Mohr (Columbus
School of Law, Class of 1996) for his invaluable assistance. I also extend my appreciation
to Professor David Koplow of Georgetown University School of Law for his thoughtful
comments on an earlier draft. Although the arguments expressed in this Article draw in
part on my experience as an attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department
of State, none of my views should be understood to represent, directly or indirectly, the
positions of the Department of State or any other agency of the U.S. Government. It goes
without saying that the Article's defects are my responsibility alone.
1. The IAEA was established by international agreement for the purpose of advancing
peaceful cooperation in the international development of nuclear energy. Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093,
276 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 29, 1957) [hereinafter IAEA Statute]. The Board
of Governors, which meets several times a year and may also meet on an urgent basis, is
the principal policy-making organ of the IAEA for most management issues. See David
Fischer & Paul C. Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal 11-12 (1985).
2. Report on the Implementation of the Agreement Between the Agency and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection
with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. GOV2636
(Feb. 25, 1993), reprinted in Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
Compliance with Arms Limitation and Disarmament Agreements: Note by the Secretary
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tariat suspected, and the Board of Governors agreed, that North
Korea had concealed at those sites nuclear material subject to
IAEA safeguards, and that perhaps North Korea had engaged
covertly in the separation of significant quantities of weapons-
grade plutonium.3 On March 12,1993, the DPRK, pursuant to arti-
cle X(1) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons (NPT or Treaty),4 gave notice to the United Nations Security
Council of its intent to withdraw from the Treaty effective three
months later.5 On April 1, after the DPRK refused to comply with
the Agency's request for a special inspection within the time frame
set by its February 25 resolution, the Board of Governors deter-
mined that it was unable to verify whether North Korea had
diverted nuclear material subject to safeguards from peaceful pur-
poses. Thus, it found the DPRK in noncompliance with obligations
under its agreement with the Agency for the application of safe-
General, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Annex 3, at 52, U.N. Doc. A148/133 (S/25556) (1993)
[hereinafter February 1993 Note by the Secretary General].
3. Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on
Behalf of the Board of Governors to the Security Council and to the General Assembly of
the United Nations on the Non-Compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
with the Agreement Between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC 403) and the Agency's Inability to Verify the Non-
Diversion of Material Required to be Safeguarded, reprinted in February 1993 Note by the
Secretary General, supra note 2, at 3, 5 [hereinafter February 1993 Director General's
Report]. See IAEA Safeguards: Aims, Limitations, Achievements, IAEA Doc. SGIINF/4,
at 25-28 (1983) [hereinafter IAEA Safeguards: Aims, Limitations, Achievements].
4. 'fTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, art. X, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. 483, 493, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 175 (entered into force Mar. 5,
1970) [hereinafter NPT].
The NPT establishes a global regime dividing states into two categories: nuclear-weapon
states (NWS), which may possess nuclear weapons; and nonnuclear-weapon states
(NNWS), which undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. See NPT,
supra, arts. I, II, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171. Under the Treaty, a state may
adhere as a NWS only if it has detonated a nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967.
Id. art. XI, 21 U.S.T. at 494, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175.
5. Letter Dated 12 March 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/25405 (Mar. 12, 1993).
Article X(1) of the NPT provides:
[e]ach Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw
from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It
shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the
United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall
include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized
its supreme interests.
NPT, supra note 4, art. X, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175.
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guards in North Korea pursuant to the NPT.6 Thereafter, on May 1
the Depositaries to the NPT-the United States, the United King-
dom, and the Russian Federation-called on the DPRK to
"retract"7 its withdrawal, followed on May 11 by the Security
Council's unanimous call for the DPRK to "reconsider"8 its deci-
sion to withdraw from the NPT. On June 11, after intense negotia-
tions with the United States, the DPRK purported to "suspend" its
withdrawal from the NPT and to modify unilaterally its obligation
pursuant to the NPT to accept safeguards on all its nuclear
material. 9
6. February 1993 Director General's Report, supra note 3, at 2; see also infra note 45
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the relevant provisions of NPT safeguards
agreements, see infra notes 22-25.
7. NPT Co-Depositaries Statement, reprinted in Letter Dated 1 April 1993 from the
Representatives of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/25515 (Apr. 2,1993)
[hereinafter Depositaries' Statement].
8. S.C. Res. 825, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3212d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doe. S1RES1825 (1993)
[hereinafter Resolution 825].
9. Report Dated 16 September 1993 by the Director General on the Implementation of
the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [hereinafter
September 1993 Director General's Report], in Note by the Secretary General, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., Appendix, para. 25, U.N. Doc. S/26456 (Sept. 17, 1993) [hereinafter
September 1993 Note by the Secretary General]; also reprinted in Text of U.S.-North
Korean Declaration of June 11, 1993, Arms Control Today, July-Aug. 1993, at 19. The NPT
explicitly provides for withdrawal. NPT, supra note 4, art. X, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729
U.N.T.S. at 175. It does not expressly provide that a notice of withdrawal can be revoked
or suspended. Nonetheless, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties expressly
permits only the "revocation" of a notice of withdrawal, although it does not expressly
prohibit suspension of a notice of withdrawal. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
concluded May 23, 1969, art. 68, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 348 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
The United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, although it considers it to
reflect customary international law. See generally Richard D. Kearney & Robert E.
Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 Am. J. Int'l L 495 (1970). Because the DPRK
suspended its notice of withdrawal only a day before it would have become irrevocable,
there remains the somewhat theoretical question whether, if the DPRK were to revoke its
suspension of its notice of withdrawal, that action would result in its withdrawal on the
very next day or instead function as a new notice of withdrawal effective only after the
expiration of the three month period provided for in article X(1). The question might be
of practical significance to this Article's proposition that the duty to comply with a special
inspection requested while a state is a party to the NPT survives that state's withdrawal
from the NPT; provided that, after revocation of the DPRK's suspension of its notice of
withdrawal, the IAEA were to request, after expiration of the period remaining on the
original notice of withdrawal but before the expiration of a new three-month notice period,
a special inspection exceeding the scope of its initial request. Such a request might also
trigger a duty of compliance that would survive withdrawal from the NPT.
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This nearly-consummated attempt to withdraw from the NPT,
virtually on the eve of the conference of parties that will meet in
April 1995 to decide the fate of the Treaty after the expiration of its
initial twenty-five year term,10 requires a critical re-examination of
the effect of withdrawal from the NPT on the safeguards obliga-
tions established through the Treaty. It appears to be the DPRK's
position that withdrawal from the NPT would effectively terminate
the legal basis for international efforts to determine whether the
DPRK, while an NPT party, had engaged in unsafeguarded
nuclear-weapons related activities." It is the thesis of this Article
that there are principled grounds for maintaining that, on the con-
trary, the IAEA's right to safeguards pursuant to a special inspec-
tion requested before withdrawal from the NPT takes effect
survives withdrawal from the Treaty. If correct, this proposal
would imply that the dispute between the parties to both the NPT
and the IAEA and North Korea would still be framed as a legal
dispute amenable to principled, legal solutions, even after with-
drawal. The DPRK would owe a continuing obligation to the
international community, and this obligation would provide a legal
foundation in support of the political rationale justifying Security
Council action, under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
12
for international sanctions against North Korea. 3
Moreover, by interpreting article X(1) of the NPT as preserving,
rather than extinguishing, special inspection rights established
prior to withdrawal, North Korea may have less of an incentive to
withdraw from the Treaty. Although the strengthening of the NPT
under this interpretation may make adherence more costly for sig-
10. Article X(2) of the NPT provides: "TWenty-five years after the entry into force of
the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in
force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This
decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Teaty." NPT, supra note 4, art.
X, para. 2, 21 U.S.T. at 494, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175. A conference is scheduled to convene in
New York in April 1995. Interview: Thomas Graham: Preparing for the 1995 NPT
Conference, Arms Control Today, July/Aug. 1994, at 10.
11. See infra notes 51-53.
12. Under the United Nations Charter, chapter VII, and articles 25 and 48, the Security
Council may require DPRK compliance with its legal obligations only if it finds the
situation to constitute a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."
U.N. Charter art. 39.
13. In the case of Iraq, for example, the fact that Iraq breached its NPT obligations
appears to have substantially strengthened the case for imposing a special regime
prohibiting Iraq from engaging in a broad range of nuclear activities. See S.C. Res. 687,
U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 6, paras. 12-13, U.N. Doe S/RES/687 (1991)
[hereinafter S.C. Resolution 687].
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natory states, the confidence-building functions served by the NPT
can be enhanced by weeding out those states whose adherence
would be deterred by the proposal advanced in this Article.
In developing its thesis, this Article will review the history and
purpose of IAEA safeguards and their relation to the NPT, and
then show that special inspections in the DPRK represent a transi-
tional moment for the IAEA safeguards system. This Article will
then consider two different arguments in favor of a continuing right
to inspections even against a state exercising its right to withdraw
from the NPT to escape its safeguards obligations: the first identi-
fies circumstances under which a state would not have the right to
withdraw from the NPT; and the second asserts that the effects of
withdrawal from the NPT do not include the extinction of the safe-
guards obligations, or at least certain critical safeguards duties
established through NPT adherence. The Article demonstrates
that it is impossible to identify any meaningful and principled limi-
tation to a NPT party's right to withdraw. It then argues that,
although the IAEA's right to apply safeguards with respect to the
nuclear activities of the withdrawing state terminates with with-
drawal, a right to conduct any special inspection requested before
withdrawal relating to suspect activities that occurred while the
state was still a party to the NPT should survive withdrawal. This
argument is framed in terms not only of general principles of treaty
law articulated in the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties,
which, for the most part, represents a codification of customary
international law, but also in terms of the object and purpose of the
NPT and safeguards agreements entered into by states to fulfill
their NPT safeguards obligations. Finally, this Article recommends
that an interpretation to this effect be reflected in the final docu-
ments of the conference to be held by the parties to the NPT in
1995 for the review and extension of the Treaty.
I. TBE IAEA SAFEGUARDS REGMM AND THE NPT IN
HISTORICAL CoNTExr
North Korea's frontal attack on the NPT, and the possibility that
it may lead to the unravelling of the international nonproliferation
regime, poses challenges for President Clinton similar to those that
confronted President Kennedy. Indeed, John Kennedy voiced his
fear, perhaps even resignation, that nuclear proliferation was man-
19941
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kind's tragic destiny.14 In the years prior to the negotiation of the
NPT, widespread acquisition of nuclear weapons seemed inevitable
to statesmen and strategists alike. Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser
to President Kennedy's Secretary of State Dean Rusk, recently
recalled the pessimism shared by academics in the early 1960's
when he recounted that members of a Harvard-Massachusetts
Institute of Technology study group on arms control, including
himself, placed bets in sealed envelopes on how many nuclear pow-
ers would exist at the close of the decade. When Harvard Profes-
sor Albert Carnasale opened these envelopes a quarter century
later, he discovered that not a single expert had projected fewer
than twenty nuclear powers by 1970.15
History, however, at least in the short term, did not turn out the
way President Kennedy and the experts feared. After the five per-
manent members of the United Nations Security Council crossed
the nuclear threshold, only a handful of other states realized their
nuclear dreams; President Kennedy's nuclear nightmare.16 These
states-Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa-developed
nuclear weapons programs covertly but never illegally. None
adhered to the NPT or a comparable international legal obliga-
tion17 while pursuing an active weapons program. Indeed, with the
exception of South Africa, which publicized its nuclear program
after adhering to the NPT and reversing its nuclear weapons capa-
bility, none of these states has been prepared to declare publicly
14. At a press conference on March 21, 1963, President Kennedy stated: "I am haunted
by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful there may be ten nuclear powers...
and by 1975, fifteen or twenty." Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power 477
(1993) (quoting Pub. Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1961-1963, Mar. 21,
1963).
15. Abram Chayes, Efforts to Control Weapons Proliferation: Possible Legal Regimes
or a Quixotic Effort? 86 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 513, 523 (1992).
16. Michael Cusack, Where the Bombs Are, 124 Scholastic Update 4 (Feb. 24, 1992).
See generally Mitchell Reiss, The Last Nuclear Summit, 17 Wash. Q. 5 (1994); John M.
Deutch, The New Nuclear Threats, 71 Foreign Aff. 120 (1992).
17. States may undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons through adherence to regional
regimes. See, e.g., Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,
opened for signature Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 (supplemented by
Additional Protocol I, 22 U.S.T. 786, 634 U.N.T.S. 360, and Additional Protocol II, 22
U.S.T. 75, 634 U.N.T.S. 634) [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco]. Under the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, Latin American states are precluded from permitting the deployment in their
territory of nuclear weapons under the control of a third party, thus establishing, unlike the
NPT, a so-called "nuclear free zone." See also South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,
opened for signature Aug. 6, 1985 (entered into force Dec. 11, 1986), reprinted in 24 LL.M.
1440 (1985). By contrast, under the NPT, a NNWS may permit the deployment on its
territory of nuclear weapons under the control of a NWS. See generally Mason Willrich,
Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control 71-77 (1969).
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that it has ever possessed nuclear weapons.' 8 Thus, for nearly the
entire twenty-five years of the NPT's initial term, no state did any
real damage to the emerging expectation that broader adherence
to the NPT would strengthen, rather than undercut, international
security.
How did this surprising set of circun~stances transpire? One crit-
ical factor was the role of IAEA safeguards. For the life of the
NPT, safeguards have served as the principal tangible expression of
the Treaty. Both the NPT and the safeguards trace their origins to
a policy adopted by President Eisenhower, which he called "Atoms
for Peace." This policy discouraged nuclear weapons proliferation
by establishing a framework for non-nuclear states to receive the
benefits of the peaceful uses of the atom without needing to
develop independent nuclear programs.19 Similarly, article IV(2)
of the NPT establishes a duty of nuclear cooperation,2 subject only
to the specific obligation stated in article 1H(2) not to export
"source or special fissionable material" or "equipment or material
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or produc-
tion of special fissionable material" to any nonnuclear-weapon
state (NNWS) party, unless such items are subject to safeguards2 1
Article III(1) of the NPT requires NNWS parties to accept these
18. Phillip van NieKerk, South Africa Had 6 A-Bombs: De Klerk Says Arms Were
Dismantled in '90, Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 1993, at Al.
19. President's Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Pub. Papers 813 (Dec. 8,1953) (Dwight D. Eisenhower).
See generally Lawrence Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and World
Nuclear Order 56-76 (1987).
20. Article IV(2) provides that:
[a]l parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate
in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the
Treaty in the position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or
together with other States or international organizations to the further
development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with
due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
NPT, supra note 4, art. IV, para. 2, 21 U.S.T. at 489-90, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
21. The terms "source material" and "special fissionable material" were drawn from the
LAEA Statute. IAEA Statute, supra note 1, art. XX, paras. 1 , 3, 8 U.S.T. at 112. 276
U.N.T.S. at 38. In general terms, source (or so-called "indirect use") material is material
capable of being used to produce special material, and special (or so-called "direct use")
material is material readily usable for nuclear explosive purposes. See Scheinman, The
International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 19, at 166 (Table 5-3). The AEA
definitions list the specific materials the Agency has concluded meet these implicit criteria
and authorize the Board of Governors (although the Board has never exercised this
authority) to revise the list from time to time.
1994]
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safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities.22 Accordingly,
the objective of IAEA safeguards, as stated in article III(1) of the
NPT, is "verification [of NNWS's obligation] with a view to
preventing diversion" of nuclear material to nuclear explosive
purposes.23
22. Article III(1) provides:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the reaty undertakes to accept
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the
International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the
exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed
under this Teaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures
for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source
or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in
any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards
required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under
its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
NPT, supra note 4, art. III, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 487-88,729 U.N.T.S. at 172. Indeed, article
111(4) requires NNWS parties to discharge this obligation by commencing the negotiation
of an agreement to this effect with the IAEA within 180 days of their adherence to the
NPT, and to complete such negotiations within 180 days after their commencement. The
term "principal nuclear facility" is defined in paragraph 78 of The Agency's Safeguards
System (1965, as provisionally extended in 1966 and 1968), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/66/Rev.
2 (1968) [hereinafter INFCIRC/66].
23. NPT, supra note 4, art. III, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. In its
own explanation of the safeguards system, the IABA has construed this formulation to
include providing assurance of nondiversion, warning to the international community when
it is unable to verify that there has been no diversion, deterrence of diversion by the risk
of its early detection, and the imposition of sanctions. See IAEA Safeguards: Aims,
Limitations, Achievements, supra note 3, at 21-24; see also D.M. Edwards, International
Legal Aspect of Safeguards and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 33 Int'l &
Comp. L. Q. 1, 11-14 (1984) (former Director of the IAEA Legal Division, 1977-79). In
particular, the IAEA has drawn attention to the language of paragraphs 2, 19, and 28 of
the standard agreement for safeguards pursuant to article III of the NPT approved by the
IAEA Board of Governors, which was first published in the form of negotiating
instructions to the IAEA's Secretariat as The Structure and Content of Agreements
Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153 (June 1972) [hereinafter
INFCIRC/153] and later published as The Standard Text of Safeguards Agreements in
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Annex A,
IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/276 (1974) [hereinafter INFCIRC276]. Located in Part I of
INFCIRC/153, which comprises the framework of the agreement, paragraph 2 establishes
the IAEA's "right and obligation" to apply safeguards "for the exclusive purpose of
verifying" that nuclear material is not "diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive
purposes." Located in Part II, which details the safeguards concept developed by the
IAEA specifically for the purposes of satisfying the requirement of the NPT, paragraph 28
provides that the "objective of safeguards procedures ... is the timely detection of
diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes
[Vol. 34:749
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The IAEA "safeguards" system essentially consists of (i) the
provision of information by the safeguarded state, particularly the
state's own declaration of the quantity and location of safeguard-
able nuclear material, coupled with (ii) on-site inspections by the
IAEA.2 While each safeguards agreement between the IAEA
unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection." INFCIRC153,
supra, para. 28. Paragraph 19 provides that, in a case in which the IAEA is unable to verify
that there has not been a diversion of nuclear material, the Director General of the IAEA
must so report to the Board of Governors and the Board, in turn, may impose any of the
sanctions and make any of the reports to the Security Council and General Assembly
contemplated by article XIC of the IAEA Statute, if it has found that a state has not
complied with its obligations under a safeguards agreement. Id. para. 19. The sanctions
contemplated, however, involve at most suspension of the privileges of membership in the
IAEA. See also IAEA Statute, supra note 1, art. XIX, 8 U.S.T. at 1111, 276 U.N.T.S. at 36,
38. Ultimately, the IAEA imposed this sanction on the DPRK, with the DPRK
responding tit-for-tat by withdrawing from the IAEA. See R. Jeffrey Smith & T.R. Reid,
North Korea Quits U.N. Nuclear Body- Move May Add Urgency to Sanctions Plan, Wash.
Post, June 14, 1994, at Al.
24. Paragraph 29 of INFCIRC153 provides that "material accountancy shall be used as
a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as
important complementary features." INFCIRC/153, supra note 23. Safeguards, roughly
put then, are a bean-counting exercise involving the provision of information by the
safeguarded state and on-site inspection by the IAEA to verify the location of nuclear
material. The "accountancy" component of safeguards refers to the obligation of the
safeguarded state to keep accurate and complete records of nuclear material subject to
safeguards. Paragraphs 59-69 of INFCIRC/153 provide for detailed reports by the
safeguarded state to the IAEA; notably including, pursuant to paragraph 62, an initial
report, or "declaration," which establishes a baseline for material accounting. Based on
these reports "and the results of its verification activities," the [AEA maintains an
inventory of safeguarded nuclear material. Id. para. 41. Verification activities specified in
the agreement include routine, ad hoc, and special inspections. Id. paras. 71-73. "Routine"
inspections are limited to access to "strategic points" negotiated in the subsidiary
arrangements between the safeguarded state and the IAEA for implementation of the
agreement. Id. para. 76(c). Ad hoc inspections, which are primarily conducted to verify
the initial report, id. paras. 71(a) and (b), authorize access in such cases, "and until such
time as the strategic points have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements .... to any
location where the initial report or any inspections carried out in connection with it
indicate that nuclear material is present," id. para. 76(a). When, pursuant to paragraph
73(b), the IAEA "considers that the information made available" to it "is not adequate for
the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under" the agreement, it may "obtain access, in
agreement with... [the safeguarded state], to information or locations in addition to those
specified" for routine or ad hoc inspections. Id. para. 77(b). The scope of inspections
includes, among other things, "containment," which allows for the application of locks and
seals on nuclear storage areas to prevent movement of nuclear material, and
"surveillance," which involves human and remote observation of specified activities at
nuclear facilities. Id. para. 74(d); Edwards, International Legal Aspects of Safeguards,
supra note 23, at 6.
The core idea of the safeguards system is to maintain "the continuity of safeguards" on
each atom of nuclear material subject to safeguards under the safeguards agreement, even
as it undergoes transformation into different chemical forms upon irradiation, until it is in a
chemical or physical form not amenable to weapons-related applications. See Scheinman,
1994]
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and the relevant state, pursuant to article III of the NPT, confers
upon the IAEA the power to request a special inspection of loca-
tions in addition to those agreed to by the safeguarded state for
other normal inspections,2 historically the IAEA has never sought
to exercise this right to search for undeclared nuclear material.26
Thus, the balance between assurance provided by the safeguarded
state and verification conducted by the IAEA had, in the imple-
mentation of IAEA safeguards, tilted so far toward assurance that
safeguards could not reasonably be said to provide a meaningful
measure of verification.27 In sum, the seeds of the IAEA's failure
supra note 19, at 21, 25-26. This atom-tracking approach grew out of pre-NPT safeguards
agreements, which apply safeguards on all nuclear material in a state, yet only on specific
nuclear material or facilities, and thus require principles for identifying whether material
subject to safeguards remains subject to them despite its transmutation into another
chemical form. The concept of safeguards "pursuit," which describes the continuing
application of safeguards on subsequent generations of nuclear material produced from
safeguarded nuclear material, is an essential feature of the continuity principle in such
agreements. See id. at 128.
25. INFCIRC/153, supra note 23, paras. 18, 73, & 77. The IAEA is not a party to the
NPT and, thus, is not legally bound to negotiate agreements with NPT parties along the
lines set forth in article II of the NPT. Nonetheless, there is a substantial overlap in
membership between the NPT and IAEA, and the IAEA responded promptly to the
requirements of the NPT by convening a special committee, chaired by Kurt Waldheim, to
negotiate a new model safeguards agreement that would satisfy the requirements of the
NPT. See Edwards, supra note 24, at 11; Paul C. Szasz, The Law and Practices of the
International Atomic Energy Agency 1970-1980, at 289-92 (Legal Series No. 7, Supp. 1,
1993) [hereinafter Law and Practices of the IAEA].
26. Lawrence Scheinman, Lessons from Post-War Iraq for the Full-Scope Safeguards
Regime, Arms Control Today, Apr. 1993 at 3; North Korea at the Crossroads: Nuclear
Renegade or Regional Partner?, Arms Control Today, May 1993, at 3 (news conference
with nonproliferation specialists) (Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.).
27. The distinction between "assurance" and "verification" regimes is drawn by
Kenneth Abbott in terms of whether a state provides information or a third party itself
gathers the information. Kenneth Abbott, "Trust But Verify": The Production of
Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 Cornell
Int'l L. 1, 4 (1993). Both techniques seek to make available information on the theory
that greater transparency will reduce the risk of suboptimal decision-making by players in
the classical Prisoner's Dilemma or similar strategic games, which bear some similarities to
inter-state conflicts. In such games, lack of information concerning other players'
intentions results in perceived payoffs inducing players to "defect"-that is to say,
breach-rather than "cooperate" or perform their obligations. Incentives to defect,
however, can take two forms: first, an "offensive" form in which defection gives a player
his best outcome and gives the other player his worst; or, second, a "defensive" form in
which defection merely avoids the worst outcome. Id. at 8. Abbott argues that assurance
techniques will ordinarily be used when defensive incentives predominate and verification
techniques will be required where offensive incentives are significant. Id. at 17, 23. In the
arms control context, Abbott postulates that the risk of offensive defection suggests that
assurance techniques of information production, functioning as confidence-building
measures, will be inadequate, and that instead verification techniques will predominate.
Id. at 32. Accordingly, he locates the IAEA squarely in the verification camp. Id. at 34. In
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can be found in the tension implicit in the safeguards regime
between reliance on information voluntarily provided by the safe-
guarded state and intrusive international verification. In short,
between deference to national sovereignty and the requirements of
world order.
Thus, almost as if historically inevitable, in the last several years
revelations concerning the implementation of the NPT have lent
new credibility to President Kennedy's nightmarish vision of wide-
spread nuclear weapons. For example, following the Gulf War in
1990-1991, it became clear that Iraq had come perilously close to
acquiring nuclear weapons during the late 1980's, even though it
was a party to the NPT38 Oddly enough, and perhaps contrary to
popular understanding, the fact that Iraq violated the NPT and its
NPT-safeguards agreement with the IAEA29 did not necessarily
imply that IAEA safeguards in Iraq had failed to meet expected
standards of performance.30 Indeed, the U.S. government appears
to have taken the position that no nuclear material subject to safe-
guards in Iraq was diverted to Iraq's nuclear weapons program.3
In other words, once nuclear material was captured by the IAEA's
safeguards system, it remained subject to international inspection
and supervision. The problem in Iraq, however, was that nuclear
material was present in an entirely parallel but covert nuclear pro-
fact, it appears that whatever the technical possibility it may have had to perform a true
verification function, the historical IAEA safeguards regime's failure to conduct intrusive
inspection under the special inspections rubric suggests it would be more plausible to
characterize IAEA safeguards as a confidence-building or assurance regime. That said, the
logic of Abbot's game-theory analysis suggests that the nuclear non-proliferation "game"
requires more intrusive verification techniques than have hitherto been available. But see
Robert Jervis, Security Regimes in International Regimes 173, 174-75 (Krasner ed. 1983)
(questioning, first, the viability in the security area of establishing regimes capable of
avoiding Prisoners' Dilemma inefficiencies and, second, the relevance in the security
context of the distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" defection).
28. See IAEA Reports to the U.N. Security Council from U.N. Special Commission on
Iraq (1992193), created by S.C. Resolution 687, supra note 13, (discussing in great detail the
Iraqi program).
29. Iraq's breaches of nuclear-related international obligations arguably included the
"manufacture" of a nuclear explosive device in violation of article I of the NPT; the failure
to make "all its peaceful nuclear activities subject to safeguards" in violation of article MI
of the NPT; and the violation of the safeguards treaty with the LAEA through which Iraq's
safeguards obligations under the NPT were to be fulfilled. See S.C. Resolution 637, supra
note 13, at 3.
30. See Eric Chauvistr6, The Implications of IAEA Inspections Under Security Council
Resolution 687, at 26, U.N. Doec. UN/DIR/9216 (1992) (Research Paper No. 11, United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research).
31. See Report to the Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 (1992) (for the year ending Dec. 31, 1991).
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gram completely shielded from the international inspection
regime.32
II. IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN TRANSITION
In 1992, in response to the perceived failure of its safeguards sys-
tem in Iraq, the Agency sought to increase confidence that clandes-
tine nuclear activities would not escape its attention. First, the
Agency paid additional attention to intelligence collection, particu-
larly by collaborating with IAEA member states possessing infor-
mation suggesting that a state may have developed elements of a
nuclear program outside of safeguards.33 Second, when possessed
of such information, the Agency would consider exercising its hith-
erto untapped power to demand access to a facility not previously
admitted by the state to contain nuclear material. 4 Opinion on
whether the IAEA's assertion of these powers is fully sustainable
varies,35 although no state seems to have stated that it would not
32. See Chayes, supra note 15, at 525 (describing how IAEA inspectors visited the
nuclear facility at Al Tarmiya, where a declared research reactor was surrounded only 300
yards away by undeclared calutrons producing weapons-usable uranium, "but neither to
the right nor the left").
33. See Bill Monahan, Note, Giving the Non-Proliferation 'reaty Teeth: Strengthening
the Special Inspection Procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 33 Va. J.
Int'I L. 162, 180 (1992) (citing IAEA Summary of the Director General's Press Conference
(Feb. 27, 1992) (on file with author)). The right was asserted publicly by a former IAEA
Legal Adviser and authoritative commentator on the legal authorities of the IAEA at least
as early as 1979. See Paul C. Szasz, Sanctions and International Nuclear Controls, 10
Conn. L. Rev. 545, 559 (1979) (discussing the use of information from "intelligence services
or other states or from individuals in the state itself").
34. Monahan, supra note 33, at 180. The proposal for access to locations or "areas not
normally subject to controls" publicly emerged early in the history of NPT safeguards
agreements. See generally Paul C. Szasz, The Adequacy of International Nuclear
Safeguards, 10 J. Int'l L. & Econ. 423, 433 (1975).
35. Compare, e.g., Chayes, supra note 15, at 525 (noting the Chairman and the Board of
Governors' opinion "that the IAEA really does have this authority .... [T]he legal work
that has been done to analyze the safeguards agreements and their legislative history and
to come to the conclusion that the IAEA does have this special inspection authority has
been very thorough and very good.") and Monahan, supra note 33, at 182 (arguing for a
broad right to special inspections "of undeclared facilities used in potential violation of the
NPT") with Chauvistr6, supra note 30, at 26 (asserting that both the use of information
provided by governments and special inspections of undeclared facilities would require
amendment of the applicable safeguards agreements).
Given the bias of international organizations and career civil servants not to assert
expansive interpretations of their authorities so as to limit national sovereignty, it is not
surprising that the research supported by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research would take a cautious view of the IAEA's authorities under INFCIRC/153.
Nonetheless, because this "legislative history" is in the form of documents restricted to
government access (including the IAEA's legal opinion), it must be acknowledged that a
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consider itself bound by the construction advanced by the IAEA.3
However, because the precise contours of these powers have not
been exhaustively addressed publicly by the IAEA,37 it is difficult
to know whether states have registered objections in confidential
communications. In any event, it is clear that the IAEA's recent
interpretation of the powers available to it represents a substantial
shift in its view of safeguards, transforming IAEA-NPT safeguards
into a more intrusive regime compatible with modem standards of
arms control verification.38
definitive conclusion as to this issue would seem premature. But see Chayes, supra note
15, at 30.
36. Chauvistr6, supra note 30, at 25. It should also be noted that the fourth NPT review
conference in its draft final statement expressly urged the IAEA "not to hesitate to take
full advantage of its rights, including the use of special inspections as outlined in
paragraphs 73 and 77 of INFCIRC153." Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, para. 28, U.N. Doc NPTICONFIVI
DC/1/Add. 3(A) (Sept. 13, 1990), reprinted in Chauvistrd, supra note 30, at 47, 51.
37. IAEA Director General Hans Blix has, however, described the scope of the IAEA's
special inspections rights as follows:
[We] have the right to go to a sight where we think that there are reasons to
believe that some nuclear material or installations which have not been declared,
which should have been declared, are located. And we had a discussion of this in
the Board of Governors of the IAEA and a conclusion by the chairman that we
do have the right to perform what you term rightly, special inspections.
North Korea Nuclear Program: mTstimony of Dr. Hans Blix Before the Subcommittee on
Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, at 4, July 22, 1992,
Federal News Service. He added that special inspections needed to be distinguished from
so-called challenge inspections permitted under other proposed arms control regimes:
"[Bjy challenge inspections, one usually means in [the] arms control context, the right of
another state or organization to go a site, regardless of whether there are any suspicions.
Such a right does not exist in our safeguards agreement...." Id. at 7. Thus, Blix's account
suggests that the IAEA may inspect when it "has suspicions" of the presence of undeclared
nuclear "material or installations."
Remaining questions about operationalizing special inspections include: the evidentiary
standard for determining whether the IAEA properly has "suspicions" which trigger the
right to inspect; and, perhaps more important, whether the right to inspect "locations in
addition" to those previously declared, see INFCIRC/153, supra note 23, para. 77, means
"any" additional locations. One must imagine that the IAEA's duty to develop "suspi-
cions" before invoking its right to conduct special inspections must be discharged in good
faith. See the Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 26 ("Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.") whether the
IAEA's duties in this regard must also be discharged in accordance with some objective
standard of reasonableness remains unclear. Also, one would think that the failure to pro-
vide for exceptions implies an unlimited range, particularly since the drafters of INFCIRC
153 did know how to provide for exceptions in other contexts. See id. para. 14; for a
discussion of the conditions for invoking this exception, see infra note 43.
38. See Abbott, supra note 27, at 36-38 (discussing the expansion of intrusive
verification techniques in recent arms control agreements). In game theory terms,
additional verification provides a player with information concerning another player's
behavior that will allow the player to cooperate rather than defect. Id. at 12-16. Another
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A. The North Korean Challenge to Special Inspections
A year after advancing its new interpretation of the safeguards
system, the Agency made its first attempt to demand a special
inspection at an undeclared site. However, the Agency met with
resistance, indeed defiance, from North Korea.39 The DPRK
sought to exercise 4° its right to withdraw from the NPT, 41 evidently
on the presumption that IAEA inspection rights would thereby
fully terminate. The DPRK formally identified two distinct
grounds for its withdrawal: (i) the resumption of the joint U.S.-
South Korea military exercise, "Team Spirit," which the DPRK
characterized as a "nuclear war exercise, ' 42 and (ii) the February
possibility is that information will also alter perceived payoffs from cooperation or
defection, thus transforming a Prisoner's Dilemma into a game more likely to induce
cooperative behavior, such as "Chicken," where mutual defection leads to a worse
outcome for each player than performance in the face of the other player's breach.
Arguably, proliferation-like the typical road warrior's game-is a glorified game of
"Chicken," in which acquisition of nuclear weapons by both players is an inferior outcome,
leading to an ever-increasing spiral of arms competition drawing resources from more
socially productive uses. William Poundstone, Prisoners' Dilemma: John von Neuman,
Game Theory, and the Puzzle of the Bomb 197-201,215-222 (1992) (discussing the effects
of varying perceived payoffs in changing the nature of the game). If so, proliferation may
be a game that induces greater cooperation than does the classic Prisoners' Dilemma. Cf.
id. at 201.
39. See Communication Dated 10 March 1993 from the Minister for Atomic Energy of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Addressed to the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, in February 1993 Note by the Secretary General,
supra note 2, at 56.
40. While there is no doubt North Korea discharged its obligation to notify the Security
Council through its letter of March 12 to the Security Council's president, it probably
cannot be verified, without canvassing the parties to the Treaty, whether and when it
discharged its additional obligation under article X(1) to notify each other party to the
Treaty individually (and not simply through an indirect notification to the Security Council
or General Assembly). The problem is compounded by the fact that the NP] is a triple-
depositary treaty and, given conflicting depositary practice, there may be no single
authoritative list of parties to the NPT. See NPT, supra note 4, art. IX, 21 U.S.T. at 492-93,
729 U.N.T.S. at 174-75. Nonetheless, no state seems to have contested North Korea's
performance of its obligation to notify all state parties, although it would appear this issue
was never really joined given North Korea's decision on June 11, 1993 "unilaterally to
suspend, as long as it considers necessary, the effectuation of its withdrawal" from the
NPT. September 1993 Director General's Report, in September 1993 Note by the
Secretary General, supra note 9, Appendix, para. 25.
41. The notification and statement of reasons pursuant to article X(1) of the NP' can be
found in two letters of the DPRK, each entitled Letter of the DPRK to the President of the
Security Council. See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/25405 (Mar. 12,
1993) [hereinafter Security Council Letter S/25405], and U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, at
2, U.N. Doc. S/25407 (Mar. 12, 1993) [hereinafter Security Council Letter S/25407].
42. Arguably, Team Spirit's resumption on March 9 may have reflected a U.S.-DPRK
misunderstanding about whether the 1992 suspension was a permanent concession. See
North Korea at the Crossroads, supra note 26, at 5 (Interview with Michael Mazarr, who
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25, 1993 IAEA Board of Governors resolution, which the DPRK
alleged was instigated by certain unnamed "member States,"
demanding access to "military sites not relevant to safeguards.
'43
North Korea asserted also that its adherence to the NPT had been
noted that while the suspension "was always planned as a one-year postponement, it is
unclear whether Pyongyang understood that."); see also Bruce Cummings, Tme to End
the 40 Year War, North Korean Bomb Scare, 257 Nation 206 (Aug. 23, 1993). This
misunderstanding may have been exacerbated by ambiguity about the nuclear capabilities
of U.S. forces stationed on the Korean peninsula. See Michael J. Mazarr, Lessons of the
North Korean Crisis, Arms Control Today, July/August 1993, at 9 (arguing that resumption
of Team Spirit seems to have been calculated to provoke a North Korean response and that
Washington and Seoul had never permitted verification of the removal of U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons from South Korea). Following President Bush's October 1991 decision to
remove all U.S. land-based tactical nuclear weapons worldwide, the United States
continued to follow its global policy of refusing to confirm or deny the presence of U.S.
nuclear weapons, even with respect to forces deployed in South Korea. South Korea,
however, did publicly confirm that no U.S. nuclear weapons remained on their soil. Id. at
8. Thus, because North Korea long believed that resolution of its disputes with South
Korea could be achieved only by negotiating with the United States-ostensibly as
guarantor of its "puppet" South Korea's conduct-it may also be that both (i) President
Bush's unilateral decision in September 1991 to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from
forward deployment (presumably including any tactical nuclear weapons that may have
been deployed by the United States on the Korean Peninsula), and (ii) the U.S.-South
Korean decision to suspend their 1992 joint military exercise known as "Team Spirit"
played a role in inducing the DPRK to honor its article 111(4) obligation. The U.S. failure
to fulfill at least some elements of North Korea's expectations concerning Team Spirit, may
have played a part in the timing of DPRK's decision to withdraw from the NPT. Id.
43. Mazarr, Lessons of the North Korean Crisis, supra note 42, at 8. It should be noted
that, even if North Korea's claim that military facilities are exempt from safeguards
(including safeguards pursuant to the right of special inspections) were plausible, the
DPRK would need to comply with any applicable procedures set forth in the safeguards
agreement. For example, INFCIRCI153 permits the withdrawal from safeguards of
nuclear material for certain nonproscribed military uses of nuclear material. This
exemption from the normal peaceful use condition of non-NPT safeguards agreements is
included in NPT safeguards agreements because the NPT prohibits only the nuclear
explosive weapons applications of nuclear material, not non-explosive military applications
such a nuclear propulsion of military vehicles. INFCIRC/153, supra note 23, para. 14.
However, reliance on the exemption requires compliance with certain procedures,
including the submission of reports to the IAEA. Id. In other words, where there has
been no exemption, it is unclear how any argument can be constructed that a military site
containing such exempted nuclear material should be immune from routine inspections,
much less special inspections. It should be noted that in its request for a special inspection,
the Agency has been sensitive to the DPRK's putative concern that the suspect sites are
military in character, and has expressed the willingness to discuss how these concerns can
be met in practice without compromising the effectiveness of safeguards. See Addendum
Dated 11 October 1993 to the Report by the Director General on the Implementation of
the Agreement Between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International
Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in Note by the Secretary General, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., Appendix, para. 10, U.N. Doc S126456IAdd.1 (Oct. 13, 1993)
[hereinafter Addendum to the September 1993 Director General's Report].
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based on the "premise that the depository States [the United
States, United Kingdom, and Russian Federation] of the NPT
should neither deploy their nuclear weapons on the Korean penin-
sula nor pose any nuclear threat against the DPRK," and that the
resumption of Team Spirit in 1993 after its suspension in 1992
renewed the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by the United
States against the DPRK. 4
North Korea's reluctance to comply with the IAEA's request for
special inspection, however, appears to have come on the heels of
years of noncompliance with safeguards obligations under the
NPT. For example, the DPRK became a party to the NPT in
December 1985, but breached its article 111(4) obligation by failing
to conclude its required safeguards agreement with the IAEA until
early 1992.45 In addition, North and South Korea, under a Joint
Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (the
North/South Declaration), have agreed (i) not to test, manufacture,
produce, accept, possess, stockpile, deploy, or use nuclear weap-
ons; (ii) not to possess nuclear enrichment or reprocessing facili-
ties; and (iii) to develop a system of bilateral inspections to verify
the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.46 Nonetheless, the
DPRK appears not to have considered this agreement fully bind-
44. Security Council Letter S/25407, supra note 41, Annex, at 2.
45. See Agreement Between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/403 (May 1992) (entered into force Apr. 10, 1992), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 315
(1994) [hereinafter DPRK/IAEA Safeguards Agreement].
46. Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Jan. 20, 1992
(entered into force, Feb. 19, 1992). For an unofficial English translation of this agreement,
see IAEA Doc. GOV/INF 660, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 569 (1994) [hereinafter North/South
Declaration]. This bilateral inspection regime, if implemented, would supplement IAEA
inspections on the basic commitment not to divert safeguarded nuclear material to nuclear
weapons-related purposes, particularly in view of diminished international confidence in
the efficacy of IAEA inspections after the Iraqi case. More importantly, however, it would
provide assurance as to the additional nonproliferation obligations undertaken by both
North and South Korea through the North/South Declaration. For example, nothing in the
NPT or under IAEA safeguards requires states not to accept for deployment on their
national territory weapons under the control of another state. See NPT, supra note 4, art.
I, 21 U.S.T. at 487,729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (NNWS parties merely undertake not to "receive"
or "control" nuclear weapons from a transferor); Jonathan Schwartz, Controlling Nuclear
Proliferation: Legal Strategies of the United States, 20 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1, 18 (stating
that U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe pursuant to a NATO commitment
does not involve a U.S. violation of its article I obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons,
or a violation of a NNWS party such as the Republic of Germany of its obligation not to
receive nuclear weapons); Willrich, Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 17, at 71-87
(addressing the NPT's intent not to preclude deployment of nuclear weapons so long as
control is maintained by the NWS).
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ing, as it subsequently suggested that it needed to engage in
reprocessing in order to manage the spent fuel produced at existing
reactors.47
Continuing this pattern of noncompliance, the DPRK now has
asserted that its "suspension" of its withdrawal from the NPT has
resulted in a "unique status" for the DPRK as a NNWS party.48
Under this interpretation, North Korea's safeguards obligations
under the NPT require it to accept only such inspections as are
necessary to assure the "continuity of safeguards" on the material
it previously declared to be in its possession.49 Accordingly, North
Korea denies any duty to comply with the IAEA's demand for spe-
cial inspections.5"
It is somewhat less clear whether both the North and South agreed to forgo enrichment
and reprocessing on the peninsula. They have only agreed not to possess enrichment or
reprocessing "facilities." Admittedly, the precise scope of this term could be resolved in
such a way to permit small-scale laboratories, sometimes referred to as "hot cells," for the
separation of de minimis quantities of plutonium for experimental purposes. It would be
counterintuitive, however, to interpret the North/South Declaration to leave open the
possibility of reprocessing plutonium in quantities sufficient to manufacture nuclear
explosive devices.
47. Testimony of Ambassador-at-Large Robert Gallucei Before the East Asian and
Pacific Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the U.S.-North
Korea Nuclear Agreement, Federal News Service (Dec. 1, 1994) (observing that fuel
cladding for the graphite plutonium production reactor used in North Korea degrades
quickly, and that the DPRK planned to address the environmental concerns thus posed
through reprocessing).
48. See Memorandum of DPRK Foreign Ministry (Apr. 20, 1994) in IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/442, at 1 (May 9, 1994) [hereinafter DPRK Memorandum].
49. See id. at 48; Vienna Convention, supra note 9, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Technically, the
Vienna Convention is inapplicable because it governs only agreements between states.
Nonetheless, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations and Between International Organizations, U.N. GAOR. U.N.
Doc. AICONF.129/15 (1986), reprinted in 25 LL.M. 543 (1986) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention on International Organizations], contains virtually identical provisions which,
like the Vienna Convention, may be deemed to reflect customary international law. As of
1992, however, the Vienna Convention on International Organizations was not in force.
See Multilateral Treaties, Ninth Cumulative Supplement 39 (Bowman & Harris eds., 1992).
For convenience, except where potential differences exist between the Vienna Convention
and the Vienna Convention on International Organizations, this Article will refer to the
Vienna Convention.
50. DPRK Memorandum, supra note 48, at 2. As construed by the DPRK, its special
status has allowed it to renegotiate the precise terms of "routine inspections" and, in effect,
to permit degradation of IAEA remote surveillance in ways that have led the Director
General of the IAEA to question whether the "continuity of safeguards" has in fact been
assured. See Jon B. Wolfsthal, U.S. Considers New Policy Options As North Korea
Standoff Continues, Arms Control Today, Dec. 21, 1993, at 21 (IAMA Director General
Blix "told the UN General Assembly on November 1, 1993 that the continuity of
safeguards had already been damaged," but "stopped short of determining... [they] had
been broken"); see also September 1993 Director General's Report, reprinted in
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The DPRK position appears to be based on three separate legal
theories: first, that suspension of withdrawal from the NPT has the
effect of suspending the safeguards agreement;5' second, that the
United States and IAIEA in negotiations leading to the DPRK's
suspension of its withdrawal and subsequent negotiations relating
to the resumption of IAEA inspections have "recognized" that fur-
ther inspections would be limited to assuring the continuity of safe-
guards on material declared by the DPRK;5 2 and, third, that the
September 1993 Note by the Secretary General, supra note 9, at 12 ("the Agency has not
been enabled to conduct the normal routine and ad hoc inspections which are essential if it
is to meet the requirements of the Safeguards Agreement"; it was "limited to containment,
surveillance and maintenance activities").
51. DPRK Memorandum, supra note 48, at. 1. As to the first theory, the precise effect
of the DPRK's "suspension" of its withdrawal appears to be ill-defined. Nothing in the
safeguards agreement suggests that the agreement can be modified through suspension of
withdrawal from the NFP. Rather, article 26 simply provides that the agreement shall
remain in force "as long as [the DPRK] is party to [the NPT]." See DPRK/IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, supra note 45, art. 26. Moreover, it is not even clear that the
DPRK's suspension can be construed as anything but a full revocation of its withdrawal
notice. While the Vienna Convention appears to contemplate the "revocation" of a
withdrawal from a treaty, it does not explicitly contemplate the lesser step of suspension.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 68, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 348. Presumably, it can be
argued that the lesser step is impliedly permitted. However, interpreting a "suspension of
withdrawal" to modify unilaterally the obligations originally undertaken by the
withdrawing state could conflict with the requirements for consent to a modification set
forth in article 41. Also, it could conflict with article 44(1) of the Vienna Convention,
which permits exercise of a withdrawal right provided for in a treaty only "with respect to
the whole treaty unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree."
Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 44, para. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 343. The IAEA has
consistently taken the position that, as long as the withdrawal has not taken effect, the
DPRK is bound by all the provisions of the safeguards agreement. See, e.g.,
Communication Dated 12 March 1993 from the Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, in Letter Dated 19 March 1993 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex VI, at
15, U.N. Doc. S/25445 (1993) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/25445]; September 1993 Director
General's Report, in September 1993 Note by the Secretary General, supra note 9,
Appendix, para. 25; Addendum to the September 1993 Director General's Report, supra
note 43, para. 2; IAEA Board of Governors Resolution on North Korea, reprinted in Arms
Control Today, Apr. 1994, at 19 (referring particularly to paragraph 5 of the Resolution of
March 21, 1994, which calls upon the DPRK to comply fully with its safeguards
agreements).
52. DPRK Memorandum, supra note 48, at 2. The second argument, that the IAEA or
United States accepted a special status for the DPRK under the safeguards agreement,
either under a theory of modification or interpretation, also founders on the shoals of
reality. The agreements cited by the DPRK on terms for conducting the inspections
necessary to assure continuity of safeguards appear to relate to precise procedures for
implementing routine and ad hoc inspections of declared material. See U.S. Moving
Towards Sanctions as North Korea Blocks Inspections, Arms Control Today, Apr. 1994, at
27. The IAEA thus cannot have implicitly waived its right to conduct special inspections
designed to uncover undeclared material; and, in the absence of explicit Board of
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IAEA has materially breached the safeguards agreement by seek-
ing a special inspection based, at least in part, on information pro-
vided by the United States, thus giving the DPRK the right to
suspend the treaty.53
Governors approval for a subsidiary agreement between the IAEA and DPRK
terminating or suspending the right to conduct special inspections, it may be questioned
whether the DPRK would be in a position to assert such a theory in view of the potential
invalidity of an agreement derogating from special inspection rights without Board of
Governors approval under article 46(2) of the Vienna Convention, which permits an
international organization to invoke "violation of the rules of an organization" as a ground
for invalidity when the violation is "manifest and concerns a rule of fundamental
importance." Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 46, para. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 343.
Even if the DPRK claims that the principle it agreed to with the United States in U.S.-
DPRK Joint Declaration of June 11, 1993, for "impartial application of full-scope
safeguards, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and non-interference in each
other's internal affairs" represents an acknowledgment that use of U.S. intelligence
information by the IAEA and special inspections requested on that basis constitute
disrespect for DPRK sovereignty, interference in DPRK internal affairs, or partial
application of full scope safeguards, it would be hard to see how U.S. recognition of these
propositions would be binding on the IAEA. See text of U.S.-North Korean Joint
Declaration of June 11, 1993, reprinted in Arms Control Today, July-Aug. 1993, at 19
[hereinafter Joint Declaration].
53. See DPRK Memorandum, supra note 48, at 3 (citing article 60(1) of the Vienna
Convention). The notion that the IAEA has materially breached its safeguards obligations
seems to be founded on the IAEA's reliance on U.S. satellite intelligence to request special
inspection of suspect locations. The DPRK asserted that:
[n]one of the provisions in the IAEA statute and the safeguards agreement
stipulates usability of a third country's intelligence information to the agency's
inspection activities. However, some officials of the LAEA Secretariat have
breached the IAEA statute and the safeguards agreement by systematically using
the falsified intelligence information from a third country for their inspections at
the DPRK's nuclear facilities.
Id. at 7; see also Communication Dated 16 March 1993 from the Minister of Atomic
Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea addressed to the Director General
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in U.N. Doc. SW25445, supra note 51, Annex
VII., at 16 (alleging in effect that the IAEA had breached safeguards confidentiality
requirements through information sharing with IAEA member states). Thus, the DPRK's
legal theory could be framed in at least two ways: first, that the IAEA's own behavior was
unlawful; or second, that IAEA members, presumably the United States, engaged in con-
duct attributable to the Agency that functioned as an independent breach.
Yet, the Agency's assertion of a right to receive information from third parties, and its
right to conduct special inspections on that basis, cannot be described by the DPRK as an
unforeseen development. Use of so-called National Technical Means (NTMs)-intelli-
gence gathering through satellite surveillance-appears to be a widely recognized verifica-
tion tool in arms control agreements that is not inconsistent with customary international
law. See Abbott, supra note 27, at 32-35; see also Study On the Role of the United Nations
In the Field of Verification, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., at 70, U.N.Doc. A/451372 (1991)
(implicitly relying on international acceptability in principle of satellite verification in fash-
ioning a proposal for the development of a United Nations satellite network for arms limi-
tation and disarmament verification); but see Chauvistr6, supra note 30, at 25 (concluding
that the existing LAEA regime would not be authorized to use NTMs). Even if the United
States breached obligations owed to the DPRK under customary international law not to
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None of these arguments seems persuasive, however, especially
in view of the fact that, at its February 1992 meeting, the IAEA
Board of Governors affirmed the IAEA's right to special inspec-
tions and to additional information.54 IAEA Director General
Hans Blix expressly stated that the IAEA's mandate included the
right to seek information from governments,55 and that these inter-
pretations of the safeguards agreement predated the final ratifica-
tion of the agreement by the DPRK and its entry into force on
conduct such surveillance, it would appear strained to treat such a violation as a separate
breach of the IAEA Statute or of the safeguards agreement by the United States. Nothing
in the IAEA Statute or the safeguards agreement expressly provides for obligations of this
kind for members of the IAEA. Indeed, there seems to be no general consensus that
obligations based on such agreements may be generally inferred from the constitutive
instruments of such organizations. To the contrary, the International Law Commission
(ILC) rejected a proposed provision of the Vienna Convention on International Organiza-
tions to this effect. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of
the 34th Session, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 45, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982 (discussing
the defects of proposed article 36 and concluding that it is not possible to declare a general
rule since the question will always turn on the precise legal relationship created under the
constitutive instrument). Neither would it seem plausible to impute responsibility to the
IAEA itself because it used information unlawfully acquired by the United States; it
appears the DPRK asserts as a remedial principle the functional equivalent of the U.S.
Supreme Court's exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment. See generally Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). This strains credulity.
Finally, North Korea's claim that in response to breach it can subvert the whole safe-
guards system, defining for itself the scope not only of special, but also of routine and ad
hoc, inspections seems to be inconsistent with article 44(2) and (3) of the Vienna Conven-
tion. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 44, paras. 2, 3, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 343.
Under paragraph 2, a ground for suspension under article 60 of the Vienna Convention
may ordinarily be invoked "only with respect to the whole treaty." The DPRK appears to
assert that it can suspend parts of the safeguards agreements. To do so, the DPRK would
need to rely on the exception stated in paragraph 3, which permits suspension
[i]f the ground relates solely to particular clauses, [but] only with respect to those
clauses where: (a) the said clauses are separable from the remainder of the treaty
with regard to their application; (b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established that acceptance of those clauses was not an essential basis of the con-
sent of the other party or parties to be bound by the treaty as a whole; and (c)
continued performance of the remainder of the treaty would not be unjust.
Id. art. 60, para. 3, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346. Thus, the DPRK would need to establish that (i)
special inspections are separable in their performance from routine and ad hoc inspections,
(ii) a right to potential special inspections was not essential to the IAEA's consent to be
bound, and (iii) it would not be unjust to require the IAEA to apply safeguards without a
special inspection, when routine and ad hoc inspections establish inconsistencies, and at the
same time preclude the IAEA from making the finding of non-diversion intended under
the safeguards regime. And even if the DPRK were to carry such a virtually impossible
burden of persuasion, article 44(3) of the Vienna Convention would still bar the DPRK
from suspending its duty to permit routine and ad hoc inspections.
54. See supra note 33.
55. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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April 10, 1992.56 Arguably, the DPRK's implicit acceptance of the
safeguards agreement on these terms places it in a weak position to
assert that the IAEA's use of third-party information constitutes
material breach of the safeguards agreement?
The DPRK's pattern of noncompliance thus seems substantial.
Nevertheless, North Korea's near-withdrawal from the NPT in
1993, at least on its face, may not have been motivated by a deci-
sion to conceal an ongoing nuclear weapons program. That North
Korea was entitled to engage in reprocessing before the entry into
force of the Joint Declaration is beyond question,58 but the DPRK
may have engaged in more reprocessing while it was an NPT party
than it had revealed in its initial negotiations with the IAEA Secre-
tariat over the declaration submitted by the DPRK.5 9 Thus, some
56. See IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/419, para. 5 (Apr. 8,1993) (report pursuant to paragraphs
4 and 5 of the Board of Governors Resolution of April 1, 1993, which, inter alia, found the
DPRK in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations) [hereinafter INFCIRC/419].
57. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 60, para. 3(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346
("violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object and purpose" of
the safeguards agreement) and art. 60, para. I ("material breach of a bilateral treaty by one
of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty
or suspending its operations in whole or in part").
58. Neither the NPT nor safeguards agreements bar facilities for nuclear enrichment or
reprocessing. Either of these technologies may be used to produce weapons-usable
nuclear material and, accordingly, are considered "sensitive" for export purposes under the
international regime for multilateral control of nuclear-related equipment or material. See
Notification to the Agency of Exports and Imports of Nuclear Material, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/209IRev.1 (1990) (NPT Treaty Exporters' Committee or "Zangger Committee,"
in honor of its first chairman, guidelines for identifying "equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material"
which may not be exported unless subject to safeguards pursuant to art. 11(2) of the NPT
include equipment for enrichment or reprocessing) [hereinafter INFCIRCr209/Rev.1].
These activities, though relevant for weapons purposes, are also basic to nuclear fuel cycles
for peaceful purposes. For example, uranium enrichment (i.e., the separation of uranium
isotopes in order to increase the percentage of U235 slightly above its naturally occurring
rate of .7 percent in uranium ore) is critical to production of fuel for the most commonly
used reactor type for energy production. Mohamed L Shaker, 1 The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty 283 (1980). Some states have pursued an alternative energy
program involving the large-scale production of plutonium through the irradiation of
uranium and the subsequent separation from this "spent fuel" by a chemical process
known as reprocessing of large quantities of plutonium. So-called "breeder reactors,"
based on plutonium fuel, have the unique capability of producing more plutonium-based
fuel than they consume, and thus pose the risk of producing large quantities of weapons-
usable material. See Mason W'lirich, International Safeguards and Nuclear Industry 54-56
(1973) (noting that plutonium produced by "breeders" will be weapons-usable). Such
peaceful programs have not been considered violations of the NPT when they are subject
to safeguards. See generally Shaker, supra, at 279-92.
59. One possible scenario is that the DPRK engaged in unsafeguarded, and thus
unlawful, reprocessing of spent reactor fuel in 1989 or thereafter when it removed, as it has
admitted, small quantities of reactor fuel from a damaged reactor fuel rod. See North
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analysts have considered the possibility that the DPRK has sought
to conceal not an ongoing nuclear weapons program, but merely
past reprocessing campaigns related to a subsequently terminated
nuclear-weapons prpogram.60
B. Implications
Regardless of whether North Korea sought to withdraw from the
NPT, and then unilaterally reinterpreted its safeguards obligations
in order to conceal a present or past nuclear weapons program, its
behavior seems to have been predicated on two assumptions: first,
that its withdrawal from the NPT was legally effective; and, second,
that withdrawal under article X(1) of the NPT would fully termi-
nate all international rights of inspection.
However, even if the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT were
legally effective, the IAEA would still retain certain inspection
rights pursuant to a preexisting non-NPT safeguards agreement
between the IAEA and the DPRK, not subject to unilateral termi-
Korea at the Crossroads, supra note 26, at 4, 8-9 (interview with David Albright); see also
David Albright, North Korea Drops Out, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 1993, at 9-11.
The IAEA inspections of DPRK nuclear facilities pursuant to the DPRK/IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, supra note 45, may well have revealed information concerning this
breach which the DPRK had sought to conceal. The DPRK reaction to this unanticipated
discovery may have been to back away from its prior commitment to the NPT, only to
eliminate the prospect of further international inspections. It may even be that destruction
of the evidence, and thus the possibility of ever determining whether the DPRK in the past
breached its safeguards obligation, could facilitate the DPRK's continued adherence to its
safeguards obligations and the NPT. For example, a former U.S. Ambassador to South
Korea argues that:
full revelation of that record might have shown Kim Il Sung, the "Great Leader"
to be a liar-something that the Pyongyang regime would never allow. A further
irony is that if the Clinton Administration and the International Atomic Energy
Agency remain obsessed with what happened in 1989, the chance to deal with
North Korea's current future nuclear activities may be lost.
Donald P. Gregg, Korea: Toughness and Talk, Wash. Post, June 17, 1994, A25. But see
John Wolfsthal, Bringing North Korea Back Into the Non-Proliferation Treaty Fold, Arms
Control Today, May 1993, at 20, 25 (suggestion by proliferation specialists that amending
the DPRK declaration to the IAEA to include the suspect sites would have allowed the
IAEA to conduct "routine" rather than "special" inspections). Arguably, this approach
could have allowed the DPRK leadership early on in the crisis before the stakes were
escalated to save face. The interim settlement between the United States and North
Korea, see Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, reprinted in Arms Control Today, Dec. 1994, at 19, which does
not provide for IAEA inspection of the suspect sites in the new term, appears to be based
on this approach.
60. See, e.g., North Korea at the Crossroads, supra note 26, at 3, 5.
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nation.6 ' Such rights, moreover, would be of unlimited duration. -
But the critical question which arises when a state withdraws from
the NPT concerns the scope of any revived non-NPT safeguards
obligations, particularly, the circumstances under which undeclared
facilities could be inspected. The special inspection rights based on
non-NPT safeguards agreements do not authorize the IAEA to
conduct an inspection unless the Agency has reason to believe that
specific material subject to safeguards under that agreement is at a
specific location.6 3 In other words, non-NPT safeguards agree-
61. INFCIRC/153 agreements contain a clause which suspends, as long as that
agreement is in force, the operation of any other safeguards agreements. INFCIRC/153,
supra note 23, para. 23. For example, the DPRK/IAEA Safeguards Agreement states.
The application of Agency safeguards in the [DPRK] under other safeguards
agreements with the Agency shall be suspended while this Agreement is in force.
If the [DPRK] has received assistance from the Agency for a project, the
[DPRK's] undertaking in the Project Agreement not to use items which are
subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose shall continue to
apply.
DPRKIIAEA Safeguards Agreement, supra note 45, art. 23. Accordingly, when the
INFCIRC/153 agreement is no longer in force, any other agreements automatically revive.
The DPRK in 1977 entered into such an agreement with the IAEA for the application of
safeguards on a Soviet-supplied research reactor. See The Text of the Agreement of 20
July 1977 between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the
Application of Safeguards in Respect of a Research Reactor Facility, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/252 (Nov. 14,1977) [hereinafter INFCIRC/252].
62. Non-NPT agreements are negotiated by the IAEA in accordance with principles set
forth in INFCIRC/66, supra note 22, at 5-7. Under this type of agreement, safeguards are
applied in perpetuity on any material or equipment ever made subject to safeguards. This
perpetuity principle for the negotiation of INFCIRC/66 agreements, a conscious departure
from prior IAEA policy, was established by a memorandum of the IAEA Director
General, The Formulation of Certain Provisions in Agreements under the Agency's
Safeguards System (1965, as provisionally extended in 1966 and 1968), IAEA Doc. GOV/
1621 (1973) [hereinafter GOV/16211. Paragraph 2 of the Annex of this memorandum
states that. in the event of termination of the agreement, "the rights and obligations of the
parties, as provided for in the Agreement would continue to apply in connection with any
supplied material or items and with any special fissionable material produced, processed or
used in connection with any supplied material or items which had been included in the
inventory, until such material or items had been removed from the inventory." GOV/1621,
supra, para. 2. Section 24 of INFCIRC252, for example, provides that "the agreement
shall remain in force until, in accordance with its provisions, safeguards have been
terminated." INFCIRC/252, supra note 61, § 24. Section 12, concerning termination,
incorporates by reference "paragraphs 26(a), (c) and (d) or 27" of INFCIRC66, which
provide for termination of safeguards on nuclear material only upon certain judgments by
the IAEA primarily relating to whether the material has been returned or is no longer
usable. With respect to facilities, section 12 provides that safeguards will be terminated
when the IAEA determines that the facility is "no longer usable for any nuclear activity
relevant from the point of view of safeguards." Id. § 12.
63. Despite their perpetual effect, the safeguards rights found in INFCIRC66
agreements do not include a broad right of special inspections in INFCIRC/153. They
provide, however, for one limited type of "special inspection." See INFCIRC66, supra
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ments do not provide a foundation for inspections designed to fer-
ret out covert nuclear programs at undeclared facilities.
As a result, the efficacy of safeguards could depend on whether
the special inspection right under the NPT safeguards agreement
survives withdrawal from the NPT. The public perception appears
to be that safeguards rights terminate completely upon with-
drawal. 64 Academic commentary, however, has not exhaustively
examined this question, at least not with respect to the IAEA right
to inspect to determine whether a state has unlawfully engaged in
nuclear weapons activities before its withdrawal.
In addition to its effect on the crisis on North Korea, the answer
to this question has far-reaching implications for the NPT. First, if
the DPRK is correct, once a state has withdrawn, parties to the
NPT would be unable to verify the existence or nonexistence of a
nuclear weapons program in that state during any previous period
note 22, para. 53 (providing for special inspections if "the study of a report indicates that
such inspection is desirable" or if "[a]ny unforeseen circumstances requires immediate
action"). It appears this limited right was indirectly incorporated in INFCIRC/252, supra
note 61, as well. Section 14 of INFCIRC/252, relating to "Safeguards Procedures,"
specifies that the "safeguards procedures to be applied by the agency under this
Agreement are those specified in the Safeguards Document," which is in turn defined as
INFCIRC/66. The special inspections right in paragraph 53 of INFCIRC/66 is located
under the chapter "Safeguards Procedures."
The term "special inspection" under INFCIRC/66, however, is not defined, as it is in
paragraph 73 of INFCIRC153, supra note 23, to include a right to access "information or
locations in addition to the access specified" for routine or ad hoc inspections. It is
implicitly defined in terms of the normal domain of INFCIRC66 safeguards, the specific
facilities and material listed in the inventory and those locations where that material or
equipment may be found. Perhaps paragraph 29 of INFCIRC/66, which provides that
"safeguards procedures ... shall be followed, as far as relevant, with respect to safeguarded
nuclear materials, whether they are being produced, processed or used in any principal
nuclear facility or are outside any such facility," can be interpreted to permit application of
safeguards and thus special inspections wherever such material is found. The availability of
such a right in a concrete case, however, would depend on a critical question of fact: could
the IAEA have reason to believe the precise material subject to safeguards is at a
particular location? The IAEA would need to meet a difficult, and probably impossible,
burden of proof to form a reasonable belief that the nuclear material inventoried in a non-
NPT safeguards agreement is now at a particular location. By contrast, under the NPT
INFCIRC/153 regime, the safeguards obligation extends to all nuclear material regardless
of how it came into a state's possession. As a result, to request a special inspection of a
specific site, the IAEA would only need to believe that any nuclear material subject to
safeguards may be located there.
64. The Washington Post appears to have summarily concluded that all international
inspection rights would terminate were North Korea to withdraw from the NPT. See
Thomas W. Lippman, Perry Offers Dire Picture of Failure to Block North Korean Nuclear
Weapons, Wash. Post, May 4, 1994, at A29 (For example, "North Korea announced last
year that it intended to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, ending the
International Atomic Energy Agency's right to inspect North Korea's nuclear facilities.").
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in which the state had been legally bound by the NPT not to
engage in such a program. 65 Second, if withdrawal were known to
have this effect, it might undermine efforts at the upcoming 1995
conference to extend the NPT indefinitely. Furthermore, the
absence of any significant costs in legal terms associated with with-
drawal (and the implications for the utility of the NPT itself as a
security and confidence building device) will no doubt affect the
willingness of states to forgo their nuclear weapons options for a
meaningful period of time. As a result, if the IAEA were to adopt
the position that its special inspection rights survive withdrawal
from the NPT, this would change states' perceptions of the conse-
quences of safeguards termination following either unilateral with-
drawal from or termination of the NPT. These changed
perceptions, building on the IAEA's recent interpretations of its
rights to use information collected from third-party governments
and to conduct special inspections, could buttress the use of polit-
ical pressure to induce stricter adherence to NPT obligations."
Before turning to the core problem of whether any safeguards
rights survive withdrawal, this Article will address the preliminary
question of whether a state can exercise its right to withdraw from
the NPT and avert the IAEA's assertion of its right to a special
inspection. Would, for example, an assertion of the right to with-
draw be invalid if made to conceal a past violation of the NPT?.
Specifically, how should the statement by the three states deposita-
ries for the NPT, "questioning" North Korea's statement of the
65. It should be noted that article I of the NTlr does not prohibit NNWS's from
"attempts" to acquire nuclear weapons, but only from the actual "manufacture" of a
nuclear weapons. NPT, supra note 4, art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171. The
precise contours of the prohibition against "manufacture" have not been authoritatively
determined. But see Shaker, supra note 58, at 249. Nonetheless, it can be inferred that any
significant activities bearing on the production or separation of nuclear material for use in
a nuclear explosive device outside of safeguards, if not technically constituting the
proscribed "manufacture" of a weapon, would still constitute a separate breach of the
article HI safeguards obligation the principal function of which is to facilitate enforcement
of NNWS obligations under article I.
66. In effect, the durational extension of safeguards proposed in this Article would
increase the pool of information available to other players in the security regime
constituted by the NPT and the JAEA system of safeguards. Additional information could
permit greater cooperation by facilitating a better appreciation of other players' perceived
payoffs in the same way that special inspections of undeclared locations and information
from third-party governments do. See supra note 27 (discussing game theory analysis by
Kenneth Abbott).
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grounds for its withdrawal, be interpreted:67 as a legal claim that
withdrawal would be ineffective? Or as a political assertion initiat-
ing a bargaining process?68
III. THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO WImDRAw FROM T=E NPT
This section will examine whether article X(1) of the NPT can be
interpreted to limit the right of a state to withdraw from the Treaty.
It analyzes the relevant materials in accordance with the interpre-
tive principles set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (the Vienna Convention). 69 Under the Vienna Conven-
tion and customary international law, the scope of the NPT right to
withdraw must be defined, first, in terms of the ordinary meaning
of the text in context and in light of the NPT's object and pur-
pose.70 The relevant context for interpreting article X(1) arguably
includes the assurances given by the NWS parties as an inducement
for NNWS parties to adhere to the NPT, as confirmed by Security
Council Resolution 255 recognizing those assurances.71  Article
X(1)'s relation to the object and purpose of the NPT can best be
understood by considering how it differs from ordinary grounds for
withdrawal, which it is meant to supplement, and by relevant sub-
67. See Depositaries' Statement, supra note 7, at 2 ("We question whether the DPRK's
stated reasons for withdrawing from the 'reaty constitute extraordinary events relating to
the subject-matter of the 'reaty.").
68. The Depositaries' Statement did not assert that the DPRK's announcement was
invalid; it simply urged the DPRK "to retract its announcement" of its intention to
withdraw. Id. Moreover, S.C. Resolution 825 of May 11, 1993, noted the NPT
depositaries' question, but called upon the DPRK to "reconsider the announcement" of its
intent to withdraw. S.C. Resolution 825, supra note 8, at 2. Thus, both the Depositaries'
Statement and Resolution 825 could reasonably be construed to acknowledge the legal
efficacy of the withdrawal, but the question is not free from doubt.
69. See discussion supra notes 9 and 51.
70. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31, para. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 ("A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.").
71. Article 31(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention admits reference to "any instrument
which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty." Vienna Convention,
supra note 9, art. 31, para. 2(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. Though not technically presented as
part of the agreed package of documents constituting the NPT, nor exchanged or proffered
at the time of the Treaty's conclusion, the so-called positive security assurances were
extended by the United States, United Kingdom, and Russian Federation for the express
purpose of inducing non-nuclear weapon states to adhere to the NPT. See U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Pub. No. 48, International Negotiations on the Treaty
on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 112-14, 127-28, (1969) [hereinafter
International Negotiations]. Accordingly, to interpret the withdrawal clause, it would not
be unreasonable to look to the security assurances, and, specifically, the role they
contemplate for Security Council action pursuant to chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
1994] CONTINUING IAEA SAFEGUARDS
sequent practice under the treaty, which arguably include safe-
guards agreements entered into to fulfill NPT safeguards
obligations.71 Negotiating history of the NPT reflected in both the
negotiations leading to the NPT text and in deliberations on ratifi-
cation is an important supplementary source for both resolving
remaining doubts about the meaning of article X(1) and confirming
interpretations derived from the use of primary materials7
Briefly, it would seem none of the available sources provides a
sound basis for identifying limits on a state's right to withdraw
from the NPT. On the contrary, because only the most theoretical
and strained interpretation seems to provide any hope for limiting
the right to withdraw, the stronger position appears to be that the
right to withdraw is, for all practical purposes, absolute.
A. Text of Article X(1)
Although interpretation must begin with the precise words at
issue, legal drafters do not write on a blank slate, but rather in the
context of the "relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties." 74 Accordingly, this section will ana-
72. See the Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31, para. 2(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340
(stating that the context also includes "any agreement relating to the treaty which was
made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty"). Similarly,
article 31(3)(a) requires consideration, in relation to the context of the treaty, of "any
subsequent agreement betweenthe parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions." Id. art. 31, para. 3(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. The INFCIRC/
153 agreement, negotiated at the LAEA with the participation of the major nuclear
supplier state parties to the NPT, was accepted by NNWVS parties as the basis for their
compliance with their article 111(4) obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement with the
IAEA assuring the application of safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities as
required under article 1H(2) of the Treaty. Arguably, INFCIRC/153 constitutes such a
"subsequent agreement" for purposes of article 31.
73. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S at 340. Under article 32,
[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd
or unreasonable.
Id. art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
74. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31, para. 3(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 ("There
shall be taken into account, together with context ... any relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties."). Nonetheless, the Vienna
Convention approach to interpretation focuses on the "ordinary meaning" of the precise
words agreed to by the parties to the treaty. See Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Chad) 1994 LCJ. 6, at 21-22 (Feb. 3), reprinted in 33 LL.M. 571 (1994)
("Interpretation must be based above all on the text of the treaty."). In the Libya/Chad
Territorial Dispute Case, a contemporary example of its jurisprudence on this subject, the
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lyze the text of article X(1) in light of the general principles of law
its drafters may have referred to in giving expression to their pur-
poses. At first blush, it appears undeniable that article X(1)
utilizes a formulation which expressly confers upon each state the
right to withdraw when "it decides," in the exercise of its sover-
eignty, to make certain statements.75 This kind of clause implies
acceptance by the parties of self-interpretation as the applicable
standard for measuring performance of the rights and obligations
subject to the clause.76
Upon closer inspection, however, article X(1) may be ambiguous
to the extent that it calls for a compound judgment relating to
three elements: first, that "extraordinary events" have occurred;
second, that those extraordinary events "relate to the subject mat-
ter" of the Treaty; and, third, that there is a threat to a state's
International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected the suggestion that the 1955 Treaty between
Libya and France did not intend to fix boundaries not already set by prior agreements,
stating it had "no difficulty either in ascertaining the natural and ordinary meaning of the
relevant terms of the 1955 Treaty, or in giving effect to them." Id.; see also Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 325 cmt. g and reporter's note 4
(1986) [hereinafter Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations]; see also David J. Bederman,
Revivalist Canons and 'reaty Interpretation, 41 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 953, 973 (1994); Maria
Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Teaties Before United States Courts,
28 Va. J. Int'l L. 281,328 (1988). But see Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties 69-76 (1973) (demonstrating that, while it considers textualism the primary
approach, the Vienna Convention gives due deference to teleological and intentionalist
methods of interpretation). For a recent confirmation of Sinclair's view, see the very same
Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute Case, in which the ICI, despite a pellucid text, as described
above, invoked the 1955 Teaty's object and purpose, id. at 51-52, and context, id. at 53-54,
and found it appropriate to "confirm" its interpretation by a review of the travaux, id. at
55-56. One cannot help but see hints of the modem U.S. approach that no text is lacking in
ambiguity. See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de
L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F. 2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974) (barring an arbitral award of
damages for "loss of production" could be interpreted to permit an award of damages for
"loss of production").
75. NPT, supra note 4, art. X, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 493-94, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175. Article
X(1) states: "Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Teaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." Id. (emphasis
added). The subjective character of the determination is emphasized in this provision's
third sentence, which states that the notice the withdrawing state is required to give "shall
include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme
interests." Id. (emphasis added).
76. According to Schwelb, the term was first coined by Leo Gross in an essay honoring
Hans Kelsen. See Egon Schwelb, The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and International Law, 58
Am. J. Int'l L. 642, 663 n.64 (1964). Auto-interpretation, in Schwelb's view, involves the
exercise of a right to make a judgement stipulated in a treaty, without second-guessing by a
tribunal. Id. at 662-63 & n.65 (citing article IV of the Limited Test Ban Teaty, which was
the precursor of article X(1) of the NPT, as an example of auto-interpretation "expressly
stipulated").
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"supreme national interests." One might argue, for example, that
only the first two elements could be considered legally "self-judg-
ing."77 If the clause, moreover, were considered entirely self-judg-
ing, the withdrawal right could so undercut any NPT obligation
that the treaty would effectively constitute a legal nullity.78 Ordi-
narily, the International Court of Justice would seek to find a basis
for avoiding this stark result and sever the clause from the treaty7 9
or, alternatively, avoid the question entirely where the injured
party refused to forgo its own right of auto-interpretation.90 Thus,
it might be suggested that limiting the self-judging effect to the
question of whether there was an "extraordinary event" would pre-
serve the legal validity of the clause as a whole.
On the other hand, such a parsimonious interpretation of the
self-judging language in article X(1) would be unnecessary to sus-
tain its legal validity. If fully self-judging, the clause does not
render the whole agreement a nullity, because other legal value is
exchanged. Article X(1) contains a three-month notice period
before withdrawal becomes effective.81 During the three-month
period, all NPT and safeguards rights would continue.82 Indeed,
the IAEA might be entitled to call for a special inspection to ascer-
tain whether the state had sought to exercise its right to withdraw
77. In this connection, the NPT Depositaries' Statement purported to question only
whether the DPRK's "stated reasons for withdrawing... constitute extraordinary events
relating to the subject-matter of the Treaty." Depositaries' Statement, supra note 7, at 2.
It did not also question whether the asserted events also "jeopardized the supreme
interests" of the DPRK. Id.
78. See Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 LCJ. 101, 116-19 (Mar. 21) (dissenting
opinion of Judge Hersh Lauterpacht) (arguing that such a self-judging reservation is
inconsistent with good faith and would involve a nullity, since the instrument of acceptance
as a whole would be nonseverable and thus invalid).
79. Id. at 76-78, 93-94 (dissenting opinion of Pres. Klaestad & Judge Armand-Ugon)
(arguing the obligations were severable and thus the acceptance of jurisdiction would
continue to be valid). See generally D.W. Bowett, Reservations to Non-Restricted
Multilateral Treaties, 48 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 67 (1977) (stating impermissible reservation
renders the reservation alone a nullity if severable or entire acceptance of treaty invalid if
not severable).
80. See Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.) 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6). The Court avoided
the question of the validity of a self-judging reservation on the ground that neither party
questioned its validity, but suggested that under article 36(6) of the Statute of the Court,
the ICJ is the ultimate arbiter of its own jurisdiction. This theory of judicial review would
not apply, however, to self-judging, non-jurisdictional provisions.
81. NPT, supra note 4, art. X, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 493-94,729 U.N.T.S. at 175 (requiring
the withdrawing state to "give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty
and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance.").
82. The IAEA has explicitly affirmed this proposition in its dispute with the DPRK. See
supra note 51.
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in good faith rather than to conceal a breach of the safeguards obli-
gations. Under these circumstances, one would hesitate to claim
that the self-judging character of the withdrawal clause, even if
deemed self-judging with respect to each judgment the clause
requires a state to make before it may give the required notice of
withdrawal, renders the NPT devoid of legal obligation.83 Accord-
ingly, the plain meaning of article X(1) ought to control, and a
state's right to withdraw should be given the maximum deference
possible consistent with the requirement of good faith performance
of a treaty.84
Does good faith exercise of a withdrawal right require more than
mere notification to the Security Council and to the parties to the
NPT? Article 65 of the Vienna Convention provides: first, "[a]
party which, under the provisions of the present Convention,
invokes.., a ground for... withdrawing from it or suspending its
operation, must notify the other parties of its claim";85 second, the
state may not implement its withdrawal, "except in cases of special
urgency,.., less than three months after the receipt of the notifica-
tion";8 6 and, third, if any state objects, the withdrawing state must
"seek a solution through the means indicated in article 33 of the
Charter of the United Nations." 87 The latter prescribes "negotia-
tion, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle-
ment, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice" and Security Council inter-
vention.88 Compliance with these procedures could thus imply a
duty to suspend any attempt to exercise the right to withdraw until
the dispute resolution procedures specified in article 33 of the
Charter are exhausted.
83. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ice. v. U.K.), 1973 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 2), reprinted in 12
I.L.M. 290 (1973) (suggesting that arguments derived from common law doctrine of
consideration may be applicable to international agreements). Accordingly, the proverbial
"peppercorn" involving the identification of any quantum of consideration, even if a major
portion of the agreed exchange fails, would be sufficient to validate an agreement. Any
period of notice of termination, regardless of its duration, would be sufficient to sustain the
agreement. Cf. E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 2.14 (1990); see also infra
note 194 for a discussion of the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case.
84. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339 ("Every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."). As
a result, even self-judging withdrawal clauses are subject to the requirement of good faith.
Schwelb, supra note 76, at 663.
85. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 65, para. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347.
86. Id. art. 65, para. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347.
87. Id. art. 65, para. 3, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347.
88. U.N. Charter art. 33.
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However, even assuming all these intricate requirements apply
to article X(1) withdrawals (which is doubtful),89 the NPT right to
withdraw may be regarded as a specific regime (a lex specialis) not
subject to article 65 of the Vienna Convention.9" Moreover, the
Vienna Convention specifically permits a state to exercise its right
of withdrawal "in answer to another party claiming performance of
the treaty or alleging its violation."9' Thus, absent any procedural
barrier establishing objective grounds for challenging the legality
of the exercise of the right to withdraw, it seems the validity of
withdrawal should be viewed solely under the framework of the
general principle of good faith.92
Yet the precise content of good faith in the law of treaties relat-
ing to a self-judging decision may not be ascertainable. It may
even be tautological: the commentary to article 26 of the Vienna
Convention treats "good faith" as an integral part of the pacta sunt
89. For example, invoking "extraordinary events" under article X(1) of the NPT is
arguably not a ground "under the provisions of the present Convention" for purposes of
article 65(1) of the Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 65, para. 1,
1155 U.N.T.S. at 347. Moreover, applying article 67, which describes the form instruments
of withdrawal must take expressly treats withdrawal pursuant to the provisions of the
treaty as a category separate from a withdrawal pursuant to article 65: "[a]ny act...
withdrawing from... a treaty pursuant to the provisions of the treaty or of paragraphs 2 or
3 of article 65." Id. art. 67, para. 2,1155 U.N.T.S. at 348 (emphasis added). Accordingly, it
would be strained to construe the term withdrawal "under the provisions of the present
Convention" pursuant to article 65(1) to include withdrawal under treaties expressly
providing for withdrawal. The domain of article 65 must then be those treaties which are
silent on the subject and for which the procedural mechanisms set forth in article 65 would
facilitate the resolution of disputes over unilateral termination. Finally, it would be hard to
question a withdrawal from the NPT under the exception in article 65(2) of the Vienna
Convention for special urgency, even if the rule in article 65(2) were applicable.
90. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 65, paras. 1, 4, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347, 348.
Article 65(4) states that "[n]othing in the forgoing paragraphs shall affect the rights or
obligations of the parties under any provisions in force binding the parties with regard to
the settlement of disputes." Id.; see infra note 99 and accompanying text. This clause
functions in tandem with the limitation of the domain of article 65(1) to withdrawal "under
the provisions of the present Convention." See supra note 89.
91. Id. art. 65, para. 5, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 348 ("The fact that a State has not previously
made the notification prescribed in paragraph 1 shall not prevent it from making such
notification in answer to another party claiming performance of the treaty or alleging its
violation.").
92. One scholar reviewing the negotiating history of article 65 of the Vienna Convention
has concluded that the ILC reached an impasse on the question of whether a state could
take unilateral action after it had unsuccessfully pursued the dispute resolution procedures
contemplated under the Convention. Arie E. David, The Strategy of Treaty Termination
167 (1975) (quoting Special Rapporteur to the ILC, Sir Humphrey WValdock, who
commented on draft article 65 that "[i]f after [seeking pacific settlement under U.N.
auspices] the parties should reach a deadlock, it would be for each Government to
appreciate the situation and to act as good faith demands.") (emphasis omitted).
780 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34:749
servanda rule itself, raising the proverbial dilemma of the chicken
and the egg.93 Theories that have been advanced for divining the
meaning of good faith seem too indeterminate to be of much use in
constructing objective criteria that could facilitate resolution of
concrete cases.94 And even if a self-judging withdrawal right has
been exercised in bad faith, it might still be that, rather than invali-
93. See David, supra note 92, at 170. David has persuasively argued that unilateral
termination pursuant to article 65 of the Vienna Convention depends on circular
reasoning: whether a withdrawal is lawful depends on whether it is undertaken in good
faith; and whether withdrawal is in good faith depends on whether the party has the right
to withdraw.
94. One could develop a method based on evaluating the process of interpretation.
David postulates, for example, that the best solution is to treat good faith in this context as
a duty not to abuse legal rights by an over-literal interpretation of a treaty. Id. at 171;
accord J.F. O'Connor, Good Faith in International Law 122 (1991). O'Connor notes,
however, that whether an "abuse of rights" is a breach of a legal obligation, rather than
merely an act bringing upon its author political and moral consequences, is a matter on
which there has been serious disagreement. O'Connor, supra, at 83. O'Connor contrasts
Judges Alvarez and Azevedo's concurring opinions in Conditions of Admission of a State
to Membership in the United Nations, 1948 I.C.J. 57 (May 28), in which both considered
votes to deny admission to the United Nations based on political, rather than legal, criteria
to be an abuse of rights. Although Judge Alvarez did not consider this a legal question,
Judge Azevedo did. O'Connor, supra, at 71, 81.
Alternatively, one could measure the good faith of an interpretation by whether it falls
within a range of substantive outcomes. Ian Johnstone, for example, has argued that an
interpretation which does not fall within the range of permissible constructions, as
reflected in community judgments, is as much abrogation of a treaty as withdrawal
pursuant to an express right. See Ian Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of
Interpretive Communities, 12 Mich. J. Int'l L. 371, 384-85 (1991). While Johnstone notes
that the explicit, self-judging withdrawal clause in the Limited Test Ban Treaty upon which
article X of the NPT was modeled would, as a practical matter, be "subject to indirect
community judgment," he does not appear to advance the more radical proposition that
community judgment in this context is relevant to the legal validity of the exercise of the
right of withdrawal. Id. at 384 n.50, 388 n.60. For an explication of the idea that the
international legal order is a primitive legal system, in the sense that term is used by
H.L.A. Hart, because it relies uniquely on community judgments (particularly those of
international lawyers) for authoritative decision, see Terry Nardin, Law, Morality and the
Relations of States 166-186 (1983). However, significant barriers prevent the use of the
relevant interpretive community for assessing the meaning of a clause, such as the NPT
withdrawal clause, so close to the sources of state sovereignty and thus survival; chiefly,
one would counsel caution in relying on opinions of private actors formed without the
benefit of all the information, including that acquired covertly, available to the government
of the withdrawing state. Surely questions about the legitimacy of objective evaluation of
such decisions would suggest a need for a precautionary principle governing international
lawyers' claims that a state's withdrawal from the NPT was not legally defensible. Cf.
Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 9 (1994) (recognizing the need
for "more empirical inquiry" as to "whether a specialized 'interpretive community',"
particularly international lawyers, "influences state responses to the controversial issues
raised in U.N. bodies"). For a potentially persuasive case that the United States breached
its article VII obligations under the NPT by refusing to pursue comprehensive test ban
negotiations during the 1980's, see David A. Koplow, Parsing Good Faith: Has the United
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date withdrawal, the bad faith exercise of the right is a separate
breach of the duty of good faith.95 The remedy for breach of the
duty of good faith may not be the invalidation of the withdrawal.
96
Thus, it is difficult to argue that a withdrawing state would be
required by the treaty termination provisions of the law of treaties,
or the general principle of good faith performance of a treaty, to
suspend its attempt to withdraw. In the absence of such a proce-
dural mechanism, it is hard to see how the principle of good faith
could be given enough weight to override a sovereign right to with-
draw so explicitly recognized in the NPT.
One possible counterargument remains, however. Perhaps the
fact that the NPT refers the issue of withdrawal to the Security
Council implicitly invokes the general pacific settlement proce-
dures under chapter VI of the U.N. Charter. Yet, if anything, the
requirement of notice to the Security Council suggests that the
NPT recognizes that the fundamental question posed by with-
drawal can be addressed only through political, not legal, means.
The Council, of course, particularly through its binding decisions, is
the international system's preeminent political venue for evaluat-
ing the "supreme national interest" of states in protecting them-
selves from nuclear attack or any other "threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression." 97 If withdrawal itself
were a legal question, the parties to the NPT would also have
included a provision for dispute settlement by the legal organ of
the United Nations, the International Court of Justice.93 The func-
States Violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treat?, 1993 Wis. L Rev. 301
(1993).
95. See Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 1948
LCJ. at 79-80 (dissenting opinion of Judge Azevedo).
96. Reparations may be the alternative remedy. See Elisabeth Zoller, Peacetime
Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures 64-65 (1984). Alternatively, states
may wish to seek to invoke a bad faith withdrawal of a party from the NPT as a ground for
their own suspension or withdrawal from the Treaty, particularly if they are specially
affected. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 60, para. 2(c), 1155 U.N.T.S at 346.
97. U.N. Charter art. 39 (authorizing the Security Council to adopt measures binding,
pursuant to articles 25 and 48(2), on all members and, through them, international
organizations when the Council fulfils it obligation to "determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.").
98. This is not intended to question the competence of either the ICJ or the Security
Council to address the legal or political elements of a dispute, even though the matter
might simultaneously be before both bodies. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities
In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 LCJ. 392, 433-435 (Nov. 26). Thus, the
understanding of the parties concerning whether withdrawal is a legal or a political issue
might be inferred from their decision to include political, but not legal, dispute resolution
mechanisms.
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tion of the three-month notice period is thus to provide a time dur-
ing which political means may be found, particularly through the
intervention of the U.N. Security Council, to resolve the underly-
ing concerns giving rise to a state's decision to withdraw from the
Treaty.99
On the other hand, it might be argued that, by referring the mat-
ter to the Security Council, the Treaty implicitly incorporates the
Charter obligation to seek a peaceful resolution of the dispute
under the provisions of chapter VI,l°°even where (as argued
above) article 65 of the Vienna Convention referring to chapter VI
of the U.N. Charter is inapposite. The withdrawing party would
then be barred from completing withdrawal from the NPT and thus
creating an actual, rather than potential, threat to the peace-in a
sense, moving the situation from chapter VI to chapter VII-
10 1until it had exhausted chapter VI procedures. Yet it is doubtful
99. Shaker, supra note 58, at 895-96 (noting the Soviet representative's assertion that
"observance [of the NPT] and its effectiveness are bound to be related to the powers of the
Security Council") (quotation in original). Shaker himself adds that
[s]ince the decision to withdraw might most probably be based on security
considerations, as can be implied from the text of article X and its negotiating
history, the Security Council would be a suitable forum for meeting the security
preoccupations of the withdrawing Party. Moreover, the possibility that
withdrawal might imply or indicate an imminent acquisition of nuclear weapons
by the withdrawing State, may bring into play the Security Council resolution 255
on security guarantees .... The entire situation might thereafter be characterised
as a "threat to the peace" under Article 39, justifying the application of
appropriate sanctions.
Id.; see also Mason Wrillrich, The reaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:
Nuclear Technology Confronts World Politics, 77 Yale L. J. 1447, 1511 n.151 (1968) (noting
that the negotiating history indicates the defeat of the Rumanian objection to requiring
notification to the Security Council because "the right of withdrawal was within the exclu-
sive competence of every state and no other state or international organization was quali-
fied to discuss it"). Willrich goes on to assert that, "[t]he Security Council would probably
become involved, in any event, if a state sought to withdraw form the Teaty, if not to assist
the party considering withdrawal, then to consider sanctioning it for creating a situation
endangering the peace." Id.
100. See U.N. Charter art. 33(1) ("The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which
is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all,
seek a solution ... by peaceful means of their own choice."); see also id. art. 2(3) ("All
Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.").
101. The argument that a party withdrawing from the NPT must seek first to exhaust the
dispute resolution procedures set forth in article 33 of the U.N. Charter is not free from
doubt, however. As noted above, supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text, in the related
context of withdrawal from a treaty not under the specific rules set forth by that treaty,
article 65 of the Vienna Convention specifically requires exhaustion of the dispute
resolution procedures set forth in article 33 of the Charter. It is silent, however, on the
dispute resolution procedures that would govern withdrawal pursuant to the terms of the
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that under the current views of states, withdrawal would be barred
as a countermeasure under the Charter or, more generally, under
international law.10°
Neither is it certain that notice to the Security Council implies
that a situation triggering application of chapter VI has arisen.
Even if article 33 could be interpreted to bar completion of with-
drawal prior to exhaustion of chapter VI procedures, the critical
question would then be whether withdrawal would "likely...
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."
103
The example of the North Korean situation illustrates that negotia-
tions over the delicate subject of withdrawal are likely to induce
statements by the Security Council that tend to minimize the grav-
ity of the situation. In Resolution 825 (1993), the Security Council
merely noted the "crucial contribution which progress in non-
proliferation can make to the maintenance of international peace
and security," and asked the DPRK to "reconsider" its notice of
withdrawal.' 4 It should be noted, however, that the Resolution
failed to go as far as the NPT Depositaries' Statement, which
expressly declared that "withdrawal from the NPT would consti-
tute a serious threat to regional and international stability." '1 s
Although the Depositaries' Statement does not use the precise
Treaty. The only duty to pursue dispute resolution would then flow from the Charter itself,
which would in any event supersede the NPT and thus bind the withdrawing state. See
U.N. Charter art. 103. Accordingly, the parties to a dispute would need to comply with the
Charter's requirements before taking action. Possibly, the Charter could be interpreted to
require the parties to exhaust all available procedures before implementing withdrawal.
The strongest case for this proposition would appear to be that of a reprisal. See United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 LC.J. 1, 43 (May 24)
(the Court, appearing to reject the U.S. characterization of its use of force as a
humanitarian exercise, criticized the U.S. raid to rescue hostages as "calculated to
undermine respect for the judicial process"). Yet it is not clear there is international
acceptance for such a restriction in even this case. Compare Oscar Schachter, Dispute
Settlement and Countermeasures in the International Law Commission, 88 Am. J. Int'l L
471 (1994) (noting and criticizing the resistance of the ILC to the proposal that
countermeasures, defined not to include lawful responses such as retorsion or reciprocity,
be barred until dispute resolution procedures are exhausted) with Zoller, supra note 96, at
15-35, 122-24 (arguing that, even when the injured state elects not to treat a material
breach as a ground for suspension or termination of a treaty, other countermeasures in
response to breach are permissible; exploring criteria for when countermeasures subjudice
are permissible; and, in this connection, disagreeing with the ICJ's categorical disapproval
of the U.S. mission to rescue hostages taken in Tehran while the dispute was before the
Court).
102. See Schachter, Dispute Settlement and Countermeasures in the International Law
Commission, supra note 101, at 475.
103. U.N. Charter art. 33.
104. Resolution 825, supra note 8, pmbl. paras. 1, 3.
105. Depositaries' Statement, supra note 7, at 2.
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words of article 33, much less make the finding required for
mandatory chapter VII action, its intent seems clear. Thus, the
Security Council failed to endorse the Depositaries' conclusions or
draw any specific inferences as to the implications of withdrawal
from the NPT when it declared to use the language required to
trigger application of chapter VI of the Charter. Certainly the
DPRK would be able then to argue that the Council did not, within
the three-month time frame contemplated by the NPT, take the
position that the DPRK was legally required to defer withdrawal
pending exhaustion of dispute resolution procedures.
Finally, that article X(1) requires notification of the Security
Council suggests that the parties never saw withdrawal as a legal
issue. This follows from both the political nature of the Security
Council's functions and the fact that the Security Council need not
review the legality of a state's withdrawal before taking action. If,
for example, a state withdrew in order to commence a nuclear
weapons program after withdrawal, there would be no question of
its legality since customary international law does not prohibit the
acquisition of nuclear weapons. °6 This is not to say that the Secur-
ity Council or its members are precluded from making judgments
about the legality of a state's conduct that could help to establish a
political basis for Security Council enforcement action.107 That
said, it is equally clear that, under the law of the Charter, with-
drawal per se could present a basis in appropriate circumstances for
a Security Council finding in favor of chapter VII measures; the
breach of a legal obligation is not a prerequisite, but the facts
106. Szasz, Sanctions and International Nuclear Control, supra note 33, at 552 n.21
(suggesting that in establishing a basis for sanctions "it cannot be asserted that any state
which has not entered into a specific treaty, such as N.P.T. or Tiatelolco, is prohibited by
international law from manufacturing nuclear weapons or even from deploying and using
them"). But see S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 33d Sess., 2046 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
418 (1977) (imposing an arms embargo against South Africa because, among other things,
the Council feared that "South Africa is at the threshold of producing nuclear weapons")
(preambular para. 5).
107. The Security Council, in Resolution 687, based on its concerns over "reports in the
hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-
weapons programme contrary to its obligations" under the NPT, S.C. Resolution 687,
supra note 13, at 3, decided to impose strict limitations on Iraq's nuclear activities
exceeding those imposed by the NPT, id. at 6, para. 12; see Chauvistr6, supra note 30, at 6-
7 (characterizing the preambular clause as an "unusually broad interpretation of the NFT'
to prohibit merely the acquisition of nuclear material). Schachter has noted that, "[i]n
practice" the Security Council has imposed sanctions "against a state that has not complied
with a Charter requirement or significant legal obligation." Schachter, United Nations
Law, supra note 94, at 12.
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underlying it may be relevant to the Council's determination called
for in article 39.108
In sum, the article X(1) notice period establishes an important
legal obligation serving the fundamental interests of all parties to
the Treaty. The right to withdraw is subject, of course, to the
requirement of good faith; yet, none of the procedural mechanisms
under the Vienna Convention, customary international law, or the
U.N. Charter would appear to bar withdrawal even if disputed by
other parties to the NPT or members of the United Nations. Fur-
thermore, the text of the NPT calls upon the Security Council only
to perform the political functions contemplated by the Charter.
B. Context
The security assurances issued by the three original1°9 nuclear
weapon state parties to the NPT, and Security Council Resolution
255,110 also provide a context for interpreting article X(1) and
108. Schachter, United Nations Law, supra note 94, at 12 (observing that chapter VII
"was not meant to provide sanctions for enforcing international legal obligations as such"
and the Security Council may impose sanctions against "a state that has not violated
international law if the Council decides that sanctions are necessary to give effect to its
decisions in the interest of maintaining peace and security"); see also E. Szegilongi,
Unilateral Revisions of International Nuclear Supply Arrangements, 12 Int'l Law. 857, 862
(1978) (citing examples of lawful activity that could support such a finding). This is not to
argue that there is no theoretical limit to the Security Council's power to make a
determination that a situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security. See,
e.g., David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council,
87 Am. J. Int'l L. 552 (1993) (critiquing the so-called "reverse veto" exercised by the
permanent members of the Security Council to prevent the revocation of authorization
given in chapter VII resolutions for unilateral action by states, especially the permanent
members, and offering proposals for reform).
109. On March 9 and August 3, 1992, respectively, the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and France became parties to the NPT, the last of five original nuclear weapons
states eligible to become party to the Treaty under it terms. See Accession by France to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Dep't St. Dispatch, Aug. 10, 1992, at 631 (statement
released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary, Aug. 3, 1992). They did not appear to
extend their own security assurances, although France did not as a permanent member of
the Security Council in 1968 prevent adoption of Resolution 255. S.C. Res. 255, U.N.
SCOR, 23d Sess., 1433d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/255 (1968) [hereinafter S.C. Resolution
255]. On January 31, 1992, however, the President of the Security Council, speaking for
the whole Council including France and the PRC, affirmed the special role of the Security
Council in the prevention of the use of weapons of mass destruction. See Note by Security
Council President, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc S123500 (1992).
110. Resolution 255, as adopted, tracked the tripartite proposal submitted by the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee (ENDC). The resolution "[r]ecognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons
or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a
situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent
members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations" under the
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determining whether the legal efficacy of withdrawal from the
Treaty can be challenged. This is because the Eighteen Nation Dis-
armament Committee (ENDC) approved the draft treaty intro-
duced by the United States and the former Soviet Union and
recessed on March 14, 1968, only after the United Kingdom, the
United States, and the former Soviet Union introduced a proposal
for security assurances on March 7.111 In sum, the assurances,
11 2
U.N. Charter. S.C. Resolution 255, supra note 109. It further "[w]elcomes" the intention
of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union to "provide or
support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter" to a victim of nuclear
aggression, and "[r]eaffirms" the right of individual or collective self-defense "until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security." Id.
111. International Negotiations, supra note 71, at 112-14.
112. The U.S. assurance states, in pertinent part:
Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression ... would
create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which are
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act
immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to
counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression .... Therefore,
any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons
or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be
countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United
Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.
The United States affirms its intention, as a permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide
assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State
party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that is a victim of
an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear
weapons are used.
The United States reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under
Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed
attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.
Id. at 167.
The significance of these assurances as a matter of international and domestic law, how-
ever, is doubtful. According to U.S. interpretation, they do not impose additional legal
obligations on the United States other than those that already may exist under the Charter.
See Edwin B. Firmage, The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 63 Am.
J. Int'l L. 711, 742 (1969). Their status under domestic law governing the U.S. interpreta-
tion of U.S. obligations under the NPT might also be questioned, as they were explicitly
disavowed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during hearings on NPT ratifica-
tion. Id. (quoting the Committee's statement that its "support of the Nonproliferation
Treaty is in no way to be construed as approval of the security guarantee measures embod-
ied in the United Nations resolution or the supporting U.S. declaration"). Expanded
security assurances have been extended by the United States to Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan, in connection with their recent adherence to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon
states. See START II Treaty Bolsters U.S. Security and Supports Broader Foreign Policy
Goals, U.S. Department of State Dispatch 65, vol. 6, no. 6, Feb. 6,1995, at 65 (Statement of
Secretary of State Christopher on Jan. 31, 1995 before the Senate Foreign Relations Coin-
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taken together, express a judgment that the use of nuclear weapons
against a non-nuclear weapons state would, by definition, satisfy
the legal standard set forth in article 39 of the Charter for enforce-
ment action. However, they do not contemplate or discuss the
underlying legality of such a "use" of nuclear weapons. 13 Because
withdrawal, regardless of its legality, could permit the inference
that the withdrawing state is on the path towards developing
nuclear weapons, 1 4 it might create an incentive for a preemptive
use of force by another state to dismantle the withdrawing state's
nuclear infrastructure. 1 5 Because neither the security assurances
nor Resolution 255 turns on the legality of the possession or the
use of nuclear weapons, and withdrawal could itself pose the threat
of use of nuclear weapons regardless of its legality, arguably the
security assurances and Resolution 255 provide additional support
for the inference that the Security Council would not need to eval-
uate the legality of withdrawal pursuant to article X(1).
C. Object and Purpose
The object and purpose of article X(1) also tend to support a
construction of the article as fully self-judging. One plausible way
to evaluate the object and purpose of the withdrawal clause is to
consider how the right of withdrawal under the Treaty differs from
the right of withdrawal states would otherwise have in the absence
of such a clause." 6 Setting aside defects in formation invalidating
the agreement, a state may withdraw from a treaty of a permanent
character under two circumstances: first, in the event of any mate-
mittee). For the text of the U.S. security assurance to Ukraine, see U.S., Russian and
British Security Assurances to Ukraine, Arms Control Today, Jan.Feb. 1995, at 11.
113. The ICJ may soon consider this question. See Applications of the World Health
Organization for an Advisory Opinion Concerning the Legality of the Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1993 I.CJ. 93 (Sept. 13).
114. See Shaker, supra note 58, at 896.
115. See, e.g., Philip Zelikow, Offensive Military Options, in New Nuclear Nations,
Consequences for U.S. Policy 162,164 (Robert D. Blackwill & Albert Carnesale eds., 1993)
(noting the "value of amending international law norms" to authorize future preventative
military measures like Israel's 1981 raid on the Iraqi nuclear facility at Al-Tuweitba).
116. But see Cindy A. Cohn, Note, Interpreting the Withdrawal Clause in Arms Control
Treaties, 10 Mich. J. Int'l L. 849, 855, 858-64 (1989) (arguing that criteria for establishing
rebus sic stantibus may also provide guidance for determining when withdrawal clauses
may be invoked in arms control treaties.).
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rial breach by another party;"17 and, second, under the doctrine of
rebus sic stantibus, or fundamental change of circumstances.
118
Under material breach analysis, a distinction must be drawn in
terms of the character of the treaty. In a bilateral treaty, the right
of termination in the event of material breach is rather straightfor-
ward."19 In a multilateral treaty, a party must show that the breach
by a defaulting state "radically changes the position of every party
with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the
treaty."' 20 Because the NPT is a multilateral treaty, the strenuous
conditions imposed by the Vienna Convention on termination or
suspension of obligations in response to breach provide a clear
rationale for a self-judging withdrawal clause.
12'
117. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346.
118. See id. art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347. For purposes of analysis, this Article will treat
the NPT as though it were a treaty of unlimited duration because, though its initial term is
only 25 years, the Treaty could be extended indefinitely. Also, the NPT duration clause
does not provide that the Treaty will terminate if the parties fail to take action at the
Extension Conference. Treaties of unlimited duration present the strongest case for
applying the rule of rebus sic stantibus. But see Shaker, supra note 58, at 898 (stating that
"the invocation of a fundamental change of circumstances does not arise in the case of the
NPT, since the Treaty already contains a clause permitting a Party to withdraw," and
quoting the observation of the ILC in its commentary on article 59 of the draft version of
the Vienna Convention that the "fundamental change rule would for obvious reasons...
seldom or never have relevance for treaties of limited duration or which are terminable
upon notice") (internal quotations omitted).
119. Article 60(1) of the Vienna Convention, supra note 9, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346,
expressly provides that "[a] material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties
entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending
its operation in whole or in part."
120. Id. art. 60, para. 2(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346.
121. To be more precise, article 60(2) of the Vienna Convention provides different rules
for three separate cases. Id. art. 60, para. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346. Paragraph 60(2)(a)
permits the other parties to terminate the agreement by unanimous consent. Because a
nuclear weapons program by one state party would not necessarily have the same effect on
all state parties, it is rather doubtful that unanimous consent could ever be secured for the
termination of the non-acquisition obligations of the NPT.
Paragraph 60(2)(b), however, permits "[a] party specially affected by the breach" to
suspend the operation of the treaty between "itself and the defaulting State." Id. art. 60,
para. 2(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346. Yet the right of suspension as between a state and the
defaulting state would not in itself relieve the non-defaulting state of its obligations vis-a-
vis other parties to the NPT. Schwelb has considered this point in connection with
Secretary Rusk's assertion at Senate hearings on the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) that,
in the event of a material breach by a party of the LTBT, the United States would be
entitled to resume nuclear testing without delay and without regard to the period of
withdrawal specified in article IV of the LTBT. See Schwelb, supra note 76, at 663.
Schwelb concluded, relying principally on the preparatory materials to what later became
article 60 of the Vienna Convention, that Secretary Rusk's claim could be grounded on the
essentially bilateral character of the undertakings by the United States and the former
Soviet Union not to test nuclear devices in the atmosphere, even if it could not be
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Rebus sic stantibus, by contrast, in either a bilateral or multilat-
eral instrument, permits withdrawal under stringent conditions
relating to the occurrence of unforeseen events undercutting the
essential basis for the party's consent and radically transforming
the party's executory obligations.'22 Notably, the Vienna Convert-
demonstrated that the United States would be "specially affected" by the Soviet Union's
material breach. Id. at 663, 667-69. Under these circumstances, the rules governing
withdrawal in the event of material breach would be more properly drawn from the regime
of bilateral treaties.
Finally, paragraph 60(2)(c) gives "any party other than the defaulting state" the right to
suspend "the operation of the treaty... with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a
character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the
position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the
treaty." Given the existence of other nuclear weapons states outside the treaty even at its
inception, namely France and the PRC, it is equally questionable whether a single state's
breach of its 6bligations under the NPT could reasonably be said to "change the position of
every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations." Vienna
Convention, supra note 9, art 60, para. 2(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346.
Thus, taking the case of North Korea, given the presence of a nuclear weapon state in
the region, it might be questionable that even the DPRK's neighbors would be "specially
affected" or that the breach would "radically change[ ] the position of every other party"
for purposes of the Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 60, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 346. Yet, it is questionable whether the NPT could be seen as a bilateral
agreement, as argued by Schwelb with respect to the LTBT. Moreover, Schwelb's analysis
is problematic even as applied to the LTBT alone. Accordingly, the need for a special
withdrawal clause would appear to be overwhelming.
122. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention provides:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by
the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from
the treaty unless: (a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential
basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty;, and (b) The effect of
the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed
under the treaty.
Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347. The narrowness of the
doctrine is emphasized by the fact that the rule is stated in negative terms; in other words,
rebus sic stantibus is unavailable unless stringent conditions are met. See Heribert F.
Koeck, The "Changed Circumstances" Clause After the United Nations Conference on the
Law of Treaties (1968-69), 4 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L 93, 103 (1974).
A state might plausibly argue that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by its neighbor,
assuming the neighbor lacked nuclear weapons when it signed the NPT, is also an "essen-
tial basis" for the state's consent, thus meeting the condition set forth in paragraph
62(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 62, para. 1(a),
1155 U.N.T.S. at 347. On the other hand, it is somewhat more difficult to maintain that the
possibility of a state's developing nuclear weapons, either within the treaty or outside the
treaty, is "not foreseen" within the meaning of article 62(1). (Breach is not relevant to
rebus sic stantibus;, it is addressed, instead, under the principles governing withdrawal in
response to material breach.) It is difficult, moreover, to argue that the non-acquisition
obligation for NNWS parties could be "radically transformed" within the meaning of arti-
cle 62(1)(b). Indeed, the obligation is invariant with respect to whether neighboring states,
or any other states, possess nuclear weapons or the technical capability to produce nuclear
1994]
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tion has been interpreted to impose an objective standard on the
assertion of rebus sic stantibus,123 and to exclude application of the
doctrine in cases where the fundamental change of circumstances
results from a state seeking termination of the treaty.
1 24
It might then be inferred that the NPr withdrawal clause should
be construed to dispense with the restrictive conditions of the
Vienna Convention approach to unilateral termination on the basis
of a fundamental change of circumstances. In effect, the parties
must have doubted that either material breach or rebus sic stan-
tibus would have given them sufficient security to escape from their
obligations in appropriate circumstances.11 Article X(1) must, at a
minimum, permit withdrawal in some cases where these doctrines
would have not permitted withdrawal. Accordingly, it would
appear to be unreasonable to attempt to limit the right of with-
drawal to those cases where a state is predicating its withdrawal on
concerns regarding another state's compliance or a change of cir-
cumstances contemplated by article 60 of the Vienna Convention.
Does this analysis compel the conclusion that no objective crite-
ria are available to assess a withdrawal under article X(1)? Per-
haps not, but it would still reframe the question posed by article
X(1) as one more daunting than even the one posed by a with-
drawal based on rebus sic stantibus. Could one develop objective
criteria to delimit a category of "extraordinary events" less
momentous than those justifying withdrawal under material breach
or rebus sic stantibus, yet sufficiently "extraordinary" to justify
withdrawal from the NPT? Such a construction of the withdrawal
clause would seem to be unnecessary when the Vienna Conven-
tion's reformulation of rebus sic stantibus into an objective doctrine
can reasonably be seen to have driven the parties to the NPT to an
entirely subjective formulation of the right to withdraw.
weapons. Finally, while the NPT is a security treaty, and thus does not benefit from the
exclusion from rebus sic stantibus set forth in article 62(2)(a) for treaties establishing a
boundary, surely the policies favoring stability of boundaries are equally relevant to stabil-
ity in the NPT regime. If that is true, then one would be even more hesitant to invoke
article 62 as a ground for withdrawing from the NPT.
123. See Koeck, supra note 122, at 115; cf. Kelvin Widdows, The Unilateral
Denunciation of Treaties Containing No Denunciation Clause, 53 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 83, 86-
93 (1982) (discussing the ILC's adoption of the position that the "character" of certain
treaties, such as treaties establishing a permanent regime or treaties of alliance, make
escape based on rebus sic stantibus less permissible).
124. Id. at 109 (citing article 62(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention).
125. See Richard B. Bilder, Managing the Risks of International Agreement 52-55
(1981) (describing the Supreme National Interests Clause as a risk-reduction technique,
controlling the risk that other possible bases for withdrawal will be unavailable).
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D. Subsequent Practice
Subsequent agreements related to the NPT, such as the NPT
safeguards agreements, also suggest that a dispute over withdrawal
before the Security Council would not be amenable to resolution
as a legal dispute. Normally, disputes between the safeguarded
state and the IAEA concerning the implementation of an NPT
safeguards agreement, including a finding by the Board of Gover-
nors that a special inspection is "essential and urgent,"1  are sub-
ject to compulsory dispute resolution.'" However, when the
IAEA Board of Governors finds that it "is unable to verify"
whether nuclear materials subject to safeguards have been diverted
from peaceful purposes, it may then make the reports to the Secur-
ity Council and General Assembly that it would be required to
make under article XII.A.6 of the IAEA Statute in the case of non-
compliance. 128 In that circumstance, the matter would not be sub-
126. INFCIRC/153, supra note 23, para. 18.
127. See id. para. 22; see also LAEA Statute, supra note 1, art. XVII, 8 U.S.T. at 1110,
276 U.N.T.S. at 34.
128. Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute provides: "The Board shall report the non-
compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the
United Nations." IAEA Statute, supra note 1, art XILC, 8 U.S.T. at 1107,276 U.N.T.S. at
30. In some instances (particularly where even compliance with safeguards obligations
would not permit the Agency to assert that it believed all nuclear material in the state in
question was indeed subject to safeguards), paragraph 73 of INFCIRC/153 contemplates
the possibility of requesting "special inspections" under which the agency may have the
right to inspect "locations in addition to the access specified ... for ad hoc or routine
inspections, or both." INFCIRC/153, supra note 23, para. 73.
Once the Board of Governors of the IAEA makes the finding set forth in paragraph 18
of INFCIRC/153-that the Agency cannot assure the international community that the
state in question has complied with its NPT obligations not to divert nuclear material for
weapons related purposes-it may call upon the state to permit the special inspection. Id.
para. 18.
A technical argument could be made that the Board's right to make a finding of
noncompliance, and request a special inspection pursuant to paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/
153, does not in every instance amount to a finding of noncompliance with, or breach of,
the safeguards agreement. This view is supported by the formulation in paragraph 19 of
INFCIRC/153 in which the Board is authorized, in the event of noncompliance with the
request for special inspections, to make the report that it would be permitted to make
pursuant to the provisions of the Statute, which itself may be grounded explicitly on a
finding of noncompliance with a state's obligations under the Statute. See id. para. 19.
Accordingly, it might be argued that the simple refusal to comply with a request for a
special inspection is not necessarily a breach of a legal obligation, in terms of the
INFCIRC153 safeguards agreement or the Statute of the IAEA. Thus, the
"noncompliance" of a state reported to the Security Council by the Board of Governors
pursuant to paragraph 19 of the safeguards agreement would not amount to a report of a
breach of a legal obligation. Under this construction of the legal meaning of a paragraph
19 report, it might plausibly be inferred that the parties to the NPT accepted the
proposition that even a failure to comply with a request for a special inspection, where
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ject to dispute resolution.129 Thus, compulsory dispute resolution is
excluded by the NPT safeguards agreement even for disputes in
which the IAEA is not prepared to find a state to have breached,
or be in "noncompliance" with, its obligations under the safeguards
agreement. 30 This decision to foreclose use of a legal forum for
the resolution of disputes further suggests that the reference to the
Security Council, pursuant to article X(1) of the NPT, is not a legal
issue.
E. Treaty History
The language found in article X(1) was drawn from a compara-
ble provision in the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). The only
real difference is the addition in the NPT of the procedural
requirement of notice to the Security Council and the other parties
to the treaty.'3 ' Similar language has been included in virtually all
subsequent arms control agreements concluded by the United
States. It should be noted at the outset that the clause represented
such failure did not amount to a breach of a legal obligation, could still raise a question of a
potential threat to international peace and security that would be squarely within the
competence of the Security Council.
129. INFCIRC/153, supra note 23, para. 19. That said, there is at least the theoretical
possibility that precluding dispute resolution of claims arising under the safeguards
agreement would not foreclose a claim that a special inspection request by the Board of
Governors violates a state's rights under the IAEA Statute, apart from the safeguards
agreement, which could be subject to the separate dispute resolution obligation found in
article XVII of the IAEA Statute.
130. In the case of North Korea, given the strong evidence of concealment of nuclear
material, the IAEA actually found the DPRK to be in "noncompliance" for refusing to
comply with the request for a special inspection. See DPRK/IAEA Safeguards
Agreement, supra note 45, arts. 23, 33. It is not clear, however, that the Board would be in
a position to make a finding of noncompliance whenever there is a disagreement about a
special inspection. The argument here is based on the fact that the minimal assumption for
referral to the Security Council, and exclusion of judicial dispute settlement under
INFCIRC/153, is that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there has not been a diversion
of nuclear material. If anything, this lower burden of proof for making the dispute
nonjusticiable strengthens the case for treating the whole issue as a political, rather than a
legal, dispute.
131. Secretary Rusk reported to the President that:
Article X provides a right of withdrawal upon three months notice if a party finds
that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have
jeopardized its supreme interests. This provision is the same as the withdrawal
provision in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty [the "LTBT"] except that it requires
notice of such withdrawal to be given to the United Nations Security Council as
well as to the other treaty parties and requires the notice to include a statement of
the extraordinary events involved.
Report by Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson on the Nonproliferation Treaty, S.
Ex. H, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. vi-xii, 6 (1968), reprinted in International Negotiations, supra
note 71, at 179.
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a failure of the United States and Great Britain to secure in the
LTBT a withdrawal clause explicitly providing for quasi-adjudica-
tive, third-party review.132  It reflected an attempt to provide
explicitly in the LTBT a right the former Soviet Union asserted it
had on the basis of sovereignty: the right to withdraw solely at its
own discretion. 3
How the United States, as one of the lead drafters of the clause,
publicly characterized article X(1)'s meaning is an important refer-
ence point in determining the intent of the parties. In representing
article X(1) to the Senate in hearings on U.S. ratification of the
NPT, Secretary of State Rogers appears to have advanced inter-
nally contradictory views. On the one hand, Senator Javits and the
Secretary seemed to agree that the U.S. exercise of its right to
withdraw could not be questioned by any other state; on the other
132. See Note, Legal Models of Arms Control: Past, Present, and Future, 100 Harv. L
Rev. 1327,1330 (1987) (noting proposal for a "withdrawal provision based upon a claim for
withdrawal, presentation of evidence, and an assessment of the issue by a multilateral
commission").
133. Secretary Rusk explained before the Senate that the Soviet Union considered a
withdrawal clause superfluous because states had a right to withdraw from any treaty as a
function of sovereignty. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate
Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1963) [hereinafter LTBT
Hearings]. Rusk added that the United States and its western allies believed that the
Soviet view evidenced too little respect for international law and that it was necessary,
therefore, to insert a clause which would be
flexible, and very flexible, [but] would make it quite clear that the purposes of the
treaty, the subject matter of the treaty, and the jeopardy to the supreme interests
of the country, would have to be involved to permit withdrawal from the treaty,
and that a country could not withdraw for simply frivolous or unrelated matters
as matter of whim and still pretend that it is legal within the treaty to do so.
Id. But see Cohn, supra note 116, at 850-51 (relying on this language to argue that the
clause, in effect, is not entirely subjective in its application). On the other hand, when
pressed, Rusk refused to articulate criteria for determining when something could be con-
sidered "related to the subject matter of this treaty," saying "flexibility was something
which we wanted and which the other side also wanted. So I would hope we wouldn't try to
find the exact boundaries on these extraordinary events related to the subject matter. It is
a very flexible clause." LTBT Hearings, supra, at 51.
Schwelb points out that this view of the Soviet doctrine of international law seems at
odds with the typical Soviet position which emphasizes the strict observance of treaty obli-
gations. See Schwelb, supra note 76, at 661. It appears, however, that the Soviets have
articulated this view, at least with respect to international organizations, and particularly in
the context of the Charter to the United Nations (which contains no withdrawal clause but
which, based on a clear understanding at the San Francisco conference, is thought to per-
mit withdrawal). See Widdows, supra note 123, at 99 & n.39. The Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency General Counsel George Bunn reports that he was told by Chief U.S.
Negotiator Adrian Fisher that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko took the position that,
because a state could always withdraw, a special withdrawal clause was unnecessary.
George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee: Managing the Negotiations with the Russians
38 (1992).
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hand, they seemed to suggest the United States could hold others
to a "standard" of performance.1 34 While not a commanding per-
formance-amenable, perhaps, to the construction that U.S. rights
are self-judging while Soviet rights are not-Secretary Rogers, on
134. The colloquy is quoted at length to illustrate the subtlety of the exchange:
Senator Javits. [Article X(1)] says each party shall, exercising its national
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that
extraordinary interests related to the subject matter of this treaty have
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. That is a completely unilateral
decision, is it not?
Secretary Rogers. That is right.
Senator Javits. And not subject to contest?
Secretary Rogers. That is right.
Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 367-68 (1969) [hereinafter NPT Hearings]. However, seconds
later, Secretary Rogers appeared to reverse course when he was asked to consider the case
of Soviet withdrawal based on a position that the United States might regard as frivolous:
Senator Javits. Nothing could stop them?
Secretary Rogers. That is true.








Do we feel the same way? Will we, if we decide
unilaterally we ought to pull out, pull out-without getting
all tangled up in legal justifications and self-inhibiting
restrictions?
Well, Senator, you ask, will we feel the same way. I don't
think the Soviet Union would feel that way to begin with.
So I wouldn't want to say we would feel the same way. I
think we would consider the provisions of article X, and we
would take them very seriously, and we would not think of
withdrawing unless the language of the treaty applied.
In other words, I think it would have to be a situation
where extraordinary events related to the subject matter of
this treaty jeopardized the supreme interests of their
country.
In other words, I wouldn't want to leave the impression
that we were just taking this treaty lightly and any time we
could pull out in 3 months. I think the language is pretty
clear, and we take the language very seriously.
And we would endeavor to hold the Soviet Union to the
same standard?
Well, we would-
And it should really be honestly something that they could
claim, with at least some color of plausibility, represented a
jeopardy to the supreme interests of their country?
Yes. We would think that, we would hope that they had
the same general attitude about this treaty that we have,
but certainly, Senator, it is in their interests, I think, as it is
in our interests, to ratify this treaty and in their interests to
continue the treaty. So I don't believe it is a matter of
enforcement. It is just a matter of judgment.
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closer inspection, carefully articulated a fine line between legal and
political obligation. When he described U.S. and Soviet legal
fights, he categorically agreed with Senator Javits that "nothing"
can impair the right to withdraw. But, when asked how the United
States would, or the Soviet Union should, exercise their rights to
withdraw, he explained how the United States would, not "must,"
interpret the treaty, invoking the language of good faith.13 How-
ever, his language in this context was merely precatory. Nowhere
did he withdraw his earlier categorical assertions about the scope
of U.S. and Soviet withdrawal rights. At a minimum, then, at least
with respect to its representations to the Congress, the Executive
Branch did not argue that there were legal limits on a state's right
to withdraw from the NPT.136 Surely, if the United States had
believed that article X(1) gave state parties the right to challenge
the legal validity of this ostensibly self-judging clause, the Secretary
of State would have said so.
135. The United States would "take the language very seriously," and an interpretation
"should really be honestly something... with some color of plausibility." Id. at 368; cf.
U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977) ("honesty in fact") and § 2-103(1)(b) ("honesty in fact" and
"observance of reasonable ... standards") (standards of United States commercial law no
doubt familiar to Secretary Rogers, a former Attorney General in the Eisenhower
Administration).
136. The argument advanced here is merely that the Secretary's testimony bears on the
subsequent interpretation of article X by one of its principal drafters. This Article does not
explore the precise legal status of Secretaries Rusk or Rogers' representations vis a vis the
U.S. position. For a discussion of Executive Branch representations and treaty
interpretation, see, e.g., David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive
Reinterpretation of Arms Control reaties, 137 U. Pa. L Rev. 1353, 1434 (1989) (denying
the existence of any general Executive Branch power to reinterpret treaties, but noting
that "Executive Branch testimony should be treated as particularly compelling evidence of
what was integral to creating an enduring legislative understanding"). It seems clear that
any recent attempt by the Executive Branch to interpret article X could be characterized as
a "reinterpretation" at odds with one of the many strands of the ratification record. Such a
reinterpretation would raise difficult constitutional issues.
But such disputes may be inevitable in this context. For example, it appears that the
Supreme National Interests withdrawal clause in the LTBT ultimately was sought by the
Kennedy Administration, not to preserve rights against the Soviet Union, but rather to
ensure Senate approval. See Bunn, supra note 133, at 33. Also, it may well be that the
Clinton Administration's earlier proposal for a clause permitting withdrawal, without
cause after ten years, from the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, see R. Jeffrey
Smith, Total Nuclear Test Ban Favored. Clinton Overrule Pentagon Objections to Vin
Backing on Treaties, Wash. Post, Jan. 31, 1995, at A10, was driven by the Executive
Branch's desire to establish a right of withdrawal vis a vis Congress' broader right of
withdrawal Secretary Rogers articulated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
concerning how the United States would implement the Supreme National Interests
withdrawal clause in the NFP.
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The U.S. view seems to be sustained by the positions of other
participants to the ENDC, where two efforts to vary the U.S. draft
language-one seeking to delete the requirement for a statement
of reasons, the other seeking to provide criteria to facilitate assess-
ment of the legality of withdrawal-were rejected.137 Indeed, in
view of the negotiators' failure to agree on criteria for the exercise
of the right of withdrawal, it was widely understood that any with-
drawal would be a "highly controversial issue.1
38
137. The Rumanian representative at the ENDC appeared twice to have sought to
delete from article X(1) the requirement for an explanation of reasons for withdrawal. At
one point, Ambassador Escobesco argued that the content of a notice of withdrawal was
"within the exclusive competence" of withdrawing states. See International Negotiations,
supra note 71, at 90 (citing ENDC/PV.348, at 9). Later he argued that "the right to
withdraw was within the exclusive competence of every state and that no other state or
international organization was qualified to discuss it." Id. at 111 (citing ENDC/PV.376, at
10; ENDCIPV.376, at 5). The Nigerian representative also suggested that withdrawal
should be permitted "if treaty aims were being frustrated or security was being jeopardized
by the failure of a state or states to adhere to the treaty." Id. at 91 (citing Documents on
Disarmament 558 (1967)).
The Canadian representative opposed the Rumanian amendment on the ground that
withdrawal would be seen as indicating an intention to develop nuclear weapons and, thus,
"could lead to a chain reaction which might completely upset the treaty." Id. (citing
ENDCIPV.345, at 13). He also rejected limiting withdrawal to conform with treaty "aims,"
because he "doubted that it would help the stability of the treaty to include the provision
on treaty aims, which would be open to 'variable interpretations,'" and he believed that
the problem of states outside the treaty regime could be addressed by a state withholding
ratification if "it saw a threat to its security through the nonadherence of others." Id.
(citing ENDCPV.346, at 6). The Brazilian representative sought to remove the term
"extraordinary events" and replace a report to the Security Council with a report to the
depositaries. Id. at 111 (citing ENDC201, rev. 2). The Nigerian representative noted that
the terms "extraordinary events" and "supreme interests" were unclear, but averred that
"there should be no implication that the sovereign rights of states would be 'fettered' by
the treaty." Id. (citing ENDCtPV.371, at 9-10).
In this context, the U.S. representative stated that "each party would have the sovereign
right to make its own decision and to frame its statement it its own way. He did not see
why there should be any difficulty in meeting the [explanatory statement] requirement. In
his view, it was important to have a situation affecting intentional peace and security
discussed in the Security Council." Id. (citing ENDC/PV.368, at 10). In sum, however, the
Swedish representative wisely noted that "there was no authoritative interpretation of the
grounds for withdrawal and that there was uncertainty about the relationship between the
provisions on the review conference and those on withdrawal." Id. (citing ENDCtPV.373,
at 10).
138. See Shaker, supra note 58, at 893. But see K. Narayana Rao, Editorial Comment,
The Draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: A Critical Appraisal, 8 Indian
J. Int'l L. 223, 233 (1968) (advancing-presumably as a rationale for Indian
nonadherence-the strained argument that, because it is not clear that the "subject
matter" of the NPT includes nuclear attacks, it is therefore not clear that a state has the
right to withdraw in the event of a nuclear attack).
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IV. SURVIVAL OF SAFEGUARDS RIGHTS AFTER
NPT WrrHDRAWAL
Assuming a state withdraws from the NPT, one critical conse-
quence of its withdrawal is that the NPT safeguards agreement, by
its own terms, also terminates. 139 Accordingly, if the exercise of
the right of withdrawal under the NPT is not subject to any princi-
pled legal standards (including cases of withdrawal motivated by
the desire to conceal past violations of the NPT), states might be
encouraged to adhere to the NPT solely to reap the benefits of
nuclear cooperation but thereafter rid themselves of its burdens by
withdrawing with impunity."4 And, even assuming a party origi-
nally adhered in good faith, if the international community has rea-
son to suspect a breach of the NPT or the safeguards agreement,
the prospect of fully terminating safeguards obligations through
withdrawal, particularly the lapse of any special inspection request,
may encourage a state to seek to withdraw when it otherwise might
not do so.
A critical review of this issue, however, yields the conclusion that
some, though not all, safeguards rights should survive NPT with-
drawal. In support of this proposal, this Article will first discuss
the underpinnings and evolution of the survival doctrine in treaty
law and analyze its relevance to IAEA safeguards pursuant to the
NPT. It will then turn to interpretive materials relating specifically
to NPT safeguards agreements; in the absence of any provision
addressing perpetuity in the NPT safeguards agreement, it exam-
ines the relevant context and object and purpose of the agreement
(particularly from the standpoint of evaluating the relevance of
legal rights of nuclear suppliers party to the NPT). Fmally, it sug-
gests that the NPT itself would appear to confer upon the parties to
the Treaty the same rights as the IAEA would have under NPT
safeguards agreements, either as continuing rights or, in an appro-
priate case, as a remedy for breach of the Treaty.
139. INFCIRC/153, supra note 23, para. 26; see also DPRK/IAEA Safeguards
Agreement, supra note 45, art. 26 (specifically providing that "[t]his Agreement shall
remain in force as long as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a party to the
Treaty").
140. NPT, supra note 4, art. 4, 21 U.S.T. at 489-9D, 729 U.N.T.S. 172-73 (discussing
efforts to facilitate nuclear cooperation under the treaty); see also Fred Charles Ikd, After
Detection-What?, 39 Foreign Aft. 208, 216 (1961).
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A. The Principle of Survival of Rights
The modem formulation of the idea that treaty obligations can
survive the termination of a treaty is found in article 70 of the
Vienna Convention, which provides:
Unless a treaty otherwise provides or the parties other-
wise agree, the termination of a treaty under its provi-
sions or in accordance with the present Convention:
(a) Releases the parties from any obligation further to
perform the treaty; [but]
(b) Does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation
of the parties created through the execution of the treaty
prior to its termination.
14 1
Application of these principles does not turn on whether the treaty
is bilateral or multilateral,142 or on whether its parties include an
international organization. 143 Accordingly, the rule is stated as one
of general applicability in section 338 of the Restatement (Third) of
141. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 70, para. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 349. A similar
distinction may be found in U.S. commercial law under Section 2-106(3) of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which provides that: "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant
to a power created by agreement puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach.
On "termination" all obligations which are still executory on both sides are discharged but
any right based on prior breach or performance survives. This formulation thus
distinguishes between claims based on breach and those based on performance, unlike
article 70, which address only the case of rights derived from performance, thus leaving the
question of breach to the law of state responsibility. See infra notes 175-176.
142. Article 70(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that: "If a State denounces or
withdraws from a multilateral treaty, paragraph 1 applies in the relations between that
State and each of the other parties to the treaty from the date when such denunciation or
withdrawal takes effect." Id. art. 70, para. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 349. Thus, the parties' right,
individually or collectively, to the NPT safeguards provided for in article III(1) might
survive North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT under the principles found in article 70(2).
For convenience, this Article will henceforth analyze the forgoing questions as though
article 70(1) of the Vienna Convention were directly applicable.
143. Because the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement, supra note 45, is not technically
an agreement between "states," within the meaning of articles 1 and 2(1)(a) of the Vienna
Convention, article 70 of the Vienna Convention is not directly applicable to its
interpretation. Nonetheless, reliance on the principles stated in article 70 does not turn on
this fact. Identical concepts are found in article 70 of the Vienna Convention on
International Organizations. See discussion supra note 49. Therefore, these concepts can
be considered generally applicable to international agreements, including those involving
international organizations, as a matter of customary international law of treaty
interpretation. Thus, the IAEA's right to safeguards might survive the termination of the
IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement under principles articulated in article 70(1) of the
Vienna Convention. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 70, para. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S.
at 349.
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the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,1" although neither
the comment nor the reporter's notes to that section discuss its
meaning or cite any illustrative cases.
The principle of survival of rights has been described as "self-
evident." 145 However, there does not appear to have been a con-
sistently accepted theoretical foundation for its application, as evi-
denced in judicial decisions and the various efforts to formulate it
as a rule of treaty law discussed below. Courts and commentators,
both international and municipal, have often addressed the ques-
tion of survival of rights most often in the context of the survival of
personal rights acquired under municipal law but protected by
treaty.' 46 In doing so, they have developed a special jurisprudence
making clear, among other things, that more than mere expecta-
tions are to be protected under the doctrine of "vested rights."1 47
Though invoked primarily in respect of transfers of property inter-
ests, 14 it appears the principle has been deemed applicable to a
variety of legal rights, including sale, 49 status, 0 debtisi and, by at
144. Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations § 338(3) ("(a) no party as to which the
agreement is terminated is obligated to perform further acts under the agreement"; but
"(b) rights and duties of the parties as of the date of termination are not affected.").
145. Summary Records of the 708th Meeting, 1 Y.B. Int'l L Comm'n 232, para. 26, U.N.
Doc. AICN.4/SERA (1963).
146. See, e.g., Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926
P.C.LJ. (Ser. A) No. 7, at 22, 42 (May 25). It may be noted, however, that even in cases
considering whether property interests had vested for purposes of the application of a
treaty that was in force at the time, the vesting could have consequences as to whether
ancillary rights established under the treaty would also be recognized. See Arnold D.
McNair, The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 1957 Brit. Y.B.
Int'l L. 1, 16-18.
147. See, e.g., Oscar Chinn Case, 1934 P.C.IJ. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 65, 88 (Dec. 12)
(establishment of de facto monopoly in Congo shipbuilding and transport by Belgian
Government in favor of Belgian firm through tariff concessions did not deprive British
national of "vested right").
148. But see 1 D.P. O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal and International Law 257
(1967) (observing, in the context of state succession, that "the presumption that [a
successor state] intends to maintain existing titles is apparently restricted to tangible
property, or at least minimized in the case of rights arising... out of contract").
149. Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) 259,276 (1817) (Marshall, CJ.) (holding that a
French national who had inherited property by descent in the United States, at a time
when a treaty ratified in 1778 was in effect between the United States and France, was
entitled to exercise his right under a subsequent convention between the United States and
France to sell or dispose of such property following the repeal of both the treaty and the
convention).
150. See Case No. 210 (Court of Appeals of Berlin) 8 Ann. Dig. 443 (Ger.) in 8 IL.R.
443 (1936) (holding that the Luxembourg divorce decree of two German nationals, issued
while both Germany and Luxembourg were parties to the Hague Convention on Divorce,
was binding on the parties even after Germany had withdrawn from the Convention).
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least one commentator, as potentially applicable in the state suc-
cession context to international delicts.
152
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has failed, however, to
differentiate explicitly the doctrine of vested rights from the more
general question addressed in article 70 of the Vienna Convention.
In the Northern Cameroons Case, 53 the ICJ declined to consider
Cameroon's claims that the United Kingdom had breached its
Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations with respect to the
Northern Cameroons, because in the Court's judgment a decision
would have no practical effect. The rights and duties of the United
Kingdom under the Trusteeship Agreement had been terminated
with the United Nations' acceptance of the plebiscite, conducted
by the United Kingdom, leading to the division of the Northern
Cameroons between Nigeria and Cameroon. 5" The ICJ contrasted
this conclusion with the caveat that "property rights which might
have been obtained in accordance with certain articles of the Trus-
teeship Agreement and which might have vested before the termi-
nation of the Agreement, would not have been divested by the
termination.'1 55 Yet this contrast was a case of apples and oranges.
Generally, the question of whether the General Assembly's termi-
nation of a mandate extinguishes a claim that the procedures for
termination of the mandate are unlawful has nothing to do with the
municipal rights in property established during a mandate. The
ICJ's suggestion to the contrary might be misinterpreted to suggest
that the consequences of termination of treaty rights created under
that treaty should be analyzed under the jurisprudence of vested
rights.
151. See Caisse Sociale de La Region de Constantine (CASOREC) v. Enterprise
Sourdive and Others (Court of Cassation) (France) (Social Chamber) in 73 I.L.R. 31
(1973) (holding that an Algerian organization responsible for social security was entitled to
a preferential claim under French law in a bankruptcy proceeding involving a French
debtor and "payments" which had "fallen due" before Algerian independence).
152. See, e.g., Michael J. Volkovitsch, Note, Righting Wrongs: Towards a New Theory of
State Succession to Responsibility for Intentional Delicts, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 2162, 2163,
2203-05, 2214 (1992) (arguing that international torts, particularly those involving liability
for environmental damage in the newly independent states of central and eastern Europe,
should be deemed to have vested before state succession and thus be considered binding
on the successor states by operation of law).
153. Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K) 1963 I.C.J. 15 (Preliminary Objections)
(Dec. 2).
154. Id. at 34.
155. Id. This aspect of the ICJ's opinion has been cited in a leading treatise on
international law without adequate attention to the misleading nature of its reference to
"vested rights." See 1 Oppenheim's International Law 1311 n.2 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir
Arthur Watts eds., 1992).
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In some cases, use of the "vested rights" formulation has been
avoided. Instead, the legal consequences of termination of a treaty
have been determined based on reasoning drawing from the sur-
vival principle found in article 70(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention.
In the Ambatielos Case,56 the ICJ concluded that a declaration
attached to an agreement was an integral part of the agreement. It
thus reached the tortured result that claims arising under the
Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1886 referred to in the Decla-
ration attached to the Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1926
were subject to the arbitration provisions of 1926 agreement. The
Court avoided the question whether entry into force of the 1926
Treaty, which terminated the 1886 Treaty, also extinguished the
rights created under the 1886 Treaty.' 7 But Lord McNair, in his
dissent, disagreed with the ICJ's tortured construction of the
Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1926. He concluded that
claims arising under the 1886 Treaty survived its termination.1
58
Foreshadowing the Vienna Convention's approach, McNair
eschewed "vested" or "acquired" rights vocabulary and, instead,
focused on the "independent existence" of rights created under a
treaty even after the treaty terminates.
More recently, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal avoided "vested
rights" vocabulary in addressing the survival of treaty obligations.
The Tribunal concluded it could apply the U.S.-Iran Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights (Treaty of
Amity),159 as well as principles of customary international law, to
expropriation cases which "arose" while the Treaty of Amity was in
force. 60 However, the Tribunal's conclusion may well have rested,
156. Ambatielos Case (Greece v. U.K.), 1952 LC.J. 28 (July 1).
157. See id. at 44-45.
158. Lord McNair observed:
I do not see how the provisions of the Treaty of 1926 could prejudice claims
'based' on the Treaty of 1886 because, in my opinion, such claims acquire an
existence independent of the treaty whose breach gave rise to them. Neither the
expiry of the Treaty of 1886, nor the entry into force of the Treaty of 1926, could
affect the survival and validity of claims 'based' on a breach of the Treaty of 1886
which had already occurred.
Id. at 63.
159. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, U.S.-
Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899 (entered into force June 16, 1957).
160. Sedco, Inc. v. NIOC Co., 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 180, 184 (1986). There the
Tribunal reaffirmed its conclusion in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10
Iran-U.S. CL Trib. Rep. 121, 131-32 (1986) (the Treaty was "clearly applicable to [the
investment at issue in that Case] at the time the claim arose and that whether or not the
Treaty is still in force today, it is a relevant source of law on which the Tribunal is justified
in drawing in reaching its decision") (internal quotation omitted).
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as Judge Brower argued, on the surer alternative ground that the
Treaty of Amity was still in force at the time of suit.1 61 Nonethe-
less, Judge Brower concurred with the Tribunal's alternative hold-
ing and specifically relied on article 70(1) of the Vienna
Convention. 162
Indeed, confusion with the survival of personal rights under
municipal law complicated the task of formulating the survival
principle as a rule of treaty law. For example, an early attempt to
codify this concept in treaty law, the Harvard Research Draft Con-
vention (Harvard Draft), failed to make this crucial distinction.163
That said, the Harvard Draft provides an important reference point
for the U.N. International Law Commission's (ILC) efforts to for-
mulate an intelligible rule. The Harvard Draft suggested that:
"[t]he termination of a treaty puts an end to all executory obliga-
tions stipulated in the treaty; it does not affect the validity of rights
acquired in the consequence of the performance of obligations stip-
ulated in the treaty."'164 Lord McNair, expanding upon his contri-
bution on this subject in the Ambatielos Case, suggested that the
Harvard Research formulation should be amended to include "the
validity of rights acquired through the exercise of powers conferred
by the treaty."'165 The negotiating history of the Vienna Conven-
tion appears to suggest that the substance of McNair's reasoning
became the conceptual core of the article produced by the ILC and
adopted by the states present at the Vienna Conference.166
A draft article on the consequences of terminating a treaty in
what ultimately became the Vienna Convention was submitted by
Special Rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock in 1963.167 However
161. Id. at 189-90 (separate opinion of Judge Brower) (stating that "a fuller conclusion
as to [the Treaty's] applicability is in order," because its termination had not been affected
by the government of Iran in accordance with the terms of the treaty).
162. Id. at 191 n.9.
163. See Harvard Research Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 Am. J. Int'l L.
652, at 1172-73 (Supp. 1935) (commentary to draft formulation) [hereinafter Harvard
Draft].
164. Id.
165. Arnold D. McNair, The Law of Treaties 532 (1961) (citing Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,
The Law and Procedures of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation
and Other Treaty Points, 33 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 203, 269 (1957) (which, in turn, cited Lord
McNair's own statement in the Ambatielos Case)).
166. See infra notes 167 to 196 and accompanying text; see also infra note 193
(comments of Mr. de Luna).
167. Sir Humphrey Waldock, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. GAOR, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/156 & Add. 1-3, reprinted in 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 36, 94, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A (1963) (stating, in draft article 28, that termination "shall not affect the
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self-evident the principle, it soon became apparent to the partici-
pants that in its application the principle was infinitely variable. For
example, Waldock, in his commentary on the draft provision, rec-
ognized that the rule was subject to variation by the parties. As an
example of variation, he alluded to the Convention on the Liability
of Operators of Nuclear Ships (Nuclear Ships Convention), which
"expressly provides" for liability after termination of the agree-
ment for a nuclear incident "with respect to ships the operation of
which was licensed during the currency of the Convention." 16s Yet,
when the draft article was reformulated to address the case of ter-
mination or withdrawal from a multilateral treaty, 6 9 the commen-
tary again cited the Nuclear Ships Convention, but this time it was
not clear whether it was cited as an illustration of variation from
the principle or as an example of the express inclusion of the prin-
ciple in a multilateral agreement, ex abundanti cautela.170
The ILC's deliberations then turned even murkier. First, the
ambiguity of Waldock's 1963 draft was accentuated by its expan-
sion to include the "validity of any situation resulting from the
validity of any act performed or of any right acquired under the provisions of the treaty
prior to its termination") [hereinafter Second Report on the Law of Treaties].
168. Id.
169. Summary Records of the 714th Meeting, 1 Y.B. Int'l L Comm'n 282, U.N. Doc. Al
CN.4/SER.A (1963) (Waldock reported that the Drafting Committee had revised the draft
article. In pertinent part, the revision provided that: "The legality of any act done in
conformity with the provisions of the treaty prior to the denunciation or withdrawal and
the validity of any situation resulting from the application of the treaty shall not be
affected.-).
170. Second Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Commission, U.N. GAOR, 17th
Sess., at 13, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/L.102/Add.9 (1963) The provision
merely adopts the provisions [with respect to bilateral treaties] to the case of
withdrawal of an individual State from a multilateral treaty. It also takes account
of the fact that some multilateral treaties do contain express provisions regarding
the legal consequences of withdrawal from the treaty. Article XIX of the
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, for example, expressly
provides that even after the termination of the Convention liability for a nuclear
incident is to continue for a certain period with respect to ships the operation of
which was licensed during the currency of the Convention.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Commentary to the Draft Articles of the International Law
Commission, 3 Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties
85 (1968), U.N. Doc. AICONF39/11 v.3 (1968) [hereinafter Draft Articles Commentary].
Possibly, viewed as an illustration of the principle of vested rights, the limitation of liability
"for a certain period" may be a negotiated limitation on the normal application of vested
rights doctrine in the case of nuclear liability to require liability with respect to all ships
licensed for operation without a temporal limit. The potential breadth of such a result
would certainly lead the parties to the Nuclear Ships Convention to provide expressly, as it
appears they did, for some durational limit.
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application of the treaty,"'171 perhaps suggesting that additional
sources or categories of surviving rights were needed to give the
article its intended ambit. Second, in 1966, the Special Rapporteur
submitted an entirely new proposed text to the ILC, 72 which pro-
vided that termination would leave intact not only "the legality of
any act done in conformity with the treaty or that of any situation
resulting from the application of the treaty," but also "any rights
accrued or any obligation incurred prior to such termination,
including any rights or obligations arising from a breach of the
treaty."'173 The introduction of "accrued rights and incurred obliga-
tions" was roundly criticized by Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, who appears
to have seen the formulations as surrogates for "vested rights" con-
cepts protecting foreign investors. Accordingly, he considered
these concepts controversial in municipal and international law.174
Erroneously believing that the question of accrued rights and obli-
gations was solely a question of breach,' 75 he appears to have sug-
gested that the survival of rights derived from breach should not be
covered by the article under discussion. 76 Nonetheless, Jim6nez
171. Draft Articles Commentary, supra note 170.
172. Summary Records of the 846th Meeting, 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n (pt. 2) para. 16,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A (1966).
173. Id.
174. Id. paras. 63-65. As to accrued rights, Mr. Jim6nez de Ar~chaga noted that:
"nothing would be gained by mentioning it in the article, as it might be
interpreted to refer to rights acquired by nationals or individuals." Evidently, his
objection was not to the principle itself, but rather to its application to protect
rights of foreign nationals acquired under municipal law, possibly against
expropriation, under which the rights of such nationals could be espoused on a
theory of denial of justice by the states of which they were nationals. Jim~nez de
Ardchaga added that "the notion of incurred obligations was even less acceptable
and its meaning was not clear."
Id.
175. Waldock had earlier noted that if his proposal for a separate clause dealing with
"accrued rights and obligations" were accepted, "the case of termination in response to a
breach can conveniently be covered by specifying in that clause that accrued rights and
obligations include [but are not limited to] those arising from the breach of the treaty." Sir
Humphrey Waldock, Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/186 & Add.
1-7 (1966), reprintea in 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 51, para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A
(1966) vol. 2. There, Waldock at least had in mind something more than cases where a
breach had occurred while the treaty was in force and a remedy for breach was sought after
the termination of the treaty. However, the failure immediately to perform a duty does not
automatically constitute a breach. The passage of time may be necessary to transform the
nonperformance into a breach. Thus, under Waldock's theory, obligations may be
established even though nonperformance may not have constituted a breach before the
termination of a treaty.
176. Although Jim6nez de Ar6chaga went on to endorse McNair's reasoning in the
Ambatielos Case, he considered the only issue to be one involving the breach of a treaty.
The record of the ILC debate notes:
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de Ardchaga did not object to the basic proposition that obliga-
tions due to be performed while a treaty was still in effect should
survive its termination under the principle stated in the draft
article.' 77
Similarly, Reuter, going to the heart of the matter, noted that the
difficulty of reaching an acceptable formulation was a result of the
tension between the two "complementary, but contradictory,"
ideas.'78 He observed that the Special Rapporteur's approach to
"fix the difficult boundary between retroactive effects and future
effects had been to use such terms as 'act', 'situation' and 'rights
accrued or obligations incurred prior to such termination'. While
that wording could perhaps be improved, it certainly could not be
radically changed."'17 9 Thus, Reuter too endorsed Waldock's basic
premises, though not his specific wording.
He presumed that what was meant by obligations incurred were those which had
to be performed, but had not been performed in time, and would engage the
State's international responsibility: that question did not belong in a codification
of the law of treaties. When a State became responsible for failure to perform
treaty obligations, the fact that the treaty terminated after such a violation did not
extinguish the resulting international responsibility, on that point some cogent
observations had been made by Lord McNair in his dissenting opinion in the
Ambatielos Case, where he had said "I do not see how the provisions of the
Treaty of 1926 could prejudice claims 'based' on the Treaty of 1886 because, in my
opinion, such claims acquire an existence independent of the treaty whose breach
gave rise to them."
Summary Records of the 846th Meeting, supra note 172, at 16. In a related context,
Paredes made a similar objection when he:
considered it impossible to maintain, as the Commission did.., that the rights
and obligations created while the treaty was in force could subsist, while at the
same time affirming [in article 69(2)(a) (preserving legal effect of acts performed
in good faith reliance on an invalid treaty)] ... a sort of right to restitution in
integrum for those who had suffered from the consequences of the invalidity of a
treaty. There was a duality if not an actual opposition, contrary to all legal think-
ing, between the two points of view: on the one hand full restitution, and on the
other hand the thesis that rights and obligations had been created in a valid man-
ner and produced legal effects.
Id. at 155, para. 102. This comment, however, appears to have focused only on the case
where treaty rights subsist despite the termination of the treaty underjus cogens, and thus
does not constitute a general attack on the principle set forth in article 70 of the Vienna
Convention.
177. He stated: "So far, the draft has been restricted to obligations performed, or still to
be performed, under the treaty, and those two categories were sufficiently covered" in the
existing draft. Id.
178. Id. at 17, para. 71.
179. Id. para. 72. Reuter added:
It was mainly the use of the word "situation" that would call for some
modification of the text of the draft articles. It would be necessary to distinguish
between the creation and effects of a situation and probably also between
situations having immediate effects and situations having successive effects. It
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Subsequent debate appears to have focused on the task of
resolving the remaining ambiguity Reuter recognized. For exam-
ple, de Luna noted that the term "legal situation" was not clear and
"could be unduly broad."'8 0 He explained:
According to the traditional concepts accepted by conti-
nental lawyers, a treaty could give rise to rights, obliga-
tions, faculties, and powers. By virtue of the rule pacta
sunt servanda, it created rights, in that it enabled a party
to demand a certain conduct from another party; that
other party was correspondingly under an obligation so to
conduct itself. A treaty conferred a legal faculty when it
conferred the possibility of obtaining a legally prescribed
result by performing a particular act. A treaty conferred
powers when it enabled a party to take some action to
which certain results were attached. 181
De Luna's reference to the civil law vocabulary of "rights, faculties,
and powers" arisifig from a treaty suggests that a reformulation of
the concept of "legal situation" to encompass those concepts would
not have been "unduly broad.' '18a
was necessary to say, somehow or other, that a new treaty did not affect the
creation of a situation, an act, the effects of an act or the effects of a situation. He
would therefore propose stating a second and contrary rule, using the same terms,
or at least referring to the same concepts, which would read approximately:
"However, the treaty may have such effects if the object or the nature of the rule
so requires." There were in fact cases in which everyone would agree that the
treaty must have more retroactive effects than the present wording allowed.
Id.
180. Summary Records of the 847th Meeting, 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n (pt. 2) at 18, 19,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A (1966).
181. Id. These terms as general legal concepts are not unknown to common law legal
thought, including the law of agreements. "Faculty" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as
a "power," which in turn is defined as an ability "to produce a change in a given legal
relation." Black's Law Dictionary 594, 1169 (6th ed. 1990); see also Farnsworth on
Contracts, supra note 83, § 3.4 n.2 (citing "Hohfeldian terminology" as the source for the
term "power" in common law contract vocabulary and giving as one example the power of
acceptance).
182. Summary Records of the 847th Meeting, supra note 180, at 19. De Luna thus
"suggested that [the draft article] be redrafted using terms which conveyed to the
representatives of the various legal systems exactly what [article 70] was intended to set
forth." Id. The holder of a "power," in the lexicon developed by Wesley Hohfeld in
Fundamental Legal Conceptions, may impose a "liability" on another. See generally
Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923). Thus, the "liability" created
through the exercise of a power is surely within the meaning of "obligations" or "legal
situations" preserved by article 70 of the Vienna Convention, despite the termination of
the treaty giving rise to the power.
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In sum, the eventual deletion of "accrued rights" and "incurred
obligations" from the ILC draft language did not signify an inten-
tion to undercut the legal principle Waldock intended to articulate.
As Judge Lachs emphasized, the idea embodied in the Special Rap-
porteur's paragraph including these additional concepts was cor-
rect, but it
did not define the problem clearly enough. For two types
of rights and obligations were at stake: first, rights estab-
lished and obligations entered into at the time when the
treaty was concluded - they were 'vested under the
treaty', to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall - and
secondly, rights and obligations created during the opera-
tion of the treaty. It was necessary to make clear which of
the two were meant. He thought it should be the latter
group only.
113
Lachs' views bore fruit in the final formulation recommended by
the ILC and accepted by states at the Vienna Conference as article
70, which asks whether rights under a treaty already exist "through
execution of the treaty," and not whether rights of individuals have
vested.184
The negotiating history of the Vienna Convention thus reveals
that "a right, obligation or legal situation" covered by the provision
encompasses what lawyers from civil law systems refer to as
"rights, faculties, and powers."'1 s Also, the concept "created
through the execution" was clearly intended to implement Lachs'
distinction between rights "under the treaty" and obligations "cre-
ated during the operation of the treaty."18 As Jim6nez de
Arfchaga noted, the formulation preserves "obligations still to be
performed," although when they amounted to rights to a remedy
for breach such obligations would not be within the scope of article
183. Summary Records of the 847th Meeting, supra note 180, at 20, para. 34. Lachs'
views appeared not to have been challenged, although Tunkin (while endorsing Lachs'
inclusion of rights "created during the operation of" the treaty) continued to express
concern about the dangers of including "acquired rights." Id. at 21-22, paras. 51-52. But
see McNair, Law of Treaties, supra note 165, at 532 n.4 (interpreting Fitzmaurice's
formulation to include both types of rights Lachs articulated for treaty termination).
184. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 70, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 349. The final
commentary on the draft articles makes clear that article 70 of the Vienna Convention
"related only to the right, obligation or legal situation of the States parties to the treaties
created through the execution, and is not in any way concerned with the question of the
'vested interests' of individuals." Draft Articles Commentary, supra note 170, at 85.
185. Summary of Records of the 847th Meeting, supra note 180, at 19.
186. Id. at 20, para. 34.
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70.1'7 Finally, as de Luna suggested, article 70 might be understood
to preserve "faculties" and "powers," as those terms are under-
stood by the civilians, in addition to "rights." 18
But when are "powers" and "faculties" "created through execu-
tion" of a treaty for purposes of article 70? One might argue that
some "performance" in consequence of the exercise of a power is
still required to "create" an obligation "through execution" of a
treaty. Inviolability of executed obligations is a core theme under-
lying a broad range of treaty law concepts reflecting undifferenti-
ated concerns about the diplomatic and political costs of reversing
the status quo.18 9 The Harvard Draft, for example, distinguished
between "executory" and "non-executory" obligations. It pur-
ported to extinguish all executory obligations (that is to say, duties
of performance which remain to be performed), but to preserve
rights acquired "in consequence of the performance of obligations
stipulated in the treaty."'90 The commentary to the Harvard Draft
added: "It may happen, however, that some or all of the obliga-
tions on one or both sides still remain to be executed at the time of
the termination of the treaty; in that case the duty to execute the
parts which remain unexecuted ceases with the termination of the
treaty."' 91
This approach appears to be inconsistent with the ILC's under-
standing of article 70 of the Vienna Convention, particularly with
Jim6nez de Ar6chaga's recognition that the survival of "obligations
still to be performed" might be called into question. 19 The ILC
debate on article 70 appears to have recognized that rights derived
from executed performances are merely a subcategory of rights
187. See comments by Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, supra notes 176-177.
188. See comments by de Luna, supra note 182.
189. See David, supra note 92, at 13-16 (relating to rebus sic stantibus) and 208-10
(relating to procedures for notification of withdrawal).
190. See Harvard Draft, supra note 163, at 1171.
191. Id. The comment also notes that where obligations "are continuous, the duty of
performances never ceases as long as the treaty is in force and occasion for performance
arises; in this case, the obligation of further performance ends with their termination." Id.
at 1172. However, the comment does not suggest criteria for determining whether a treaty
falls into the category involving continuous performances; nor does it consider the case
where the treaty includes duties of continuous performance together with distinct
obligations triggered by specific events. Arguably, IAEA safeguards agreements, which
call for regular reports and inspections, but also include the right to extraordinary requests
for special inspections, may be seen as composites of the two categories of treaties
suggested by the Harvard Draft.
192. See Summary Records of the 846th Meeting, supra note 172, para. 86.
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that would survive termination of a treaty.193 In sum, if the
Harvard Draft has the meaning advanced above, the Vienna Con-
vention should be interpreted instead to permit the survival of
rights the Harvard Draft would extinguish. Such rights, although
created through execution of a power, might well exceed perform-
ance of duties under an agreement or the separate duty to perform
created by the exercise of a power.1 94 Indeed, giving effect to this
broader understanding in the Vienna Convention of the scope of
193. Summary Records of the 847th Meeting, supra note 180, para. 86. De Luna
expressed support for the idea behind the "accrued rights" formulation along the lines
proposed by Lachs and others:
obligations deriving, not from the treaty itself, but also from its application, as
Mr. Ago had rightly observed, must be respected and were not affected by the
fact that the treaty terminated. It was also understood that it was impossible to
go back on what had already been executed in accordance with the treaty, since
that was no longer part of what subsisted at the time the treaty was extinguished.
Id. (emphasis added). The compound formulation thus appears to recognize the distinc-
tion between "obligations deriving from application" of the treaty, which subsist, and obli-
gations deriving from "what had already been executed," which do not subsist but are
merely "impossible to back on."
194. On the other hand, it may also be that the Vienna Convention approach would not
protect some rights derived from execution or performance of obligations that might be
retrievable under a theory that focused, as does the Harvard Draft, on actual performance.
Article 70's focus on "execution" does not suggest that every execution of a treaty gives
rise to rights preserved after termination or withdrawal. Indeed, the ILC Draft Articles
Commentary noted that the provision "raised the question of equitable adjustment in the
case of a treaty which has been partially executed by one party only." Draft Articles
Commentary, supra note 170, para. 4. In view of this concern, Lord McNair had argued
against recognizing a right of unilateral termination. McNair, Law of Treaties, supra note
165, at 494 ("If one party has already benefitted under the treaty, for instance, by acquiring
territory ceded to it, there is a strong presumption that the party would not be allowed to
free itself from any obligations still remaining executory by denouncing the treaty.").
Correlatively, McNair took the view that, though ordinarily material breach of one treaty
did not give the injured party a right to suspend or terminate a separate treaty interse, in
some cases "it [is] possible to show that of two separate treaties each was consideration for
the other and that they were intended to be interdependent." Id. at 571; see also David,
supra note 92, at 228.
Moreover, the Vienna Convention and its negotiating history do not appear to rule out
common law approaches to treaty interpretation under which an agreement can be divided
into corresponding pairs of performances. Accordingly, part performance by a party of the
whole agreement could establish its right, under article 70 principles, to a corresponding
performance by the party that seeks to avoid its own duty of performance by terminating
the agreement. See, e.g., Farnsworth on Contracts, supra note 83, § 8.13; see also McNair,
Law of Treaties, supra note 165, 474-84.
Finally, the ICI seems also to have approved this reasoning, though only after the
negotiation of the Vienna Convention, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case [Ice. v. U.KJ, 1973
I.CJ. 18. There, the Court observed: "in the case of a treaty which is in part executed and
in part executory, in which one of the parties has already benefitted from the executed
provisions of the treaty, it would be particularly inadmissible to allow that party to put an
end to obligations which were accepted under the treaty by way of quid pro quo for the
provisions which the other party has already executed." Id.
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surviving rights would also be consistent with the Vienna Conven-
tion's rejection of the "vested rights" jurisprudence which seems to
have undergirded the Harvard Draft.
On the other hand, the Harvard Draft and the Vienna Conven-
tion may yet be understood to be consistent under a revised under-
standing of the Harvard Draft. An "executory" obligation can be
defined not simply as an obligation that remains to be performed,
but as an obligation whose performance depends upon a future
performance or event.195 If the Harvard Draft's exclusion of
"executory obligations" is understood to extinguish only duties of
performance which are unexecuted because they have not yet
On the other hand, this ICJ dictum is of doubtful significance, for the argument rejected
by the Court was based on a flawed understanding of the common law doctrine of
consideration. Iceland contested jurisdiction on the ground, among others, that the change
in international law following the conclusion of the Anglo-Icelandic Agreement,
containing a jurisdictional clause conferring the same right to Iceland by custom that the
United Kingdom had granted through the treaty, extinguished the consideration given by
the U.K. in return for its right to dispute resolution. Id.; see also D.W. Greig, International
Law 507 (1976). Under common law, the validity of consideration is measured at the time
the agreement is concluded. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 71, 73 (1981).
Here, Iceland advanced an ex post facto argument of dubious merit, even assuming
common law concepts of consideration were applicable.
Moreover, the ILC in its final assessment of article 70 concluded that "equitable
adjustment demanded by each case would necessarily depend on its particular
circumstances" and that "the matter should be left to the application of the principle of
good faith in the application of the treaties demanded of the parties by the rule pacta sunt
servanda." Draft Articles Commentary, supra note 170, para. 4. Thus, while the ILC did
not rule out considering a party's performance under article 70, it does not appear to have
conceived the survival of rights to constitute a special case of equitable adjustment.
In the context of safeguards agreements and the NPT, if it can be determined that
performance by the IAEA of its duty to evaluate safeguards information, which led it to
request special inspection of DPRK facilities, is the agreed equivalent of the DPRK's duty
to accept such an inspection, then it may reasonably be argued that the IAEA's "right" to
conduct the special inspection requested before termination of the safeguards agreement
was "acquired" before the date of termination. A similar analysis might support a claim by
the NFT parties to be entitled to the information relating to the DPRK's nuclear activities
safeguards would have generated prior to termination of the agreement. It would follow
that neither the IAEA nor the parties to the NPT would be entitled to information
concerning the DPRK's post-withdrawal nuclear activities.
However, it is questionable whether this approach can be taken this far. First, it seems
to run afoul of the Vienna Convention's explicit rejection of principles of equitable
adjustment under article 70 in cases where only one party has performed and a treaty
terminates. Second, it derives from the common law doctrine of consideration, whose
applicability is doubtful given that it is not even included among the requirements for
formation of treaties under the Vienna Convention. Accordingly, it might not meet the
standard of general acceptance required under article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993.
195. Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 181, at 570.
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become due, then duties to performance that have become fully
due through the occurrence of all requisite conditions of perform-
ance might well survive.196 These duties would not then be consid-
ered "executory" within the meaning of the Harvard Draft and
thus would survive a state's withdrawal from a treaty. On this
reading, the Harvard Draft would be seen as a precursor of the
Vienna Convention formulation, and "powers" and "faculties"
under the Vienna Convention would survive under article 70 when
all conditions on their exercise had been satisfied. For example, if
properly exercised while a treaty was in effect, a power would
establish obligations that acquire an existence outside the agree-
ment and thus survive its termination.
As applied to IAEA safeguards, the text and travaux
preparatoire of the Vienna Convention thus suggest that a distinc-
tion needs to be drawn between, on one hand, the general and con-
tinuing duty of the safeguarded state to provide reports and permit
routine inspections (including ongoing measures of containment
and surveillance) and, on the other, a state's duty to comply with a
request for a special inspection made by the Agency while the
agreement is still in force. The latter is arguably analogous to the
exercise of a "power" conferred under the safeguards agreement.
Once such a right is exercised, it is arguably "created," within the
meaning of article 70(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention and custom-
ary international law, "through the execution" of the safeguards
agreement, and the safeguarded state's duty of performance thus
survives until that duty is discharged or excused.
B. Survival of Rights Under the LAEA Safeguards Agreement
If a special inspection could be sought after withdrawal based on
an IAEA request while the NPT and its related safeguards agree-
ment were still in force for the safeguarded state, it could be
abused to replicate the rights terminated or extinguished by with-
drawal from the treaty unless limits were placed on its purpose and
scope. The IAEA safeguards system in practice provides informa-
tion about both past and present uses of nuclear material; thus,
safeguard inspections after termination of a safeguards agreement
could in theory provide information about either the pre- or post-
termination use of nuclear material that had been subject to safe-
196. See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts § 225(1) (1986) ("Performance
of a duty subject to a condition cannot become due unless the condition occurs or its non-
occurrence is excused.").
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guards or material subject to safeguards. As suggested below,
while there seems to be little support for permitting post-termina-
tion inspections for the purpose of obtaining information about a
state's post-termination nuclear activities, strong arguments can be
made to support inspections designed to reconstruct the pre-termi-
nation history of the state's use of nuclear materials subject to
safeguards.
V. SAFEGUARDS ON CURRENT USES
Those who have considered the possibility of the termination of
NPT safeguards agreements-in other words thought the unthink-
able-appear to have concluded that the general right to apply
safeguards on nuclear material while such an agreement is in force
expires with the termination of the safeguards agreement. 197 No
one seems to have analyzed this question, however, in terms of the
background interpretive rules found in article 70 of the Vienna
Convention. Rather, their conclusions have been based on the
intent of NPT safeguards agreements-deduced from a compari-
son with non-NPT safeguards agreements, which expressly provide
for perpetual application of safeguards under the IAEA's policy
articulated in GOV/1621.198 This failure to provide expressly for
perpetuity in the NPT safeguards agreement, when the IAEA had
197. See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 15 ("[the] effect of withdrawal is that a nonnuclear-
weapon state may free itself of its... NPT obligation to accept international safeguards,
even on material transferred while it remained a party. In the absence of other
commitments, the materials could be used in contravention of the NPT's most fundamental
principles."); Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 19, at 138
(in IAEA safeguards agreements, non-NPT states are "under more stringent requirements
than NPT states insofar as the later are bound only for the duration of the treaty ... and
also have the right to withdraw"); see also Szasz & Fischer, Safeguarding the Atom, supra
note 1, at 85 (Fischer states: "NPT safeguards would cease to apply if ... the NNWS
withdrew from the NPT."); Willrich, International Safeguards, supra note 58, at 89 (upon
withdrawal, "[e]xcept insofar as other safeguards agreements are automatically revived,
the country then holds its nuclear material free of any restrictions or controls").
198. This reflects IAEA policy with regard to perpetuity flowing from the
recommendations made by the IAEA Director General in a memorandum. GOV/1621,
supra note 62. Paragraph 2 of the Annex to the Director General's Memorandum states:
The primary effect of termination of the agreement, either by act of the parties or
affluxion of time, would be that no further supplied nuclear material, equipment,
facilities or non-nuclear material could be added to the inventory. On the other
hand, the rights and obligations of the parties, as provided for in the agreement,
would continue to apply in connection with any supplied material or items and
with any special fissionable material produced, processed or used in or in
connection with any supplied material or items which had been included in the
inventory, until such material or items had been removed from the inventory.
GOV/1621, supra note 62, para. 2.
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done so in other contexts, arguably tends to establish that the
IAEA forswore perpetuity in the NPT safeguards agreements.199
It has been suggested that this places non-NPT parties in the awk-
ward position of having more onerous safeguards obligations than
NPT parties.2° This may be explained as the bargain struck in the
negotiation of the NPT safeguards model agreement in which sup-
plier states party to the NPT accepted framing the right to safe-
guards in terms of the duration of the NFT rather than in terms of
the nuclear-end use of supplied material, facilities or equipment, in
return for which NNWS parties to the NPT accepted so-called full-
scope safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities.
This inference appears to be corroborated by the example of the
IAEA's subsequent practice as expressed in its recent safeguards
agreement with the government of Albania (the Albanian Safe-
guards Agreement).201 In this one case, the IAEA secured a full-
scope safeguards commitment from a state bound by neither the
NPT nor any other international legal regime requiring the applica-
tion of safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities.Y The dura-
tion clause provided for a fixed initial term of twenty-five years
with the possibility of additional periods? 03 The NPT duration
clause similarly provides for an initial twenty-five year term,
199. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 46, at 15 n.63, 26 n.104 (relying on the GOV/1621,
supra note 62).
200. See Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 19, at 138.
However, Scheinman also observes that perpetuity under the IAEA Director General's
Memorandum in GOV/1621 "reflect[ ] the spirit though not the letter of the NPT." Id. at
151. One wonders whether the NPT safeguards agreement should not also be interpreted
in accordance with the spirit of the NPT. See O'Connor, supra note 94, at 122 (arguing
that the principle of good faith requires that treaties "be interpreted in accordance with
their spirit").
201. Text of the Agreement of 1 July 1986 Between Albania and the Agency for the
Application of Safeguards to all Nuclear Activities of Albania, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/359
(Oct. 1988) (entered into force Mar. 25, 1988) [hereinafter INFCIRC/359].
202. See Safeguards: The Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, Note by the Director
General, LAEA Doc. GOV/2247, para. 3 (Apr. 30, 1986) (stating that this case is "the first
time a State has requested the Agency to conclude a safeguards agreement covering all its
nuclear activities other than agreements pursuant to obligations under [the NFT or the
Treaty of Tlatelolco]"). It appears that this remains the only such case of a fullscope, non-
NPT, non-Tlatelolco safeguards agreement.
203. INFCIRC/359, supra note 201, para. 25(a), states:
This Agreement shall remain in force for an initial period of 25 years. It may be
terminated at that time if notice of termination has been given by either party at
least 6 months prior to the expiration of the 25-year period. Otherwise, the
Agreement shall stand renewed thereafter for periods of 10 years unless 6
months' notice of termination has been given by either of the parties before the
end of any such 10-year period.
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although that could become perpetual or could terminate shortly
after the expiration of twenty-five years (depending on what the
parties decide at the 1995 Extension Conference).2 4 Unlike the
NPT, however, the Albanian Safeguards Agreement provides for
the continuing application of safeguards on the nuclear material
and equipment safeguarded on the date of termination.0 5 Thus,
from the Agency's express inclusion of such a right to safeguards in
perpetuity in a non-NPT fullscope safeguards agreement it could
be inferred that, in deciding to leave out such provisions in an NPT
fullscope safeguards agreement, the IAEA has relinquished the
rights it might, or even should, secure under the NPT to apply safe-
guards after termination of the applicable agreement.
On the other hand, the inference drawn from these comparisons
could be challenged on various grounds. First, NPT parties and
IAEA members are not identical. Therefore, the practice of the
IAEA in fulfilling the expectations of its membership in voluntary
material and facility-specific agreements based on the principles of
non-NPT safeguards agreements, and under the IAEA Statute,
may not be relevant to understanding what the NPT parties and
the IAEA Board of Governors agreed to in the model for safe-
guards agreements that would satisfy NNWS obligations under the
NPT. Second, the IAEA negotiating policy requiring express res-
ervation of the right to apply safeguards in perpetuity on material
or equipment that had been subject to the safeguards obligation
during the life of non-NPT safeguards agreements was finalized
only after the NPT safeguards negotiating model was issued.20 6
On balance, however, these questions do not seem significant
enough to rebut the inference of non-perpetuity permitted by the
absence of an express provision for the subsistence of safeguards
after the termination of an NPT safeguards agreement.
204. See infra notes 244-245 and accompanying text.
205. INFCIRC/359, supra note 201, para. 25(b), states:
If this Agreement is terminated for any reason: (i) safeguards shall continue to
apply with respect to nuclear material and facilities . . . which are subject to
safeguards on the date of termination and any nuclear material produced,
processed or used in or in connection with such nuclear material or facility after
the termination of this Agreement, including subsequent generations of produced
nuclear material ....
206. GOV/1621, supra note 62 (issued in 1973). Meanwhile, INFCIRC/153, supra note
23, was issued in final form in 1972. As Scheinman notes, the basic safeguards
arrangements called for by the NPT were agreed on in 1971. Scheinman, The International
Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 19, at 173.
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VI. SAFEGUARDS FOR HISTORICAL INFORMATION
In contrast, it does not appear that serious attention has been
given to the more limited claim that safeguards rights might survive
termination to allow parties to ascertain how material subject to
safeguards was used before the agreement was terminated. The
relationship between this question and supplier interests in the sta-
tus of nuclear material as of the date of withdrawal was foreseen
shortly after the NPT entered into force, when a U.S. expert
observed that: "All the Agency can do in such an event is to notify
the world community of the types, forms, and amounts of nuclear
material released from restraint."2°7 Although this comment does
not explicitly state that the IAEA is legally required to do all that it
can under these circumstances, it does seem predicated on the
assumption that the Agency will be able to take some steps in this
direction. In short, even where it is understood that the general
right to safeguards terminates upon withdrawal from the NPT, the
residual interest of the international community in learning the sta-
tus of the material and equipment supplied to the withdrawing
state might yet be acknowledged. Arguably, the most fertile
ground for advancing such a claim would be a case like the one
posed by North Korea's near withdrawal from the NPT to avoid
compliance with the IAEA's request for a special inspection.
That, in a sense, is the heart of the issue. If inspections are
required for the Agency to make the reports that the international
community, particularly nuclear supplier states, expects it to make,
does the IAEA then have a duty to seek such inspections? And, if
so, how can it not have the rights necessary to collect the requisite
information? How, then, can one establish that suppliers' expecta-
tions support an interpretation of the NPT safeguards agreements
that would authorize the IAEA to seek a post-termination
accounting?
A. Perpetuity Under NPT Safeguards Agreements
Viewing the matter from the standpoint of nuclear suppliers, the
survival of some safeguards rights for this narrow purpose would
207. WVtriich, supra note 58, at 89. Szasz has suggested that "the information gathered
while controls were still being exercised should make it possible to give an estimate of the
dimensions of the threat, based on the quantity of nuclear materials readily available for
conversion into weapons." Paul C. Szasz, The Adequacy of International Safeguards, 10 J.
Int'l L. & Econ. 423,434 (1975). Where, as in North Korea's case, the quantity of nuclear
materials available for such conversion is unknown, this conclusion may not be valid.
1994]
816 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
facilitate implementation of the balance struck between suppliers'
commitment under article IV to assure nuclear supply and their
obligations under article 111(2) not to export without safeguards.
U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, beginning with Atoms for
Peace and continuing through the present era, has consistently rep-
resented the leading edge and, over the course of time, the paradig-
matic expression of supplier concerns. Under Atoms for Peace,208
the United States encouraged the development of peaceful applica-
tions of nuclear energy through agreements under which the
United States would supply cooperating parties with nuclear mate-
rial and equipment. As a condition of this supply, the United
States secured assurances from states receiving U.S. exports that
they would not use the transferred item for non-peaceful pur-
poses20 9 and would accept U.S. inspections for the purpose of veri-
fying compliance with this peaceful use commitment. After the
establishment of the IAEA, the United States concluded trilateral
safeguards transfer agreements, under which the IAEA undertook
to apply the safeguards provided for in the agreements for cooper-
ation while the United States retained the right to apply "fallback"
safeguards on the cooperating party if the IAEA could not, or
would not, apply its safeguards.210
Subsequently, the IAEA itself also saw the need for gradually
enhancing the confidence building effects of safeguards agree-
ments. It developed its own models for agreements, applying safe-
guards on specific materials or facilities and progressively
expanding its safeguards rights to meet the demands of suppliers
for reasonable assurance that their supply would not be converted
to weapons use.21' First, the Agency expanded its safeguards to
include the right of safeguards "pursuit" (that is, the right to apply
safeguards not only on specific material or material used at a safe-
guarded facility but also to successively produced generations of
nuclear material).212 Second, as noted above, the Agency expressly
provided in its non-fullscope safeguards agreements that its rights
208. See President's Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, supra note 19.
209. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 28-31.
210. Id. at 31-34.
211. See Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 19, at 127-30.
212. Id. at 128 (noting the progression from INFCIRCJ26 (1961) for small reactors to
INFCIRC/26 Add.1 (1964) for large reactors).
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to apply safeguards would subsist as long as the nuclear material,
facilities, or equipment were in use. 21
Multilateral supplier controls also moved on a parallel track of
U.S.-led restraint.214 The NPT Treaty Exporters' Committee iden-
tified a "trigger list" of material or equipment especially designed
or prepared for the production, processing or use of nuclear mate-
rial, which NPT parties could not, under article I1(2) of the Treaty,
export unless safeguards were applied.215 At the same time, a com-
parable group was formed to accommodate nuclear suppliers, such
as France, which at the time were not NPT parties. This so-called
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), or London Club, formulated sim-
ilar but broader guidelines, which, unlike the Zangger Committee
guidelines, applied also to nuclear technology transfer.216 Later,
the Gulf War demonstrated the threat posed by the export of dual-
use items (which, while important for a nuclear weapons program,
do not rise to the level of significance necessary to warrant the
application of safeguards). The NSG guidelines were revised to
include licensing criteria, but not safeguards requirements, for
dual-use exports.217 In addition, the NSG at a meeting in Warsaw
213. Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 19, at 138.
214. U.S. controls on nuclear exports grew in scope and detail after the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 revoked the earlier ban on the export of nuclear material under the McMahon
Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755-75 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296
(1982)), particularly through amendments to the Act by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120-152 (1978), 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-82 and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2160(a)(1982) [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Act]. Over time these included, in
descending order of complexity and rigor, controls over the export of nuclear reactors and
fuel, see Non-Proliferation Act §§ 123, 126-128, minor reactor components and moderator
material, see id. § 109, and dual use commodities, see id. § 309, as well as, the Export
Administration Act. Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 2401-20). Sensitive nuclear technology, defined in section 4(a)(6) of the Non-
Proliferation Act as relating to enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water production, is
under especially rigorous controls exceeding perhaps even those governing nuclear fuel
and reactor exports. All other types of nuclear technology are subject to procedures more
comparable to the licensing requirements for dual-use items. See Atomic Energy Act
§ 57(b). Several U.S. agencies, to a greater or lesser degree, are involved in the conclusion
of agreements and issuance of licenses and authorizations for export pursuant to these
authorities. See generally Schwartz, supra note 46, at 23-50 (outlining substantive export
requirements and procedures for nuclear reactors and fuel).
215. See Communications Received From Members Regarding the Export of Nuclear
Material and of Certain Categories of Equipment and Other Material, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/2O9 (Sept. 3, 1974), revised by the IAEA and reprinted in IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/209/Rev.1, at 2 (Nov. 1990) (containing memoranda of the so-called Zangger
Committee setting forth guidelines for common nuclear export policies) [hereinafter
INFCIRCt209].
216. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254 (1978).
217. See IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/2541rev.1 (pt. 2) (July 1992).
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on March 31 through April 3, 1992 adopted a policy statement
going beyond the requirements of article 111(2) of the NPT for
safeguards on items to be exported. Instead, contracts for supply
of NSG trigger list items or technology would require the applica-
tion of fullscope safeguards. 18 The adoption of fullscope safe-
guards as a condition of supply for new contracts is the near-
realization of the longstanding U.S. policy objective since 1978 of
persuading other suppliers to adopt fullscope safeguards as a con-
dition of all nuclear supply.
2 19
U.S. practice provides a precedent for safeguards in perpetuity
even where it has not been explicitly provided for in the applicable
agreement. In at least one instance, the United States has taken
the position that certain of its rights as a nuclear supplier under its
agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation survive the termina-
tion of the U.S. agreement. 2 °0 The dispute involved the U.S. right
to consent, under the U.S.-India Agreement for Cooperation Con-
cerning Civil Use of Atomic Energy (the U.S.-India Agree-
ment),221 to the reprocessing of U.S.-origin nuclear fuel supplied
while the Agreement was still in force, material which was thereaf-
ter irradiated at the Indian reactor at Tarapur so as to produce a
weapons-usable stock of plutonium. No specific provision in the
agreement controlled this question. An argument based on article
70 of the Vienna Convention appears to have been advanced by
the United States.2m Additionally, it has been argued that the
Indian interpretation of the Agreement "obviously destroys rights
that the agreement meant to confer." 22 This argument was framed
218. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/405 (May 1992).
219. Non-Proliferation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2157(a)(1) (1982).
220. See Gary Milhollin, Stopping the Indian Bomb, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 593, 600 (1987);
see also Schwartz, supra note 46, at 34 nn. 136-37 (citing article 70 of the Vienna
Convention); Ronald J. Bettauer, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,10 Law Pol'y
Int'l Bus. 1105, 1134 (1978).
221. Agreement between the United States and India for Cooperation Concerning Civil
Use of Atomic Energy, Aug. 8, 1963, art. 2, para. E, 14 U.S.T. 1484, 488 U.N.T.S. 21
[hereinafter U.S.-India Agreement].
222. See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 34 & n.136 (relying on article 70(1)(b) of the
Vienna Convention in relation to the Tarapur supply issue).
223. Milhollin, supra note 220, at 601. According to Milhollin, the consequence of
India's position would be that the United States would have an effective reprocessing
consent right only with respect to nuclear material exported to India during the first part of
the supply period. With respect to material supplied toward the end of the supply period,
for which the United States in theory acquired a reprocessing consent right pursuant to the
Agreement, the question of reprocessing would in practice arise only after the expiration
of the Agreement. However, it would be divested of any practical possibility of
disapproving reprocessing. Id. at 601-02.
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in terms of the probable intent of the parties, particularly that
India was aware of U.S. plutonium use policy and therefore could
not have believed that the United States would export uranium to
India without perpetual safeguards and reprocessing consent
rights. 24
On the other hand, the United States appears to have been
unable to persuade India to accept the U.S. position, whatever its
theoretical merit. Concern over the possibility of disputes with
other U.S. export recipients led the United States to begin to incor-
porate such provisions in its agreements for nuclear cooperation. s
It might thus be argued that subsequent practice by the United
States, rather than reflecting merely excessive caution in drafting,
manifests U.S. recognition that perpetuity must be expressly
included in its agreements for cooperation. 6 But even assuming
this inference is correct, and that the U.S.-India agreement did not
create perpetual rights, the agreement reflects a difference of opin-
ion between the United States (a state party to the NPT) and India
(a state not party to the NPT), and it is therefore questionable
whether it controls questions of perpetuity when the dispute
involves only states party to the NPT. In any event, neither party
224. Id. However, even accepting this argument's premise, one does not need to agree
with its conclusion. To sustain Milhollin's argument that the United States should be
entitled to its full reprocessing consent right, regardless of when it supplied the material
from which plutonium could be reprocessed, it would be necessary to conclude only that
the agreement gives the United States a reprocessing consent right that extends for the full
period of the agreement. In other words, the reprocessing consent right would attach for
exported material on the date it was exported and extend thirty years thereafter.
225. See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 34 n.139 (noting that recent U.S. agreements for
cooperation expressly provide for perpetuity on all controls, in order to resolve doubts
expressed by India in the Tarapur case).
226. Id. at 34 n.138 (noting that, under U.S. law, perpetuity is required only for
safeguards).
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appears to have pressed its legal arguments.2 -7 They have sought,
instead, to resolve their dispute through negotiation.228
It is noteworthy, however, that the United States based its posi-
tion in the Tarapur question on an agreement for cooperation con-
227. India, in addition to asserting that U.S. rights would not survive termination of the
agreement, may also have revived its earlier claim that the United States breached the
agreement by not supplying nuclear material to India for use at Tarapur. India had refused
to renegotiate the U.S.-India Agreement to conform to the new standards required for
such agreements by the Non-Proliferation Act, in particular the requirement for fullscope
safeguards found in section 128 of the Act. Because the Non-Proliferation Act requires
the discontinuation of nuclear exports to any such state (subject to a national interest
waiver by the President under 42 U.S.C. § 2157 (b)(2) (1982)), it arguably compelled the
United States to breach it obligation to supply India under the Supply Agreement. But see
Brian L. Schorr, Testing Statutory Criteria For Foreign Policy: The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 and the Export of Nuclear Fuel to India, 14 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L.
Pol'y 419, 454-55 & nn.210, 216 (1982) (citing Cong. Res. Service Memo, reprinted in 126
Cong. Rec. S9949 (daily ed. July 25, 1980)) (arguing that the supply contract under the
Agreement in effect made the U.S. obligation to supply conditional on India's duty to
conform to the requirements of U.S. law). Thus, India's right to supply was predicated on
its willingness to accept the requirement of the Non-Proliferation Act, including
renegotiation of the Agreement to give the United States enhanced rights as a matter of
international law. It has thus been suggested that India's rejection of perpetuity of
safeguards and reprocessing consent rights under the U.S.-India Agreement may have
constituted anticipatory repudiation on India's part and, thus, a material breach of the
Agreement. It follows that the United States could then maintain its rights, or to suspend
its obligation to supply India without waiving its rights. See Milhollin, supra note 220, at
606.
However, the United States appears to have recognized that, if it had materially
breached the Agreement and a related agreement for supply to the Tarapur reactor, India
might have been discharged from its obligations under article 60(2) of the Vienna
Convention. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 60, para. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346. In
1980, the Carter Administration represented to Congress that the U.S. failure to supply
nuclear material to India pursuant to arrangements for the supply of the Tarapur reactor
might be seen by India as a material breach of the agreement which, in turn, would give
India the right to terminate its nonproliferation obligations. See id. at 447 n.161 (citing
State Department Fact Sheet (June 19, 1980), reprinted in 80 Dep't St. Bull. 67 (Aug.
1980)), 448 n.168 (citing Executive Order 12218, 45 Fed. Reg. 41,625 (1980)). Accordingly,
the United States arranged for France to replace it as supplier to India for Thrapur under
agreements in which India agreed that French supply was within the framework of the
original agreement. See Milhollin, supra note 220, at 601 (citing Cable New Delhi 22789
(Nov. 29, 1982) and Diplomatic Note to India from the United states (Nov. 30, 1982) (on
file with the State Department)).
228. Article X of the Agreement provides that it "shall remain in force for a period of
thirty (30) years." U.S.-India Agreement, supra note 221, art. X. Since the Agreement's
termination in 1993, it does not appear that India has directly challenged the U.S. position
by reprocessing the spent fuel without first requesting U.S. consent. It appears India has,
temporarily at least, skirted a direct conflict with the United States by securing enriched
uranium from China to run the Tarapur reactor rather than reprocessing its fuel subject to
the U.S.-India Agreement. India Buying Chinese Uranium, Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1995, at
A29. India, of course, has not accepted fullscope IAEA safeguards, but because the PRC
is not yet a NSG member, the PRC has not accepted the fullscope safeguards as a
condition of new supply. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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cluded at a time when IAEA safeguards agreements did not
explicitly provide for the perpetual application of safeguards.
Thus, if the U.S. position on perpetuity with respect to its agree-
ments for cooperation is sustainable, then it might suggest that pre-
GOV/1621 -9 safeguards agreements might also be amenable to the
construction that they too establish rights in perpetuity, despite
their failure to do so expressly.
Admittedly, post-GOV/1621, non-NPT safeguards agreements
secured perpetual application of safeguards on nuclear material
transferred to a recipient through the duration clause. But this
does not mean that the same or comparable results could not have
been achieved through different legal techniques. For example,
non-NPT safeguards agreements could have included a clause
defining the residual safeguards to be applied after termination on
the Albania model.230 Or, as has been suggested with respect to
the U.S. position on Tarapur, 31 safeguards on material supplied
while an agreement was in effect might have been maintainable on
the basis of the probable intent of the parties. Finally, such a con-
clusion might have been based on general principles of treaty law
articulated in article 70 of the Vienna Convention. 232
On this view, the modification of non-NPT safeguards agree-
ments to provide expressly for perpetuity through a perpetual
duration clause could be viewed as drafting ex abundanti cautela,
belying the ancient maxim that an excess of caution can do no
harm. Moreover, if indefinite duration clauses were included in
non-NPT safeguards agreements solely to confirm a result that
would flow from interpretation, it may well be that the failure to
include a similar duration concept in NPT safeguards agreements
does not mean that NPT safeguards agreements should be con-
strued not to provide for perpetuity. And the express method of
doing so, providing for an indefinite duration, might have seemed
anomalous in an NPT safeguards agreement (given that the raison
d'tre of NPT safeguards is the NPT, and thus the normal and natu-
ral duration of such safeguards agreements is the duration of the
NPT). By parity of reasoning, the inclusion of an explicit provision
for perpetuity in the Albania Safeguards Agreement233 could also
be seen as over-cautious drafting by the IAEA, motivated in part
229. See supra note 198.
230. See discussion supra notes 200-201.
231. See discussion supra notes 221-227.
232. See discussion supra notes 163-184.
233. See discussion supra notes 201-202.
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by India's reluctance to accept the U.S. claim that its rights under
the U.S.-India Agreement would survive the termination of the
agreement. Accordingly, the IAEA's failure to provide expressly
for perpetuity might not have been seen as a waiver of rights it
might have pursuant to article 70 of the Vienna Convention and
customary international law.
One does not, however, need to draw all the possible inferences
from the U.S. theory of perpetual rights under its agreements for
peaceful nuclear cooperation to recognize that suppliers are moti-
vated, not only by the legal requirements of the NPT, but also by
the nonproliferation policies and concerns which led to IAEA safe-
guards and the NPT in the first place, to seek complete information
on whether the material and equipment they have supplied have
been, or could be, used for nuclear weapons. Indeed, the United
States appears never to have asserted that its legal position vis-a-
vis Tarapur is mandated by article 111(2) of the NPT. Yet supplier
interests in assuring that safeguards are in fact applied, as required
by article 111(2), cannot be irrelevant to the interpretation of the
IAEA safeguards system established to fulfill the requirements of
articles III(1) and (IV) of the NPT. Hence, the safeguards estab-
lished by the IAEA to fulfill safeguards requirements under the
NPT should be interpreted in such a manner as to allow supplier
state parties to the NPT to ensure that their NPT obligations are
fulfilled. Would, for example, the Russian Federation, on the
assumption that it succeeded to the obligation of the former Soviet
Union as supplier to the DPRK,2 4 be comfortable with never
being able to verify whether the DPRK misused Soviet-supplied
234. The answer to this question is not entirely clear. Whether the former Soviet
Union's obligations would survive at all is a complex and much disputed issue. Compare
Edwin D. Williamson & John E. Osborn, A U.S. Perspective on Treaty Succession and
Related Issues in the Wake of the Breakup of the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia, 33 Va. J. Int'l
L. 261, 266 n.12, 267 (1993) (former Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State
favoring automatic and exclusive Russian succession to the NWS obligations of the Soviet
Union under the NPT, but succession of all the successor states to the Soviet seat at the
IAEA) with Detlev F. Vagts, State Succession: The Codifiers' View, 33 Va. J. Int'l L. 275,
292 (1993) (lead draftsman for relevant sections of the Restatement (Third) Foreign
Relations questioning the proposal for automatic succession, but suggesting an exception
for codificatory treaties and, questionably, locating the LTBT in that category) and George
Bunn & John B. Rhinelander, The Arms Control Obligations of the Former Soviet Union,
33 Va. J. Int'l L. 323, 335 (1993) (noting that the Russian Federation freely accepted its
status as single NWS successor of the Soviet Union, but the other successor states have not
accepted membership in the NPT); see also Lucinda Love, Note, International Agreement
Obligations After the Soviet Union's Break-Up: Current United States Practice and Its
Consistency with International Law, 26 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 373, 478-401 (1993).
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nuclear material to launch a nuclear weapons program?235 Thus,
while it would seem too much a stretch to argue that supplier states
are third-party beneficiaries of the safeguards agreements between
the IAEA and NPT parties,23 6 it would seem plausible, in light of
the U.S. position and the concerns of other suppliers, that third-
party interests must inform the interpretation of the safeguards
agreements. 237 Recognition of this supplier interest does not, how-
ever, compel the conclusion that the NPT safeguards agreements
must be construed to require full perpetuity, since only the produc-
tion of information through inspections sufficient to vindicate the
good faith performance by the supplier of its obligation not to
export in the absence of safeguards would be necessary to achieve
that end. Thus, a more limited claim of perpetuity that would per-
mit determination by international inspectors that evasion of safe-
guards, if any, was the responsibility of the recipient state would
serve the interests of the supplier in determining how better to
comply with its NPT export obligations without unknowingly facili-
tating nuclear proliferation. Would fullscope safeguards in
perpetuity be necessary to accomplish this end? Probably not, if
special inspections necessary to resolve any significant loose ends
would do the job.3
235. Would other NPT parties have an interest in knowing whether evidence in the
safeguarded state reveals that the exporter knew or should have known of unsafeguarded
use of the material exported, and may itself have breached article MI(2). and perhaps
article I, of the NPT?
236. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention provides that:
A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the
treaty intend the provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a
group of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents
thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated,
unless the treaty otherwise provides.
Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 36, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 341; see also supra note 49
(application of this rule as a matter of customary international law, including with respect
to agreements involving an international organization).
237. For example, in terms of the relationship between the IAEA and the safeguarded
state, would the safeguarded state be free to waive the IAEA's duty to perform its
safeguards obligations? Could the safeguarded state thus defeat its duty to comply with a
request for a special inspection by waiving its rights to the verification of its activities?
Such an analysis would ignore the fundamental interests of supplier states in verification
pursuant to the terms of the safeguards agreement of the recipient, nuclear activities, so
long as the treaty for safeguards remains in force, and thus defeat the object and purpose
of the safeguards agreement. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31, para. 1. 1155
U.N.T.S. at 340 (interpretation must be "in light of" the agreement's "object and
purpose").
238. This Article asserts that rights to special inspections, if legitimately sought before a
state seeks to exercise its right to withdraw, survive the effective date of withdrawal. See
infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. If correct, then the question is posed whether
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B. Perpetuity Under the NPT
While the safeguards agreement implements the NPT, the NPT
itself is also an independent source of rights and duties vis-a-vis the
safeguarded state. If the IAEA is unable or unwilling to assert that
its right to a special inspection under the terms of the safeguards
agreement survives a state's withdrawal from the NPT, it may still
be the case that the parties to the NPT, individually or collectively,
may be entitled to exercise safeguards rights after withdrawal
based on the same rationale that would support post-withdrawal
fights under the NPT safeguards agreement, either as third-party
beneficiaries of the IAEA's rights under the safeguards agree-
ment 239 or directly under the NPT.2 40
Although the precise contours of such a right would need to be
elaborated, it arguably could be understood as the functional
equivalent of a special inspection to which the IAEA might be
entitled if it asserted a right under article 70 of the Vienna Conven-
tion and customary international law. That is, the parties would be
entitled to the information which led the IAEA to request a special
inspection. The parties could then formulate their own positions
on the types of inspections necessary to ascertain whether a state
had complied with its article III obligations under the NPT, obliga-
tions which prevent a state from diverting nuclear material from
peaceful purposes. But if the IAEA Board of Governors has not
requested a special inspection, and if the IAEA Director General
has not pursued a path leading to a request for such authorization
from the Board of Governors, there would not appear to be a basis
for further demands by the parties.
the right to all special inspections so requested survives. A reasonable factual inference
might be drawn that an attempt to withdraw following a request for a special inspection is
designed to conceal evidence which an inspection might uncover. However, a contrary
inference might be drawn when a state seeks to withdraw and only then the IAEA seeks a
special inspection. Such an inspection might be part of an effort to intrude in legitimate
sovereign affairs, such as activities related to national self-defense taken after the effective
date of withdrawal to respond to the security threat that motivated a state's initial decision
to withdraw. Ultimately, the temporal center of gravity for a request for a special
inspection would need to be located on one side of the divide established when a state
gives notice of its intent to withdraw.
239. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 36, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 341.
240. The article III(1) duty under the NPT to apply safeguards on all peaceful nuclear
activities begs the question of what are safeguards. INFCIRC/153, supra note 23, gives a




C. Safeguards as a Remedy for Breach
It may also be that, if rights to inspections under the NPT safe-
guards agreement and the NPT-even for the limited purpose
advanced above-do not survive withdrawal from the NPT, post-
withdrawal inspections would serve as the appropriate remedy for
the breach of noncompliance with the Agency's special inspection
request. The difficulty with this suggestion is that special inspec-
tions may be necessary to establish the fact of a material breach.
Perhaps if the failure to comply is only with the special inspection
request itself, then the IAEA or the parties to the NPT would be
entitled to an appropriate remedy. Yet, although international law
generally requires restoration of the status quo ante as the remedy
for breach,4 1 reliance on the vagaries of a remedial rule in so sensi-
tive an area as NPT safeguards may well be the proverbial "weak
reed."
VII. SummARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This Article has considered three possible approaches for assess-
ing the availability of a legal claim under the NPT in favor of con-
tinuing rights to international inspection in the event a state seeks
to exercise its right to withdraw from the NPT. Under one
approach, the right to withdraw is not plenary and, therefore, may
not permit a withdrawal intended to terminate inspection rights
that would otherwise yield evidence concerning whether a state
had breached its NPT or NPT-safeguards related obligations.
Under another equally extreme approach, a state may withdraw
from the NPT under virtually any circumstances, but its withdrawal
would not have the effect of terminating the right to apply safe-
guards on any material that had been subject to safeguards by vir-
tue of the operation of the NPT. An intermediate position, the one
advanced here as the most plausible in terms of the NPT and its
safeguards instruments, would accept that withdrawal is not subject
to meaningful third-party review, except through the political judg-
ments and instruments available to the U.N. Security Council.
While as a general proposition the safeguards rights generated
under the NPT through the IAEA safeguards agreement would
terminate upon the effective date of withdrawal, the right to a spe-
cial inspection requested while the withdrawing state was still a
241. See generally, Zoller, supra note 96, at 63-64 (1984) (relying on the PCIJ's opinion
in the Chorzow Factory Case).
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party to the NPT, in order to verify whether nuclear material sub-
ject to safeguards was diverted from peaceful use would survive.
The fate of the NPT now hangs in the balance. The 1995 Exten-
sion Conference will allow a majority of the parties the opportunity
to select among three legally permissible options: (1) indefinite
extension; (2) extension for a fixed period (presumably amounting
to a termination of the treaty as of a date certain); and (3) exten-
sion for a series of fixed periods (presumably, including some pro-
cedural mechanism for allowing a majority of the parties to effect a
decision to move into a new period).242 This suggests that the par-
ties to the NPT may well be under some pressure to make a deci-
sion about the fate of the Treaty when critical questions raised by
the North Korean situation remain unanswered. Such questions
could undermine the willingness of the parties to extend the Treaty
indefinitely.
Conceivably, a solution to this conundrum can be found by
extending the Treaty for an indefinite duration by advancing a non-
restrictive interpretation of the Treaty language permitting exten-
sion for "fixed periods." In 1989, then General Counsel to the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Thomas Gra-
ham, argued that article X excludes the possibility of extending the
Treaty subject to new substantive conditions, such as requirements
for a comprehensive test ban or legally binding security assurances,
since this would amount to de facto amendment of the Treaty.
Indeed, such a substantive condition, in effect amending the NPT,
would conflict with the express requirement of article VII(2) that
entry into force of an amendment for each state shall be subject to
its own consent, the approval of a majority of the parties, and the
unanimous approval of the NWS's of the NPT and the IAEA
Board of Governors.243 Graham has also recently argued that the
procedural mechanism for moving from one successive period to
the next such period cannot amount to a de novo extension confer-
ence in which the parties are authorized to make each of the three
choices permitted in the one extension conference contemplated
242. See Thomas Graham, Jr., The Duration of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation reaty:
Sudden Death or New Lease on Life?, 29 Va. J. Int'l L. 661, 666 (1989).
243. Id. at 667.
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by the Treaty?'" This view has been criticized, however, as unnec-
essarily inflexible and not required by the text of the NPT. 45
The imminence of the conference also accentuates the need to
resolve the legal issues involved in the North Korean situation,
given that states will be reticent to develop or finalize their posi-
tions concerning long-term extension of the NPT when fundamen-
tal questions concerning its durability or efficacy have been so
plainly exposed. In addition, states may also be concerned with the
instability created by the potential acquisition by certain states of
nuclear weapons or nuclear material from the former Soviet
Union.
244. But see Thomas Graham, The Extension of the NPT, Statement By Mr. Thomas
Graham, Jr., Acting Deputy Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before
the American Bar Association and Center For National Security Law Conference On
NonProliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington, D.C., June 10, 1994, at 3
(on fie with author) [hereinafter Graham Statement]. In that statement, Graham argued
that
while there does exist some ambiguity as to what would constitute an acceptable
transition mechanism, even here it is possible to determine the parameters of
what would conform with the treaty negotiators' intent. Renewal absent a
decision by a majority of the parties to terminate would conform. Convening
another extension conference which would offer a range of extension options
would not.
Id.
245. William Epstein & Paul C. Szasz, Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. A Means of Strengthening the Treaty, 33 Va. J. Int'l L 735,756 (1993) (suggesting
that "a majority [of the parties] could also provide for a single extension at the end of
which the parties would again be able to select one of the options set forth in article
X(2)"). However, it does seem clear from the Epstein/Smsz formulation that any option
which confers upon an individual state a unilateral right to withdraw is foreclosed. Such a
mechanism would conflict with the precise standard set forth in article X(1) for the
circumstances under which to exercise the unilateral right to withdraw. Furthermore, it
would conflict with the express rejection of an Italian proposal to amend the original U.S.-
Soviet draft of article X, which provided that the treaty "shall be automatically extended
for terms equal to its initial duration for those governments which, subject to six months'
notice, shall have made known their intention to withdraw." Graham, supra note 242, at
671 (citing Shaker, supra note 58, at 860 (citing U.N. Doc. END CIPV.350 (1967), para. 9));
see also Mary Elizabeth Hoinkes, Correspondence, Epstein and Szasz Do the NPT No
Favor, 34 Va. J. Int'l L. 247 (1993) (Statement by the Acting General Counsel, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency; asserting that the third option in article X(2) is
unambiguous and that the extension permitted by the Epstein and Szasz approach would
require parliamentary recommendation for many NPT parties); see George Bunn,
Extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty* Legal Questions Faced by the Parties in 1995, 2
Issue Papers on World Conferences (American Society of International Law) 44-53 (1994).
But see William Epstein & Paul C. Szasz, Correspondence, Hoinkes Could Jeopardize the
Future of the NPT, 34 Va. J. Int'l L. 471 (1994) (criticizing Hoinkes for finding, where none
can be found, a plain meaning in article X(2)).
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Yet, a failure by the majority of the parties to record a choice on
the fate of the NPT would not terminate the Treaty. 46 Indeed, it
will be theoretically possible for the Conference to remain open, in
other words to convene but not adjourn sine die, so that the period
of decision could be extended.2 47 Accordingly, any substantial
questions concerning the stability of the NPT regime that are
weighty enough to cause a majority of state parties to defer a final
decision on the terms of extension would not immediately have the
legal effect of terminating the NPT.
Moreover, to the extent the North Korean case highlights an
inadequacy in the NPT safeguards regime, article VIII of the
Treaty provides an amendment process for addressing such a prob-
lem. Nothing precludes the parties to the NPT from calling for a
conference for the amendment of the NPT or even holding such a
conference as a dual extension/amendment conference. But the
technical difficulty of securing practical amendments without
allowing the process to snowball into a virtually new drafting ses-
sion suggests that amendments should not be sought.
Yet, clearly, legal questions concerning the legitimacy of IAEA
special inspections or use of government information to conduct
such inspection, or the survival of international rights to inspect the
suspect sites in the DPRK even after its withdrawal from the NPT,
would be legitimate subjects for a statement by the conference of
the Parties to the NPT. Such a statement would yield an authorita-
tive interpretation of the Treaty and the safeguards agreement it
requires that would not conflict with the provisions for amend-
ments pursuant to article VIII(2).
However postured procedurally, interpreting article X of the
NPT and the related safeguards agreement to permit the survival
of a limited right to inspect, for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the withdrawing state had breached its obligations under
the safeguards agreement or the NPT, would serve the fundamen-
tal purposes of the NPT-safeguards regime by reducing the incen-
tive to withdraw as a means for concealing noncompliance. It may
well be that the withdrawal is motivated to conceal past violations
of safeguards which would be politically embarrassing to the with-
drawing state, withdrawal or could be motivated by some other
246. Graham, supra note 242, at 668.
247. But see Graham Statement, supra note 244, at 3 (stating, but without citing any
authority or identifying a precise temporal constraint, that the extension conference would
"not be authorized to adjourn itself for a lengthy period of time in lieu of taking a decision
on extension, as this would amount to a circumvention of Article X.2").
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reason that would not necessarily imply a final decision by a state
to develop a nuclear weapons capability.248 If, however, with-
drawal from the NPT means that a state has embarked on the path
of developing nuclear weapons, it might be argued that whether
the state complied with its safeguards obligations while the treaty
was in force would be essentially moot. Yet, even if a state is with-
drawing from the NPT in order to pursue a nuclear weapons pro-
gram, it would be relevant to the international community's
understanding of the threat to international peace and security
posed by that withdrawal to know the degree to which the with-
drawing state had succeeded in developing a covert nuclear pro-
gram. It would be equally important to NFT parties to assess the
effectiveness of safeguards to determine the scope of
unsafeguarded activities in withdrawing states and the means by
which safeguards had been circumvented. 2 49
A clear statement by the NPT parties might also facilitate the
survival of a legal framework around which to conduct a debate
concerning the legitimacy of a state's withdrawal on a principled
basis. This would avoid the premature escalation of a conflict into
a raw contest of political power. Finally, in the event that interna-
tional sanctions become necessary under the authority of chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, securing international support for a find-
ing that there exist a threat to the peace by reason of a state's with-
drawal from the NPT would be garnered more easily if grounded
on the specific facts concerning a possible breach of the NPT (or its
related safeguards obligations), rather than a withdrawal for the
purpose of developing a nuclear weapons capability. Thus framed,
the case for sanctions would be more persuasive to NPT parties
concerned about presenting their own right to withdraw in the
event their "supreme national interests" so require.
248. See, e.g., supra note 90.
249. Iraq violations, for example, played a critical role in initiating new proposals for
improvements in the safeguards system, i.e., special inspections, improved intelligence
cooperation, early reporting on design, reporting on imports and exports of nuclear
material, and efforts among suppliers to supplement the NPT system by enhancing
international cooperation in export control beyond those mandated by the NFT. See
Chauvistr6, supra note 30, at 23-24. Perhaps the most constructive result has been the
expansion of the Nuclear Supplier Group Guidelines to include dual use export control,
see INFCIRC/254 (pt. II); IABA Doe. INFCIRCr254/Rev. l/Part 2 (July 1992), supra note
217, and the supplier statement of adoption of fullscope safeguards as a condition of major,
new nuclear supply, see Statement on Full-Scope Safeguards Adopted by the Adherents to
the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC405 (May 1992), supra note 218.
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At the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the parties could
seize the opportunity presented by the final conference statement
to shed some clarifying light on these and other questions.210 The
dilemma, of course, is reconciling the competing agendas of secur-
ing the extension of the NPT and ensuring an extended NPT is
secure. Flexibility in assessing the possible legal options for the
duration of an extended NPT, and for establishing a time frame for
making the decision on extension (in other words, the duration of
the Extension Conference), would obviate treating the conference
as a sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of the NPT parties
as they seek to resolve the North Korean imbroglio. But ignoring
that need to reexamine the question of the survival of safeguards
after withdrawal from the NPT would ensure that North Korea's
withdrawal will serve as an invitation for others to follow suit. Pru-
dence might counsel the path of least resistance, thus avoiding a
confrontation that could rock the foundations of the NPT. Indeed,
pursuing a course that avoids these mines could lead to the Treaty's
indefinite extension. But would such an emasculated treaty serve
any real purpose?
250. A Task Force of the Council on Foreign Relations has in fact recommended, among
other things, that "the IAEA should, within the context of existing safeguards agreements,
expand the envelope of its activities at undeclared locations, including greater use of
special inspections (so that they become more 'normal' than 'special') .. ." and [c]onsistent
with a more expansive view of IAEA activities, the IAEA should propose to undertake
'challenge inspections' that could be initiated, at TAEA discretion, upon a complaint from
an aggrieved state ... ." Nuclear Proliferation: Confronting the New Challenges, 25
(Report of an Independent Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation) (1995).
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